

Global Television News and Foreign Policy: Debating the CNN Effect

EYTAN GILBOA
Bar-Ilan University

This study investigates the origins and development of the cable news network (CNN) effect hypothesis. It reveals an ongoing debate among politicians, officials, and journalists who are involved in the political processes that this hypothesis attempts to explain, and also among scholars who have been studying it. Debates have been conducted both within and among these groups on the meaning and validity of the CNN effect, but none has contributed significantly to resolving the issue. On the contrary, these debates have presented contradicting statements that have only created confusion and misunderstanding. This study presents lessons from the decade-long effort to explore the CNN effect and projects a new agenda for more useful approaches towards different effects of global communication, apart from those covered by the present controversial hypothesis.

Keywords: foreign policy making, humanitarian military intervention, diplomacy, CNN, global communication, television news, media effects

Global television news became a reality in the early 1980s when the cable news network (CNN) expanded broadcasting to many parts of the world (Whittemore, 1990). Innovations in communication technologies, including satellites and cable television, enabled CNN to broadcast news around the clock and around the globe. It was not until the 1990–1991 Gulf conflict, however, that CNN became a significant actor in international relations (Smith, 1991; Wiener, 1991; Friedland, 1992). Hachten (1998:146) placed the importance of CNN's coverage of the Gulf conflict in historical context: "During the American Civil War in 1861–1865, the demand for news was so great that U.S. newspapers went to 7-day publication. During the 1963 Kennedy assassination, live television emerged as the preeminent medium for reporting breaking news. Such events positioned ABC, CBS, and NBC as major news gatherers but still essentially American media. During the 42-day Gulf War, CNN established the importance of a 24-h news network with true global reach." CNN's success in covering the Gulf conflict inspired other broadcasting organizations, such as BBC World Television, which already had a world radio network, NBC, Sky, and Fox News, to establish similar global networks. The creation of non-

Author's note: The author wrote this work while serving as a Fellow at the Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University. For making valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article he thanks the Center's Director Alex S. Jones, Thomas E. Patterson, Bradlee Professor of Government and the Press at the Shorenstein Center; Richard N. Kaplan, former president of CNN-US, and Ambassador Jonathan Moore, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. The author also thanks Caroline Cooper and Parker Everett for their research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2004 annual convention of the International Studies Association in Montreal.

Western news networks, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia, has further expanded and diversified global television news.

CNN's growth and diversification including the creation of CNN International in 1985 and coverage of dramatic events that occurred in the post-Cold War era drew considerable attention. These events include the Chinese government crackdown on student protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in June 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the democratization of Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, the 1990–1991 Gulf conflict, the Russian coup attempt of August 1991, humanitarian interventions caused by civil wars in Northern Iraq/Kurdistan (1991), Somalia (1992–1994), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1992–1995), and Kosovo (1999), the September 11 terror attacks in the U.S. (2001), and the wars in Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003). The expansion of CNN and other global news networks has affected many facets of global communication and international relations including communication technology, economics, culture, law, public opinion, politics, and diplomacy, as well as issues such as warfare, terrorism, human rights, environment, refugees, health, morality, and ethics (Volkmer, 1999; Hachten and Scotton, 2002; McPhail, 2002; Seib, 2002a, b; Collins, 2004). In the 1980s, these effects attracted only limited attention both in the academic and the professional communities, but CNN's coverage of the Gulf conflict changed this approach.

The emergence of CNN as a major influential global news network produced a new communication approach to international relations known as the “CNN effect theory.” This “theory” has never been properly defined and it is highly questionable whether it is at all a theory or just an attractive neologism. In the early phase of the interest in this effect, it was also called the “CNN complex,” “CNN curve,” and the “CNN factor,” and it meant different things to policy makers, journalists, and scholars. It would have been much more appropriate to view this effect as a set of assertions made by representatives of the three groups or as a hypothesis that needs to be tested and verified across time, events, and issues. The CNN effect became a subject for debate and analysis in many conferences and symposia. It attracted research funding and was the topic of numerous articles and books. Yet policy makers, journalists, and scholars could not agree on what the CNN effect meant, whether it existed or not, and if it existed, whether it positively or negatively contributed to international relations and foreign policy making.

The popularity of the CNN effect and the attention it has received in all circles, including the policy making and media communities, and its consequences for both policy making and research, call for a study of the effect's origins and development. This study attempts to answer the following questions: What exactly is the CNN effect? What were the circumstances behind the emergence of the concept? How have policy makers, journalists, and scholars approached and used the hypothesis? After more than 10 years of discussion, debate, and research, what do we know about the CNN effect? And where do we go from here? Which research directions and strategies should scholars adopt to investigate the effects of global Western and non-Western networks, not just those of CNN?

In order to answer these questions, this study systematically and critically analyzes major statements and studies published on the subject since the 1990–1991 Gulf conflict by policy makers, journalists, and scholars. The results reveal an ongoing debate inside and among each of these groups on the validity of the CNN effect hypothesis. These exchanges, however, have not yet contributed significantly to resolving the issue. On the contrary, these debates have presented contradicting statements that have only created confusion and misunderstanding. This study concludes that no sufficient evidence has yet been presented to validate the CNN effect hypothesis, that its effects have been highly exaggerated, and that the focus on this concept has deflected and diverted attention from significant effects global television does have on other issues of international relations and mass communication. The first section of this article traces the concept's origins and then doc-

uments major debates among policy makers, journalists, and scholars. The last section presents lessons and a research agenda for future studies on the effects of global communication.

The Concept's origins and Meanings

The term CNN effect first appeared in the U.S. during the 1991 Gulf War. The first uses of the term in newspapers referred to the adverse psychological, economic, and financial consequences of CNN's war coverage.¹ In an interview conducted shortly after the war's outbreak and published in *The Washington Post*, psychologist James Turner employed the term *CNN complex* to describe "news addiction": "We are concerned about people getting virtually addicted to news" he told the Associated Press, "afraid to miss every little thing that might happen" (23 January 1991:B1). It was natural for a psychologist to employ the adjective "complex," while experts in business and politics preferred the term "effect." Thus, John Rohs, a lodging industry analyst, lamented the economic consequences of the war coverage. He told *The New York Times* that "Restaurants, hotels, and gaming establishments seem to be suffering from the *CNN effect*. People are intensely interested in the first real-time war in history and they are just planting themselves in front of the TV" (28 January 1991:A12).

Between 1991 and 1994, the term CNN effect appeared in very different political and cultural contexts. For management experts "the term CNN effect described the changing attitudes of the international community, which gets more information faster than ever before with much of that information being about trends in the U.S." (Pahl, 1994). A computer security expert told participants at an information warfare conference that the CNN effect occurs when "false news is injected into a news source" (Johnston, 1996). This unique reference probably resulted from reports on manipulations of CNN by both Saddam Hussein and military commanders of the coalition forces during the 1990–1991 Gulf conflict. In 1999, however, a Russian officer, General Valery Minilov, echoed the same idea in his response to criticism of the Russian military activities against Chechens: the protests by "senior American and British officials, including Tony Blair, were based on the 'CNN effect' and misinformation. They are making political statements based on information that has not been verified, has not been proved, but is spread on a mass scale" (Aris, 1999).

Analyses of political and diplomatic references to the CNN effect reveal two definitions: facilitating instant communication between states and leaders, and forcing leaders to adopt policies that they would not make otherwise. The definition of instant communication first appeared in connection with the pressure real-time coverage exerts on the military.² In March 1991, Adam Shell (1991) quoted a U.S. public relations officer who served in the Gulf War: "From a public relations standpoint, instant communications—the *CNN effect*—has made a tough job even tougher. Information that once took days to transmit is now broadcast live as it happens." Commentators applied this version to diplomacy, not only to warfare. Writing on the 1991 Russian coup attempt, David Hoffman (1991) observed: "In many ways, the global communications network has become more important for the conduct of diplomacy than traditional cables and emissaries." He cited a policy maker in Washington who admitted: "diplomatic communications just cannot keep up with CNN." Livingston (1997) and Seib (1997) also emphasized this point.

¹I employed Lexis–Nexis and Dow Jones Interactive to identify the first references to the term in all types of publications.

²I employed the list of "peer-reviewed publications" of Proquest Research Library and Dow Jones Interactive to identify the first references to the CNN effect in academic and professional publications.

The “policy forcing” definition of the CNN effect first appeared in connection with the Kurdish rebellion against Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. At first, the U.S. and Britain were reluctant to assist the Kurds, but several commentators and scholars argued that CNN’s coverage of Saddam’s atrocities forced them to reverse their policy. An editorial published in *The Independent* (London) shortly after the beginning of the operation observed: “public opinion, shaped by newspaper, radio, and television coverage, has set the pace and *forced* the politicians to toughen their line and take action to succor the Kurds” (13 April 1991:14). In July 1991, veteran broadcast correspondent Daniel Schorr (1991:23) also argued: “within a two-week period, the president had been *forced*, under the impact of what Americans and Europeans were seeing on television, to reconsider his hasty withdrawal of troops from Iraq.”

In the last decade, the CNN effect has been mostly associated with “policy forcing.” Livingston and Eachus (1995:413), for example, defined it “as elite decision makers’ loss of policy control to news media.” Seib (2002a:27) wrote that the CNN effect “is presumed to illustrate the dynamic tension that exists between real-time television news and policymaking, with the news having the upper hand in terms of influence.” Several journalists and scholars including O’Neill (1993), Ammon (2001), and Edwards (2001) expanded the scope of the CNN effect and argued that global television coverage has completely transformed world politics. Ammon and Edwards even suggested new paradigms—“telediplomcy” and “mediapolitik”—to study this transformation (Gilboa, 2005). Policy makers, journalists, and scholars argued that the CNN effect forced policy makers to intervene in humanitarian disasters, or that it altered decision-making processes in defense and foreign affairs. Other representatives of the three groups suggested the opposite and claimed that other factors were responsible for humanitarian military interventions, and that global news networks did not alter the fundamental relations between media and government. A third group argued that the CNN effect has been highly exaggerated.³

Debates I: Policy Makers

Senior policy makers addressed the CNN effect in official statements, interviews, and memoirs.⁴ In May 1993, then U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Madeline Albright (1993), spoke about the crisis in Bosnia and offered the first official American explanation of the CNN effect: “Every day we witness the challenge of collective security on television—some call it the *CNN effect*,” she told a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “Aggression and atrocities are beamed into our living rooms and cars with astonishing immediacy. No civilized human being can learn of these horrid acts occurring on a daily basis and stand aloof from them.” In October 1993 she repeated the same theme in a testimony about the crisis in Somalia before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Sharkey, 1993:18–19). Referring to the pictures of starved and dying Somalis and of a dead American soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu she said: “Television’s ability to bring graphic images of pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both for immediate engagement in areas of international crisis and im-

³In 1993, the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center published a special issue of the *Media Studies Journal* titled “Global News after the Cold War,” and a briefing paper titled “The Media and Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World.” The same institution, in collaboration with Wilton Park, organized a policy-oriented center in Britain, a conference titled: “The Media and International Affairs after the Cold War” (Hopkinson, 1993). Wilton Park further pursued the subject in conferences and reports (Hopkinson, 1995).

⁴A few years after the founding of CNN, Lloyd Cutler (1984:223), President Carter’s legal Counsel, was surprised by “how much television news had intruded into both the timing and the substance of the policy decisions that an America president is required to make.” This observation primarily stemmed from the frustration the Carter Administration experienced with television coverage of the 1979–1981 Iranian Hostage Crisis.

mediate disengagement when events do not go according to plan. Because we live in a democratic society, none of us can be oblivious to those pressures." Neuman (1996:15–16) called this phenomenon—the forcing of both entry and withdrawal—"the CNN curve."

When asked to comment on factors that changed foreign policy making, former Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, emphasized the importance of the CNN effect: "The public hears of an event now in real time, before the State Department has had time to think about it. Consequently, we find ourselves reacting before we have had time to think. This is now the way we determine foreign policy—its driven more by the daily events reported on TV than it used to be" (Pearce, 1995:18). Former Secretary of State, James Baker III (1995:103), also emphasized the CNN effect. In his memoir he wrote: "The terrible tragedy of Tiananmen was a classic demonstration of a powerful new phenomenon: the ability of the global communications revolution to drive policy." He added that since then "in Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Chechnya, among others, the real-time coverage of conflict by the electronic media has served to create a powerful new imperative for prompt action that was not present in less frenetic time."

Baker further elaborated on this conclusion in an interview with Marvin Kalb (1996:7): "The 'CNN effect' has revolutionized the way policy makers have to approach their jobs, particularly in the foreign-policy arena." Baker identified three CNN effects, two negative and one positive. The negative effects are the need to respond quickly to events that do not allow sufficient time to consider policy options, and the need to cope with television's attempts to determine national interest. The positive effect is the option of using CNN to communicate directly with foreign leaders. During the 1991 Gulf crisis, Baker delivered the last ultimatum to Saddam Hussein through CNN, and not through the U.S. ambassador to Iraq (Neuman, 1996:2). When she was secretary of state, Madeleine Albright agreed with Baker on the two negative effects, but described the positive effect as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it allows officials to know in real time what is going on in the world and to communicate fast with foreign leaders (Kralev, 2001:105). On the other hand, "it makes you have to respond to events much faster than it might be prudent." Reports may be inaccurate and officials do not have time to put them in a proper context, and consequently the response is based on "a little nugget of fact, and when you learn the context later, things change."

Several high-ranking American foreign-policy officials made even more assertive statements on the CNN effect. A former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, John Shattuck, wrote: "The media got us into Somalia and then got us out" (1996:174). Another former Assistant Secretary of State and U.S. envoy to the former Yugoslavia, Richard Holbrooke (1999), also credited media coverage for the Western intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo. Non-American officials have expressed similar opinions. Former U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in 1995: "Pictures relayed around the world by CNN have led people to demand that their governments, through the UN, take action" (Epstein, 1995). He is also quoted as complaining that "CNN is the sixteenth member of the Security Council" (Minear, Scott, and Weiss, 1996:4). Former British Foreign Secretary David Owen (1996:308) observed that media's calls for intervention in civil wars are not new, but "what is different today is the 'CNN effect.' The TV camera in Sarajevo recording minute by minute, hour by hour, day by day, in real-time ... conveys an immediacy and has an impact that no newspaper ... carries."

Another former British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd (1997:11), blamed foreign correspondents covering the Bosnian crisis for advocating military intervention by being the founding members of the "something must be done" school. Hurd, American leaders, and world leaders referred to reporters who were critical of Western inaction in humanitarian crises, such as when CNN's Christiane Aman-

pour confronted and lectured President Bill Clinton in a live telecast of the program "Global Forum" from Sarajevo in May 1994:

As a leader of the free world, as leader of the only superpower, why has it taken you, the United States, so long to articulate a policy on Bosnia? Why, in the absence of policy, have you allowed the U.S. and the West to be held hostage to those who do have a clear policy, the Bosnian Serbs? And do you not think the constant flip-flop of your administration on the issue of Bosnia sets a very dangerous precedent and would lead people such as Kim Il Sung or other strong people to take you less seriously than you would like to be taken? (Ricchiardi, 1996:25)

The stunned Clinton responded "No, but speeches like that may make them take me less seriously than I'd like to be taken." This was not a standard interview. Rather, it resembled a debate between two politicians where the journalist was not simply asking questions but attempting to push for a particular policy (Dobbs, 1995; Seib, 2002a:53–54).⁵

Statements made by senior officials and incidents such as Amanpour's lecture may imply a loss of policy control to global television, as if leaders can no longer make decisions on the basis of interests, but are driven by emotional public opinion aroused by television coverage. Yet, politicians and senior policy makers have offered diverse and often contradicting views on this claim. In a policy meeting, held on 17 July 1995, Clinton was quoted as saying: "We have a war by CNN. Our position is unsustainable; it's killing the U.S. position of strength in the world" (Woodward, 1991:261; Morris, 1999:95). However, Clinton only talked about media "pressure" to intervene militarily in Bosnia. Although he was sensitive to both horrific violence and to media coverage of his policies, he successfully resisted the pressure to change his policy of non-intervention for several years. Similarly, while complaining about the pressure reporters applied on Western governments to intervene in Bosnia, Hurd did not acknowledge that the media had influenced the formulation of policy (Hindell, 1995:73).

Other senior policy makers have also provided a more complex view of the effects of global news coverage. After serving as National Security Adviser and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell observed: "Live television coverage does not change the policy, but it does create the environment in which the policy is made" (McNulty, 1993:80). Anthony Lake, a scholar and Clinton's first National Security Adviser, acknowledged that public pressure driven by televised images increasingly played a role in decision making on humanitarian crises, but added that other factors such as cost and feasibility were just as important (Hoge, 1994:139). Andrew Natsios (1996:150; 1997:124), a former senior official of the Agency for International Development, noted that the CNN effect has been highly exaggerated. The concept suggests, he wrote, that policy makers only respond to humanitarian crises when there are scenes of mass starvation on television news, and that they obtain most of their information about disasters from the media. According to Natsios, "both propositions are inaccurate and seriously exaggerated." Finally, when commenting on Canada's policy toward the 1996 refugee crisis in Eastern Zaire, Canadian senior diplomat Brian Buckley (1998:39) also wrote that the media was crucial in focusing international attention on the crisis, but "they did not determine the policy, the key decisions, or their implementation."

Policy makers were divided on the meaning and validity of the CNN effect. Former high-ranking officials, including secretaries of state Baker, Eagleburger,

⁵In a professional article, Amanpour (1996) explained the reasons for her campaign to alter Western policy in the Bosnia crisis. Her colleagues Bell (1997) and Vulliamy (1999) developed a whole ethical approach, called "journalism of attachment," to justify this and similar campaigns. For a critique of their approach see McLaughlin (2002:166–181).

and Albright, British foreign secretary Owen, assistant secretaries of state Shattuck and Holbrooke, and the U.N. Secretary General, all viewed the CNN effect as a powerful policy-forcing factor. But other former elected politicians and senior officials, including President Clinton, British foreign secretary Hurd, National Security Adviser, and Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Powell, National Security Adviser Lake, and foreign-policy officials Natsios and Buckley, all thought the CNN effect was not a decisive factor in foreign policy making.

Debates II: Journalists

Editors, reporters, anchors, commentators, and television critics representing all types of mass media became very interested in the CNN effect and debated each other and officials about its meaning and validity. Like policy makers, journalists were inspired by television images of the 1992 crisis in Somalia, the outbreak of ethnic wars in the Balkans, and the Western responses to these crises. They wrote various types of works from short columns to lengthy scholarly books. Like policy makers, they have disagreed about the definition and the context of the concept. H.D.S. Greenway (1992), a former editorial page editor for *The Boston Globe*, asked why President George Bush decided to intervene in Somalia and not in Sudan, where starvation was worse, or in other similar humanitarian crises around the world. "The answer is," he wrote, "that Somalia was where television was." Somalia will be remembered, he added, because it was the first intervention motivated by purely humanitarian reasons, and because it was "the purest example of television not just providing, but being the *casus belli*." *The New York Times*' television critic Walter Goodman (1992) wrote on the Somali intervention: "it was television's wrenching pictures from Somalia that goaded a reluctant administration to act." Walter Goodman (1994) repeated the same argument in a piece on the crisis in Bosnia.

Popular commentators also subscribed to the CNN effect hypothesis. Charles Krauthammer (1994) asserted in *The Washington Post* that changes in policy toward military intervention in humanitarian crises in Somalia and Bosnia were caused by television pictures. A year later he (1995) offered a more general statement: "it is inconceivable that the U.S., or any other Western country, could ever again fight a war of attrition like Korea or Vietnam. One reason is the CNN effect. TV brings home the reality of battle with a graphic immediacy unprecedented in human history." Other commentators, however, have taken the opposite position. For example, Stephen Rosenfeld (1997), also a commentator for *The Washington Post*, wrote: "The CNN effect . . . has nowhere produced more elusive self-congratulation among us media types than in the matter of humanitarian disasters. In Somalia and elsewhere . . . journalism sought credit for bringing pictures of unspeakable suffering into American homes and thus precipitating a life saving official response. Except that it's not really so, or not so to anywhere near the point often claimed, anyway."

The Somalia intervention inspired a broad debate among prominent print and broadcast journalists. Ted Koppel (1994) of ABC News said that graphic coverage of television pictures of starving children drove the U.S. to intervene in Somalia. Former *New York Times* reporter David Halberstam and CNN's former executive Ed Turner expressed similar opinions (Sharkey, 1993:16–17). But "image in and of itself does not drive policy" said former CBS diplomatic correspondent Marvin Kalb, "image heightens existing factors" such as the history of the region and chances of achieving clear objectives. These factors, he argued, have the decisive effect on policy making. Tom Rosenstiel (1994), a former national correspondent for *The Los Angeles Times*, also doubted the CNN effect and wrote that the network became "a pulpit for foreign politicians who lacked traditional diplomatic standing, especially fading despots and sponsors of terrorism." During the Clinton years, he

added, "CNN has become a means to communicate to the press corps without having to hold briefings or face reporters en masse." According to Rosenstiel, CNN has been more of a tool in the hands of policy makers than an independent and influential news channel.

Journalists have also debated diplomats on the CNN effect. One interesting exchange on the Somali crisis occurred in 1993 between veteran diplomat and scholar George Kennan and CBS's reporter and anchor Dan Rather. On the day the U.S. Marines landed in Somalia, 9 December 1992, Kennan (1996:294–297) wrote in his personal diary that this was "a dreadful error of American policy" accepted by the public and Congress only because of television coverage: "There can be no question that the reason for this acceptance lies primarily with the exposure of the Somalia situation by the American media, above all, television. The reaction would have been unthinkable without this exposure. The reaction was an emotional one, occasioned by the sight of the suffering of the starving people in question." Almost a year later, Kennan (1993a) published this commentary from his personal diary in *The New York Times* eliciting a sharp denial from Dan Rather.

Rather (1993) cited humanitarian crises where, despite the coverage of atrocities, the U.S. did not intervene, and asserted: "Reporters sometimes feel strongly about the stories they cover, and some may wish for the power to direct public opinion and to guide American policy—but they do not have it." He added that television must provide the people with information with which they can form their own opinions. Kennan (1993b) responded that television did not provide the information needed to make sound judgments on Somalia or any other international event: "Fleeting, disjointed, visual glimpses of reality, flickering on and off the screen, here today and gone tomorrow, are not the information on which sound judgments on complicated international problems are to be formed." Kennan clearly exhibited the classic negative approach of veteran diplomats to coverage of foreign policy and diplomacy, but Rather (1994:229–250, 1995) still insisted that he was wrong. Veteran television journalist Robert MacNeil (1994:123) followed up on the Kennan–Rather debate and argued that television brought "public opinion into play as never before in determining where national interest lies and what policy will further it," and he also agrees that foreign policy making "becomes in part a contest of images." He added, however, a single decisive variable: leadership. If a leader can define national interests clearly, "television—however lurid, responsible, or irresponsible—will not drive foreign policy. When he fails to do so, it may."

The debate between journalists on the CNN effect became more sophisticated when several correspondents conducted research and published scholarly studies and books. Nik Gowing (1994), a veteran television journalist and a BBC World anchor, wrote one of the pioneering works on the CNN effect. He agrees CNN coverage has drawn attention to crises and may have evoked emotional public reactions. But based on interviews with policy makers in several countries, he concluded that they resisted pressure to act solely in response to television news reports. He noted that in the early 1990s, for example, the U.S. and Western governments refrained from intervention in the Bosnian crisis despite substantial news coverage of atrocities. In a later study (2000:211–212), he used the reversal of U.S. policy toward the 1996 catastrophe in Burundi to demonstrate the opposite example: willingness to intervene despite the absence of television coverage.

Several journalists wrote interesting books about the CNN effect. Michael O'Neill, (1993:26), former editor of *The New York Daily News*, suggested a new paradigm of world politics that accorded global television a new dominant role in politics and foreign policy. Based on events that occurred in the world at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, he argued that television and the public are changing the world: "The electronic revolution is changing the way nations are governed, profoundly altering the balance of power between citizens and governors, magnifying public demands and conflicts, and increasing the velocity of action

and reaction beyond the limits of thought.” But Johanna Neuman (1996:16–17), a former foreign editor for *USA Today*, reached the opposite conclusion. She placed the CNN effect in a broad historical context of developments in communication technologies, diplomacy, and warfare, and found that new communication technologies that allowed the emergence of CNN and the Internet do not “constitute a revolution in policy or politics.” They have only affected the speed of communication and the breadth of audience. She asserted that media technology “has not in the end, changed the fundamentals of political leadership and international governance.”

Warren Strobel (1997:5), a former White House correspondent for *The Washington Times*, investigated the effects CNN coverage was having on humanitarian interventions in the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. His research supported Neuman’s conclusions, not those of Kennan and O’Neill. He concluded: “the CNN effect implied by Kennan does not exist.” Based on interviews with policy makers, Strobel distinguished between effects on outcome and effects on policy making and wrote: “I found no evidence that the news media, *by themselves*, force U.S. government officials to change their policies. But, under the right conditions, the news media nonetheless can have a powerful effect on process. And those conditions are almost always set by foreign-policy makers themselves or by the growing number of policy actors on the international stage.” Strobel failed, however, to clearly define these circumstances.

Editors Greenway, O’Neill, and Turner, commentators Goodman and Krauthammer, anchor, and editor Koppel, and correspondents Schorr and Halberstam, all accepted the validity of the CNN effect hypothesis. Other journalists, including Editor Neuman, anchors Rather and Gowing, commentator Rosenfeld, and correspondents Kalb, Rosenstiel and Strobel, disagreed with their colleagues. One television reporter, MacNeil, took a middle position. He argued that the CNN effect may exist only when leaders do not exercise their duties and instead allow the media to determine foreign-policy priorities and measures.

Debates III: Scholars

Scholarly studies of the CNN effect present mixed and confusing results. Like policy makers and journalists, scholars have also focused on the humanitarian interventions in places such as Northern Iraq and Somalia, but only a few have conducted comparative research, developed models and frameworks for analysis, or done empirical investigations. Shaw surveyed coverage of the Kurdish crisis in the British print and the electronic media and analyzed national and local public opinion polls. “In Kurdistan,” he concluded, “it was the British media and public opinion which forced governments’ hands” (1996:vii). Yet the correlation he found between media attitudes and public opinion is not sufficient to establish a cause–effect relationship as well as a connection between public opinion and policy change. This could have been accomplished only by an additional examination of the policy-making process that Shaw avoided.

Miller (2002) focused on the policy-making process and his findings contradict Shaw’s conclusions. He distinguished between media coverage and media pressure, and applied the “positioning hypothesis” from discursive psychology to examine the linkages between coverage and policy in Britain and the U.S. The positioning hypothesis allows a researcher to analyze exchanges between institutions such as the media and the government through press conferences and official statements. Unlike Shaw, Miller distinguished between government rhetoric and sequences of actual policy making, and found that both television and print media coverage did not have a significant effect on American and British policy toward the Kurdish crisis.

U.S. intervention in Somalia has been the second battleground for studies of the CNN effect and it has also yielded similar controversial results. Although Cohen (1994:9–10) did not conduct any empirical research, he still argued that television “has demonstrated its power to move governments. By focusing daily on the starving children in Somalia, a pictorial story tailor-made for television, TV mobilized the conscience of the nation’s public institutions, compelling the government into a policy of intervention for humanitarian reasons.” But Mermin (1997, 1999:137) called Cohen’s claim “a myth” and later explained: “The case of U.S. intervention in Somalia, in sum, is not at heart evidence of the power of television to move governments; it is evidence of the power of governments to move television.” Well before Mermin reached this conclusion, Livingston and Eachus (1995:413) concluded that the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in Somalia “was the result of diplomatic and bureaucratic operations, *with news coverage coming in response to those decisions*” (emphasis added). Similarly, Robinson (2001) argued that in the Somalia crisis, leaders set the media’s agenda, not the other way round. Finally, it is interesting to note that two scholars who used the realist approach to international relations also disagreed on the Somali intervention. Mandelbaum (1994:16) could not find any national interest in the Somali intervention and therefore concluded that it was propelled by “television pictures of starving people.” But Gibbs (2000) argued that the U.S. intervened in Somalia because of strategic and economic interests, and policy makers only exploited television pictures to present a convenient and moralistic humanitarian justification. Gibbs’s interpretation, however, may well explain the U.S. entry but not its withdrawal in 1994.

A valid scientific approach to the study of the CNN effect requires two inter-related comparative analyses: (1) an assessment of global television’s impact on a specific foreign-policy decision in comparison with the relative impact of other factors, and (2) application of this procedure to several relevant case studies. Only a few researchers have followed this procedure. Carey (2001:73) argued that Clinton’s decisions to intervene in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo resulted from domestic factors including the mass media and public opinion. Jakobsen (1996:212), however, investigated the same interventions and discovered that CNN’s coverage was an important factor because it placed the crises on the agenda; but still the decision to intervene “*was ultimately determined by the perceived chances of success*” (emphasis added). In a later study (2000), he further argued: “interventions are unlikely to follow unless they can be conducted quickly with a low risk of casualties. Since this is rarely the case, media pressure on reluctant governments are most likely to result in minimalist policies aimed at defusing pressure for interventions on the ground” (2000:138). Mueller (1997:84), who extensively studied American military interventions abroad, also concluded: “The conventional wisdom about the CNN effect amounts to a triumph of myth over matter.” He argued that pictures of horrors in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Haiti did not inspire a surging public demand for military intervention because “the public saw no serious threat to American security in either of these cases that could justify risking American lives.”

Two recent studies suggested elaborate models that predict the conditions under which the CNN effect may work. Ammon (2001) claimed that paradigmatic changes in both communication and diplomacy produced a new paradigm of world politics that he called “telediplomacy.” The emergence and expansion of real-time global news coverage caused the shift in communication, while the “new diplomacy,” mostly characterized by openness, generated the shift in foreign policy making. The result, telediplomacy, has displaced the existing diplomatic methods and for the first time in human history, under certain conditions, it also drives policy and determines diplomatic outcomes. According to Ammon (2001:91–92), these conditions include a specific issue, such as a global crisis or a humanitarian emergency, with fast-breaking events which are characterized by a leadership vacuum, media autonomy, and high visibility which means the event can attract the attention of

real-time global television. Ammon applied his model to three crises: the Northern Iraq crisis, where he argued all five conditions were present and that CNN forced intervention on the U.S. and its allies; the simultaneous Shiite's uprising in Southern Iraq, where several conditions were missing and therefore the media did not affect policy; and the 1994 civil war and genocide in Rwanda, where, despite the presence of all the conditions, real-time coverage did not affect policy. Conditions that were not included in the original model determined the outcome of the Rwanda case, thus exposing a major structural weakness in Ammon's paradigm.

Robinson (2000, 2002a,b) developed a much more sophisticated policy-media interaction model of the CNN effect that includes two basic variables: policy certainty and media framing. His model predicts that media influence is likely to occur when policy is uncertain and media coverage is critically framed and empathizes with suffering people. When policy is certain, media influence is unlikely to occur and policy uncertainty, in itself, is not sufficient to activate the CNN effect. Robinson applied this model to the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo and found that the media influenced U.S. policy at the time, the defense of the Gorazde "safe area," because Clinton's policy toward the conflict was uncertain and therefore the media strongly criticized him. In the Kosovo case, Clinton's air-war policy was clear and the media failed to affect it. Validation of this model, however, requires further testing through several other case studies.

Livingston (1997) argued that there are three CNN effects, not one: an accelerant to decision making, an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals, and a policy-agenda-setting agent. He then showed how differently they operate among eight different types of international intervention developed by Haass (1994) including conventional warfare, strategic deterrence, tactical deterrence, special operations, and low-intensity conflict, peacemaking, peacekeeping, imposed humanitarian operations, and consensual humanitarian operations. This framework is sophisticated precisely because it fully utilizes and combines relevant models from communication and international relations. Livingston (2000) demonstrated the usefulness of this framework by applying it to NATO's intervention in Kosovo. It is not clear why scholars interested in the CNN effect have not yet extensively used this excellent framework.

Scholars have disagreed about the validity of the CNN effect hypothesis. They have used various approaches and methodologies including case studies, comparative analysis, and paradigms, as well as various methodologies including content analysis, framing, and interviews (Gilboa, 2005). Researchers have employed theories and methodologies from several social sciences including communication, sociology, psychology, and international relations. The results of all these efforts are confusing. Shaw and Ammon found the CNN effect in the Kurdish crisis, but Miller did not. Mandelbaum and Cohen found it in the Somalia crisis, but Livingston and Eachus, Mermin, Robinson, Dauber, and Gibbs did not. The comparative approach also failed to resolve the controversy over the CNN effect. Ammon argued that CNN became the dominant force in international relations, and Carey concluded that television news was a major factor in Clinton's humanitarian interventions; but Jakobsen and Mueller found exactly the opposite. Livingston and Robinson have suggested that the CNN effect was highly exaggerated and should be further studied through new models and approaches.

Discussion and Conclusions

Policy makers, journalists, and scholars have mostly disagreed on the CNN effect. Disagreements surfaced both within each of these groups and among them. Representatives of all three groups argued that the CNN effect has completely transformed foreign policy making and forced interventions in places such as Northern Iraq, Somalia, and Kosovo. Others have suggested the opposite, that the CNN

effect has not dramatically changed media–government relations, it does not exist, or has been highly exaggerated and may occur only in rare situations of extremely dramatic and persistent coverage, lack of leadership, and chaotic policy making. The three groups have only agreed on two effects (Gilboa, 2003; Livingston, 2003): (1) Global television news coverage has accelerated the foreign-policy making process; and (2) it can affect the conduct of policy—as opposed to its establishment—by showing graphic images that tend to undermine elite and public support for specific policy goals. But even here the effect is highly contingent on circumstances.

The CNN effect hypothesis has been defined very broadly, but to test it, this theory had to be operationalized in a very narrow way; when this occurred, as has been demonstrated in several studies, it became easier to disprove many of its claims and implications. Many studies confuse a cause and effect relationship between coverage and policy. It is clearly necessary to distinguish between cases where a government wishes to intervene, and therefore not only does not object to media coverage of atrocities but also actually initiates or encourages the act, and cases when a government is reluctant to intervene and consequently resists media pressure to do so. Global television cannot force policy makers to do what they intend to do anyway. Another problematic assumption confuses “control” and “pressure.” There is a difference between “forcing” policy makers to adopt policy and “pressuring” them to do so. The “forcing” framework suggests that the media is taking over the policy-making process, while the “pressuring” framework considers the media one of several factors competing to influence decisions. Many studies pursued the “forcing” argument,” but they only presented evidence of “pressure” to support their claims.

The findings of this study do not necessarily mean that the concept is, and always will be, confusing and meaningless. Badsey (1997:19) suggested “although the CNN effect may happen, it is unusual, unpredictable and part of a complex relationship of factors.” Several studies specified conditions under which global television might force policy on leaders. These conditions exist both in the policy-making and the news-making processes. One study suggested that “Vivid coverage will only create major international political resonance if, by chance, it hits a critical, often unpredictable void in the news cycle. Alternatively, there will be an impact if it creates a moment of policy panic when governments have no robust policy and charts a clear course” (Gowing, 2000:210). Other studies point to conditions such as the broadcast of dramatic images and an issue that is simple and straightforward (Hopkinson, 1993:33), geopolitical interests (Natsios, 1996), policy uncertainty and pro-intervention media framing (Robinson, 2000, 2002b), slow and indecisive government reactions (MacFarlane and Weiss, 2000:128), policy contexts and political persuasion (Dauber, 2001), and a policy vacuum (Seib, 2002a:28). The critical factor in all these conditions is leadership. If leaders do not have a clear policy on a significant issue, the media may step in and replace them. These situations, however, reflect more on leaders than on the media, and these conclusions do not require extensive research. Researchers have not adequately answered the question whether global television can force leaders to alter a policy that they do have.

The focus on CNN’s coverage of humanitarian crises has created several research gaps. It has deflected and diverted attention from significant effects global television does have on various conflict phases other than warfare and violence, the global war against terrorism, policy making, news making, and audiences in different regions and countries (Gilboa, 2005). Scholars have ignored the absence of television coverage of pre-violence and post-violence phases of conflict. This omission may have significant consequences for attempts to prevent violence or for conflict resolution and conflict transformation steps that are taken once the violence ends. Studies of the CNN effect have focused on policy making in defense and foreign affairs, but global television is affecting, perhaps in different ways, policy

making in areas such as economics, trade, health, culture, and the environment on a worldwide scale.

Livingston (2003) argued that innovations in communication technologies have created what he called "CNN Effect Plus." This concept refers to the many new communication devices, including wireless telephony, videophones, and remote sensors, now available for reporters even in the most remote areas of the world. Livingston argues that this technology-driven effect could alter policy-making processes in defense and foreign affairs. New communication technologies also include the Internet which potentially could also have significant implications for the conduct of foreign policy (Potter, 2002; Seib, 2002b; Drezner and Farrell, 2004; Larson, 2004). The effects of technological innovations on the roles of global communication require extensive research and application.

Most studies of the CNN effect link media influence on policy to the impact of coverage on public opinion and to subsequent public pressure on leaders to adopt the policy advocated by the media (Seib, 2002a:27). But as Gilboa (2002a, 2003) and Miller (2002) demonstrated, it is possible and even necessary to examine effects of global communication on policy making that are more direct in their application and independent of public opinion. We do not yet have a theory that effectively addresses the web of relations and influences among the government, the media and public opinion. Entman's (2004) "cascading activation model" is the closest and should be employed to explore the effects of global television news. Entman suggests that several actors, including presidents and their chief advisers on defense and foreign affairs, other elites, and the media, are engaged in a battle to shape frames that reach the public through the media and greatly influence the formation of public opinion. His model explains how the "thoughts and feelings that support a frame extend down from the White House through the rest of the system—and who thus wins the framing contest and gains the upper hand politically" (p. 9). The model argues that some actors have more power than others to push frames down the road to the public and, therefore, could help identify when and how pictures on global television may drive policy.

Global television has also significantly affected the daily work of editors and journalists (Walsh, 1996; Collins, 2004). The emergence of new global non-Western television networks, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia, has challenged the veteran global news networks. It is important to research the effects of global news competition on both networks and audiences. It is possible, for example, that the availability of several alternative channels would motivate audiences to select a network closest to their ideological and political dispositions. It would be extremely interesting to compare coverage of the same events and processes on CNN International and CNN-U.S. or on BBC World, which does not broadcast in the U.K., and BBC. Similarly, coverage on the Western networks should be compared with coverage on non-Western networks such as Al-Jazeera. We do not know sufficiently how different audiences living in different cultural, economic, and political environments interpret a message that is broadcast globally by CNN and the other global networks. It is also necessary to examine the ramifications and implications of the U.S.-led global war against terrorism on global communication, and, on the other side, particularly in the Muslim and the Arab worlds.

The findings of this study demonstrate that the research directions scholars and journalists have pursued during the last 10 years have yielded only limited results. It is clear now that the media play several roles in policy making, diplomacy, and international relations other than those incorporated in the CNN effect hypothesis (Gilboa, 2000, 2002b, 2003; Graber, 2002:159–194; Paletz, 2002:338–362). Also, because of the expansion of several global networks, it is time to replace the term CNN effect with a broader and more neutral term such as "controlling actor"—an actor that determines foreign policy (Gilboa, 2002a). There is a need to develop new models and methodologies and apply existing promising ones to investigate

both the areas that have been studied and those that have been neglected. The grand paradigms of O'Neill, Edwards, and Ammon would not be very helpful. On the contrary, a narrower definition of the media's role and research that combines communication theories with theories of international conflicts may yield more convincing results. The models and approaches of Livingston, Robinson, Miller, Entman, and Gilboa are the most promising and should be used to research old and new topics. A new research agenda that includes neglected subjects and new methodologies may help to fill the gaps and resolve the debate over the CNN effect.

References

- ALBRIGHT, M. (May 10, 1993) *Building a Collective Security System*, Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East and on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Washington, DC: Department of State.
- AMANPOUR, C. (1996) "Television's Role in Foreign Policy." *Quill* **84**:16–17.
- AMMON, R. (2001) *Global Television and the Shaping of World Politics: CNN, Telediplomacy, and Foreign Policy*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
- ARIS, B. (November 6, 1999) "Russia Shrugs off Protests over Chechen Civilian Dead." *The Daily Telegraph* (London) **17**.
- BADSEY, S. (1997) "The Media and UN Peacekeeping since the Gulf War." *Journal of Conflict Studies* **17**:7–27.
- BAKER, J. III (1995) *The Politics of Diplomacy*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
- BELL, M. (1997) "TV News: How Far Should We Go?" *British Journalism Review* **8**:7–16.
- BUCKLEY, B. (1998) *The News Media and Foreign Policy: An Exploration*. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University.
- CAREY, H. (2001) "U.S. Domestic Politics and the Emerging Humanitarian Intervention Policy: Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo." *World Affairs* **164**:72–82.
- COHEN, B. (1994) "A View from the Academy." In *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, edited by W. L. Bennett and D. Paletz, pp. 8–11. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- COLLINS, S. (2004) *Crazy Like Fox: The Inside Story of How Fox News Beat CNN*. New York: Portfolio.
- CUTLER, L. (1984) "Foreign Policy on Deadline." *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* **22**:223–232.
- DAUBER, C. (2001) "Image as Argument: The Impact of Mogadishu on U.S. Military Intervention." *Armed Forces and Society* **27**:205–229.
- DOBBS, M. (July 23, 1995) "The Amanpour Factor: How Television Fills the Leadership Vacuum on Bosnia." *Washington Post* **C2**.
- DREZNER, D., AND H. FARRELL (2004) "Web of Influence." *Foreign Policy* **145**:32–40.
- EDWARDS, L. (2001) *Mediapolitik: How the Mass Media have Transformed World Politics*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- ENTMAN, R. (2004) *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- EPSTEIN, E. (June 26, 1995) "Boutros-Ghali Expects Criticism to Fade." *San Francisco Chronicle* **A5**.
- FRIEDLAND, L. (1992) *Covering the World: International Television News Services*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press.
- GIBBS, D. (2000) "Realpolitik and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Somalia." *International Politics* **37**:41–55.
- GILBOA, E. (2000) "Mass Communication and Diplomacy: A Theoretical Framework." *Communication Theory* **10**:275–309.
- GILBOA, E. (2002a) "Global Communication and Foreign Policy." *Journal of Communication* **52**:731–748.
- GILBOA, E., ed. (2002b) *Media and Conflict: Framing Issues, Making Policy, Shaping Opinions*. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers.
- GILBOA, E. (2003) "Television News and U.S. Foreign Policy: Constraints of Real-Time Coverage." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* **8**:97–113.
- GILBOA, E. (2005) "The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations." *Political Communication* **22**:27–44.
- GILBOA, E. (2005) "Media and International Conflict." In *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Communication: Integrating Theory, Research, and Practice*, edited by J. Oetzel and S. Ting-Toomey. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

- GOODMAN, W. (December 8, 1992) "Re Somalia: How Much Did TV Shape Policy?" *New York Times* **C20**.
- GOODMAN, W. (February 14, 1994) "Are the TV Images Father to U.S. Action in Bosnia?" *New York Times* **C16**.
- GOWING, N. (1994) *Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions?* Cambridge, MA: The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University.
- GOWING, N. (2000) "Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention?" In *The Media and International Security*, edited by S. Badsey, pp. 203–226. London: Cass.
- GRABER, D. (2002) *Mass Media and American Politics*, 6th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- GREENWAY, D. H. S. October 8, 1992 "It's Foreign Policy by Camera Crew." *Boston Globe* **1**.
- HAASS, R. (1994) *Intervention: The use of American Military Power in the post-Cold War World*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- HACHTEN, W. (1998) *The Troubles of Journalism: A Critical Look at What's Right and Wrong With the Press*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- HACHTEN, W. AND J. SCOTTON (2002) *The World News Prism: Global Media in an Era of Terrorism*, 6th ed. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
- HINDELL, K. (1995) "The Influence of the Media on Foreign Policy." *International Relations* **12**:73–83.
- HOFFMAN, D. (August 23, 1991) "Global Communications Network was Pivotal in Defeat of Junta." *Washington Post* **A27**.
- HOGUE, J. F. JR. (1994) "Media Pervasiveness." *Foreign Affairs* **73**:136–144.
- HOLBROOKE, R. (1999) "No Media—No War." *Index on Censorship* **28**:1–20.
- HOPKINSON, N. (1993) *The Media and International Affairs after the Cold War*. London: HMSO (Wilton Park Paper 74).
- HOPKINSON, N. (1995) *The Impact of New Technology on the International Media and Foreign Policy*. London: HMSO (Wilton Park Paper 97).
- HURD, D. (1997) *The Search for Peace*. London: Little, Brown.
- JAKOBSEN, P. (1996) "National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?" *Journal of Peace Research* **33**:205–215.
- JAKOBSEN, P. (2000) "Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect." *Journal of Peace Research* **37**:131–143.
- JOHNSTON, C. (May 30, 1996) "Prepare for InfoWar. Hacking Enemy Computers is Now High on the Military Agenda." *The Guardian* **5**.
- KALB, M. (1996) "Report First, Check Later: An Interview with James Baker III." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* **1**:3–9.
- KENNAN, G. (September 30, 1993a) "Somalia: Through a Glass Darkly." *New York Times* **A25**.
- KENNAN, G. (October 24, 1993b) "If TV Drives Foreign Policy, We're in Trouble." *New York Times* **4/14**.
- KENNAN, G. (1996) *At a Century's Ending: Reflections, 1982–1995*. New York: Norton.
- KOPPEL, T. (December 1, 1994) *The Global Information Revolution and TV News. Lecture at a Conference on Managing Chaos*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace.
- KRALEV, N. (2001) "Around-the-Clock News Cycle: A Double-Edged Sword: An Interview with Madeleine Albright." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* **6**:105–108.
- KRAUTHAMMER, C. (February 18, 1994) "Intervention Light: Foreign Policy by CNN." *Washington Post* **A25**.
- KRAUTHAMMER, C. (July 13, 1995) "The B-2 and the 'Cheap Hawks.'" *Washington Post* **A25**.
- LARSON, J. (2004) *The Internet and Foreign Policy*. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 325.
- LIVINGSTON, S. (1997) "Beyond the 'CNN Effect': The Media-Foreign Policy Dynamic." In *Politics and the Press: The News Media and their Influences*, edited by P. Norris, pp. 291–318. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- LIVINGSTON, S. (2000) "Media Coverage of the War: An Empirical Assessment." In *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*, edited by A. Schnabel and R. Thakur, pp. 360–384. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- LIVINGSTON, S. (2003) "Diplomacy in the New Information Environment." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* **4**:111–117.
- LIVINGSTON, S., AND T. EACHUS (1995) "Humanitarian Crises and U.S. Foreign Policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect Reconsidered." *Political Communication* **12**:413–429.

- MACFARLANE, N. S., AND T. WEISS (2000) "Political Interest and Humanitarian Action." *Security Studies* **10**:121–142.
- MACNEIL, R. (1994) "The Flickering Images that May Drive Presidents." *Media Studies Journal* **8**: 121–130.
- MANDELBAUM, M. (1994) "The Reluctance to Intervene." *Foreign Policy* **95**:3–8.
- MCLAUGHLIN, G. (2002) *The War Correspondent*. London: Pluto Press.
- MGNULTY, T. (1993) "Television's Impact on Executive Decisionmaking and Diplomacy." *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* **17**:67–83.
- MCPHAIL, T. (2002) *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders, and Trends*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- MERMIN, J. (1997) "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* **112**:385–403.
- MERMIN, J. (1999) *Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- MILLER, D. (2002) Measuring Media Pressure on Security Policy Decisionmaking in Liberal States: The Positioning Hypothesis. Paper Presented to the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, March 24–27.
- MINEAR, L., C. SCOTT, AND T. WEISS (1996) *The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- MORRIS, D. (1999) *The New Prince: Machiavelli Updated for the Twenty First Century*. Los Angeles: Renaissance Books.
- MUELLER, J. (1997) "The Common Sense: Public Opinion Regarding International Relations." *National Interest* **47**:81–88.
- NATSIOS, A. (1996) "Illusions of Influence: The CNN Effect in Complex Emergencies." In *From Massacres to Genocide: The Media, Public Opinion, and Humanitarian Crises*, edited by R. Rotberg and T. Weiss, pp. 149–168. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- NATSIOS, A. (1997) *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- NEUMAN, J. (1996) *Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?* New York: St. Martin's Press.
- O'NEILL, M. (1993) *The Roar of the Crowd: How Television and People Power are Changing the World*. New York: Times Books.
- OWEN, D. (1996) "A Clinician Caution: Rhetoric and Reality." In *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before they Start*, edited by K. Cahill, pp. 305–317. New York: Basic Books.
- PAHL, T. (1994) "New Challenges in Overseas Exposures." *Risk Management* **15**:1–4.
- PALETZ, D. (2002) *The Media in American Politics*, 2nd ed. New York: Longman.
- PEARCE, D. (1995) *Wary Partners: Diplomats and the Media*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
- POTTER, E., ed. (2002) *Cyber-diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- RATHER, D. (October 14, 1993) "Don't Blame TV for Getting Us Into Somalia." *New York Times* **A22**.
- RATHER, D. (1994) *The Camera Never Blinks Twice*. New York: W. Morrow.
- RATHER, D. (1995) "The United States and Somalia: Assessing Responsibility for the Intervention." In *Somalia, Rwanda, and Beyond: The Role of the International Media in Wars and Humanitarian Crises*, edited by E. Girardet, pp. 27–43. Geneva: Crosslines Global Report.
- RICCHIARDI, S. (1996) "Over the Line." *American Journalism Review* **18**(September):25–30.
- ROBINSON, P. (2000) "The Policy–Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power During Humanitarian Crisis." *Journal of Peace Research* **37**:613–633.
- ROBINSON, P. (2001) "Operation Restore Hope and the Illusion of a News Media Driven Intervention." *Political Studies* **49**:941–956.
- ROBINSON, P. (2002a) "Global Television and Conflict Resolution: Defining the Limits of the CNN Effect." In *Media and Conflict: Framing Issues, Making Policy, Shaping Opinions*, edited by E. Gilboa, pp. 175–191. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers.
- ROBINSON, P. (2002b) *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*. London & New York: Routledge.
- ROSENFELD, S. (April 18, 1997) "Before the Camera Roll." *Washington Post* **A25**.
- ROSENSTIEL, T. (August 22, 29, 1994) "The Myth of CNN." *The New Republic*, 27–33.
- SCHORR, D. (1991) "Ten Days that Shook the White House." *Columbia Journalism Review* **4**(July–August):1–23.
- SEIB, P. (1997) *Headline Diplomacy: How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- SEIB, P. (2002a) *The Global Journalist: News and Conscience in a World of Conflict*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

- SEIB, P. (2002b) *Going Live: Getting the News Right in a Real-Time, Online World*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- SHARKEY, J. (1993) "When Pictures Drive Foreign Policy." *American Journalism Review* 15(December):14–19.
- SHATTUCK, J. (1996) "Human Rights and Humanitarian Crises: Policymaking and the Media." In *From Massacres to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy and Humanitarian Crises*, edited by R. Rotberg and T. Weiss, pp. 169–175. Cambridge, MA: The World Peace Foundation.
- SHAW, M. (1996) *Civil Society and Media in Global Crises*. New York: Pinter.
- SHELL, A. (1991) "Military PIOs Direct "Theater of War": Public Information Officers in the Iraq–Kuwait Crisis." *Public Relations Journal* 9:9–10.
- SMITH, P. (1991) *How CNN Fought the War: A View from the Inside*. New York: Birch Lane Press.
- STROBEL, W. (1997) *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, the News Media's Influence on Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- VOLKMER, I. (1999) *News in the Global Sphere*. Luton: University of Luton Press.
- VULLIAMY, E. (1999) "Neutrality and the Absence of Reckoning: A Journalist's Account." *Journal of International Affairs* 52:603–620.
- WALSH, K. (1996) *Feeding the Beast: The White House Versus the Press*. New York: Random House.
- WIENER, R. (1991) *Live from Baghdad*. New York: Doubleday.
- WHITTEMORE, H. (1990) *CNN: The Inside Story*. Boston: Little Brown.
- WOODWARD, B. (1991) *The Commanders*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Copyright of International Studies Perspectives is the property of Blackwell Publishing Limited and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.