

# History and International Studies

by

Michael G. Fry

American Historical Association
institutional services program

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400 A Street SE, Washington, DC 20003



**Michael G. Fry** is director of the School of International Relations and professor of international studies at the University of Southern California. His research and teaching focus on the history of international relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the foreign policies of Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, and the role of the Great Powers in the Middle East since 1914. He received his PhD from the London School of Economics and has served as director of the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada and dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver. His books include *Illusions of Security: North Atlantic Diplomacy 1918–1922* (Toronto, 1972), *Lloyd George and Foreign Policy,* Vol. 1, *The Education of a Statesman 1890–1916* (Montreal, 1977), and *Despatches from Damascus. Gilbert Mackereth and British Policy in the Levant, 1933–1939* (Tel Aviv, 1986). He is currently completing the second volume of his study of Lloyd George and, as a visiting scholar at The Washington Program of The Annenberg Schools, preparing a book on aspects of decision making.

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# Contents

# Preface

The Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA), a ten-school consortium, is concerned with improving the quality of teaching and research carried out in its member institutions. With the assistance of the Exxon Foundation and under the genial gaze and tolerant eye of Arnold Shorr, the association is exploring the continued relevance to the curriculum of the founding disciplines of international studies: history, law, and political theory. The deans and directors of the schools ask particularly whether there is a core curriculum that should be part of the education of every graduate student in international studies. It seemed appropriate to begin by examining the role of history in the international studies curriculum, an examination that culminated in a colloquium held at the Foreign Service Institute in Washington, D.C. in November 1985. Several historians from the schools were involved: John Finan (The American University), Michael G. Fry (University of Southern California), Theodore Geiger (Georgetown University), Arthur Gilbert (University of Denver), Jonathan Haslam (The Johns Hopkins University), Alan K. Henrikson (Tufts University), Graham W. Irwin (Columbia University), Albert D. Mott (The American University), and Seth Tillman (Georgetown University).

Their report identified several considerations and problems. The APSIA institutions are not in the business of training professional historians, do not expect to have a fully rounded history curriculum, and are not really concerned with issues in the philosophy of history. They are interested more specifically in history's contribution to an international studies curriculum, in terms of both content and methodology. They are concerned with the advantages their students derive from being historically sensitive and aware. They seek benefits of career-long relevance to students that should come from an awareness of the historical dimensions of the study of international relations. That all of the schools have a mixture of international and North American students presents a particularly interesting challenge.

The historians of the APSIA institutions assert, without reservation, that history should be an integral and central part of an international studies curriculum and can be in no sense peripheral. They regard their work as an essential ingredient, as a vital part of an interdisciplinary curriculum. As they broached the question, several specific issues emerged: Is history part of necessary remedial work for beginning graduate students? Can the historical content of the curriculum be increased without risking the displacement of other valuable elements such as foreign language training, methodology, and theory? Should the historical content of the MA and PhD curricula be markedly different? Should history courses be part of a core curriculum, a field of study, or merely electives? Should they be history courses per se or

courses that have a substantial historical content? There is also the question of the types of history that are most appropriate, particularly when one realizes that the work of many of the schools focuses on such broadly defined themes as foreign policy analysis, political and economic diplomacy, security affairs, international political economy, area studies, and so forth. Should the more traditional forms of diplomatic or international history be at the center of any enterprise, or are other approaches, such as the sociological or anthropological, equally significant? A related question is the centrality of courses dealing with the experience and behavior of the United States. These various issues suggest that those who would reform the curricula of the APSIA institutions should do so with great care.

An examination of these questions also points unerringly to the problem of the type of historians the APSIA institutions are or should be hiring. Alternatively, are traditionally trained historians likely to take up the opportunities that are presented in schools of international affairs rather than in history departments? Doubtless, such schools are and will remain challenging places for historians to work, but the possibilities of intellectual collaboration between historians and various social scientists are very good. Indeed, it might be argued that the time is ripe on both sides for increasingly integrated and interdisciplinary work. Historians, it is hoped, are disregarding views that were associated with the famous contending approaches debate. They have stopped regarding themselves as barriers against social science or science per se. They no longer see themselves as mere sources of data that their social science colleagues can use. Rather, historians regard themselves as being in the vanguard of creative interdisciplinary approaches that are likely to be valuable for the international relations curriculum. Indeed, some would argue, as Alan Henrikson did at the November 1985 colloquium, that historians can claim to have the central intelligence of the subject of international studies.

Thus, the value of history in the international affairs curriculum was affirmed. Historians of the APSIA institutions seek to increase student awareness of the reciprocal relationship between the past and the present, and of the different historical processes that result in and provide solutions for recent events and problems. They hope to demonstrate the contribution that being historically aware can make to certain forms of analysis and reasoning, to the formulation of generalizations, and to the stimulation of comparison. For foreign students, the intellectually liberating experience of speculating freely about the functioning of the international system over time seems likely to be particularly rewarding.

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# International History and International Relations

## Prospects for the Curriculum

by Michael G. Fry

*History is the school of statesmanship.*
—Sir John Seeley

International relations is not a discipline. It has been and remains a field of inquiry that rests on plural foundations. Its intellectual taproots lie in history, law, and political theory; some would add geography. The state, relative capabilities, power, anarchy, and rationality are its governing concepts. In the last thirty years, principally in the United States, an attempt has been made to give international relations a central place in the social sciences. Some, in their enthusiasm, have even claimed that the field has reached the level of normal science or has arrived at an integrated research program. This attempt, exciting to some and exasperating to others, is immature, and it has produced as many casualties as conquests within scientific ranks. It has left historians unsure.

Diplomatic historians stood among the founders of international studies but have been elbowed aside, and some of the fault lies with themselves. They allowed history to become a mere preface to current events, their empiricism to become little more than a source of data for social scientists, and their intellectual preferences to be used as a bulwark against science itself. They all too frequently dismissed international relations as or mistook it for journalism. At the same time, their intellectual predicament was sharpened by a decline within the history profession of the status and stature of their work. Thus, on two fronts the professional standing of historians of international relations became an unhappy one. International relations flourished; diplomatic history within and outside international relations did not. The uncertain role of history in the curricula of schools of international relations in the United States is in part an artifact of this situation.

*International History: Predicaments and Prospects*

Periodically, historians in the United States examine themselves, their research and teaching, and the state of the discipline. The most recent outcome of this process of self-examination, of light-shedding without bloodletting, was unequivocal.[1] So much of the recent past and the challenging future lay with social history and fresh approaches to socioeconomic phenomena, with the "new" political history, with the study of women, minorities, ethnic groups, and classes, with local, community, and urban studies, with area and regional history, with comparative, integrated history, and with quantitative methodologies. Diplomatic history, as a subfield of political history in the Thucydidean and Rankeian tradition, was not regarded as being on the exciting frontiers of inquiry. Devoted scholars of diplomacy and their diminishing band of apprentices were not at any critical point of intersection or departure. Journals shunned their papers; conference organizers gave them less space and time. The charge was repeated: diplomatic history was stagnant in terms of empirics and analytics. The tides of history rose on other shores; the currents flowed in different channels while diplomatic historians drowned in their own narrow monographs.

This verdict reflected the deterioration of the ascribed status of diplomatic history within the profession in the last thirty years. Indeed, structuralists have attacked diplomatic history since the 1930s as a particularly arid form of instrumentalism. Socioeconomic historians, seeking to make history a formal social science, have not hesitated to declare diplomatic history irrelevant. The situation is not without its paradox, for military history in its many and, in some ways, innovative forms flourishes as scarcely before. Diplomatic historians themselves, in this hostile environment (and perhaps mildly and deservedly embarrassed by the most vigorous controversy of the day, the origins and course of the cold war), experienced deprivation. Some became introspective intellectually, seeking to form separate groups and to provide distinct outlets for their work, allowing caricatures to prevail and the charge of narrow specialization to flourish. Diplomatic historians seemed to mark time, hoping that the pendulum would swing back and bring renewed relevance, if not centrality.

Others, however, experimented and broadened their inquiry, as the term "diplomatic history" gave way to "international history."* International historians prospered intellectually and have a record of considerable achievement. They have demonstrated that the traditional and narrow forms of diplomatic history will not suffice. While a sense of being peripheral within the history profession remains, these historians have done more than insure

* One wonders why the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, the first professional organization devoted to American international history, entitled its journal *Diplomatic History*.

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that there would be no headlong rush into further obscurity. They have pointed the way to revitalization, to reform and improvement, and to remedies for past mistakes. They have demonstrated that modern international history deserves to be at the focus of debate on history and international relations. They and others have begun to show anew how history is an integral, essential component of international relations and its curriculum, as much because of the epistemological assumptions of historical explanation as because of content. Moreover, lines of continuity and complementarity are re-emerging with some vigor between history and the social sciences as they relate to the study of international relations. There is a basis, therefore, for guarded optimism, for assertion, and for experimentation.

Change is at its best when those who pursue it emphasize the enduring merits of past achievements. Modern historians of international relations, concerned with the derivation and conduct of national defense and foreign policies (that is, with policy formulation and statecraft) and with the evolution and functioning of the international state system should first affirm the relevance and the enduring significance of the subject and their paradigm. They are dealing with generic forms of state external behavior, with war and the practices of peace, with quasi war and diplomacy (which is intelligence and covert operations) as governments deal with other governments, with oppositions to governments, and with groups seeking the status of either opposition or government. They might, with appropriate caveats and a sensitivity to countervailing arguments, even restate the case for the primacy of politics and strategy and for the state, with its vigor and residual autonomy, as the critical actor and unit of analysis. They must reassert the validity of the study of rationality and of power as influence, as an expression of mobilizable resources, and as an indicator of control over outcomes. They must resist, particularly in the United States, undue pressure from an intellectual and social environment that reflects a disillusionment with elites and the exercise of power, and distaste for the study of them. This perhaps necessary distance from a progressive tradition must not lapse into an obsession with supposedly great leaders and their works, for, after all, when *annalism* has had its say, the study of war and its avoidance, of peace and its preservation, must prosper, especially when war as an instrument of policy can threaten the existence of civilized society. In this way, international history will preserve an evolving identity and not be subsumed by the necessary adaptations it must make.

Second, from that foundation and flow of consciousness, historians of international relations must continue to reassess their work both empirically and analytically. A re-examination of subject matter, of issues and boundaries, will establish its coherence, yet prevent any excess satisfaction with the act of assertion, and remove any lingering hope that traditional diplomatic history will suffice. As the influence of economic, political, intellectual, social, and cultural domestic factors on the formulation of foreign and

defense policy is explored further, the necessary societal framework of policy, decision, and government behavior will be confirmed. When the influence of structures and systemic constraints is examined, the essential unity of and reciprocal relationships between the domestic and international spheres will be demonstrated. In that framework, elite choice and decision, the tension between short-term opportunities and long-term consistency, and the relationship between existing resources, mobilizable capabilities, interests, and goals can be explored to explain international behavior and events. Even that agenda is formidable when applied to the history of the industrial states of the twentieth century with their burgeoning functions, ever more complex organizations, and complicated processes, and in view of their global involvements and predicaments, all captured in archives of unprecedented size. The task becomes increasingly difficult if such work is pursued comparatively across time and space in persistent fashion. Many historians will assert, therefore, that decades of critically important work lie before them, as the archives disgorge successively the bipolar world and beyond.

Despite the magnitude of that challenge, others, still seeing themselves essentially as historians of international relations, will continue to broaden the inquiry, conscious of debates on structural realism, on the nature of the state, on the relations in the global system between states and actors that are not states, on the functioning of regimes, and thus on competitive research agendas. They will explore transnational and transgovernmental relations. Politics will be set alongside economic, intellectual, and cultural relationships. When these relationships are fused in truly interdisciplinary fashion or are treated comparatively, historians may speak of intersocietal relations. Foreign economic policies, government behavior in markets, and the pursuit of international public goods will compete with diplomatic and strategic issues and the pursuit of power. International historians will explore the limits of state influence, redefine security as a concept, and thus address new problems and puzzles.

The pace of historical analysis is determined more by the availability of primary sources than by puzzlement, and such research must be based on sources that are plural in origin and nature, neither confined to those produced by the state nor, when dealing with states, to those sectors of government managing political and strategic issues. Balance will always be a problem in any multisource approach, for no institution matches the state as a creator and manager of archives, yet the research agenda must remain manageable and the subject of international history sufficiently discrete.

Nothing dictates that the more traditional empirically will be the more conservative analytically, although asking new questions and seeking fresh data may stimulate experimentation with different techniques. Such experimentation may lead historians toward the social sciences and their methods of making data. Such approaches would not be new for certain historians. The issue is how central these approaches could become, how general and

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widespread, and thus whether they would constitute a significant advance. (It is worth noting that Alexander George's use of structured, comparative case studies is proving attractive to historians seeking patterns, regularities, and prevailing essences.)

Leaving that as an open question, many historians will confirm the validity and vigor of a tested methodology that achieves precision to a rare degree. This methodology is based on the qualitative textual examination of manuscript and printed primary sources from archives that are national and international, public and private, and representative of the whole structure of government. These historians will always consult the record of public debate and pronouncement and the press. At the same time, they will use proven complementary techniques such as oral history and interviewing.[2] The more contemporary the problem, the more interviewing will be a central rather than a peripheral technique. These sources provide the evidence for the writing of dense, analytical, narrative history that sets the context, identifies the relevant factors and persons and establishes their contingent relationships, and details the strict sequence of the processes by which events and the contemporary perceptions of events unfolded. Finally, historians impose interpretative explanations on both the relationships and processes in order to account for change and its consequences. Questions of responsibility are not ignored, but little is to be gained by reducing history to a quasi-judicial process and becoming obsessed with conspiracy, rather than exploring the central problem of the relationship between prevailing structures and purposeful individual behavior.

An examination of content and method, of new problems and fresh techniques, of insight and findings, leads to the third proposition. Historians of international relations must seek more explicitly points of intersection with other areas of historical inquiry and with relevant sectors of the social sciences. They should do so with the firm assumption that the distinction between policy and theory is a false one and the separation of theory from empirics is folly. The point to be made is an analytical one, but the implications professionally are not insignificant. Yet, historians of international relations in search of enrichment need not worship in profligate fashion. They have only to look at the rate of progress in the social sciences to resist any temptation to get down on their knees. These are early days there in terms of scholarly time.

One way to explore these points of intersection, which does not formally distinguish substance from method but is easily identifiable as an organizing principle, is the use of levels of analysis. What the appropriate levels are will vary with subject matter and could point in some studies to such levels as the subnational, ethnic groups, regions, or cultures. The approach here is a traditional one but is not meant to be in any sense binding or to claim that other approaches to history such as the anthropological or sociological with their levels of analysis are less valid and therefore carry less potential.

International historians would do well to follow the lead of Paul Schroeder[3] when exploring the infinitely richer literature in the social sciences on systems. They should recognize that the international system, ontologically, is neither an abstraction, a scientific metaphor, or a "metaphysical entity," nor merely a context in which individuals and governments operate relatively freely, but rather ". . . a series of intersecting outcomes not readily deducible from a summing up of individual policies."[4] The international system has rules, conventions, regimes, and devices; levels of conflictual and cooperative behavior; preferred methods of communicating, bargaining, and negotiating; and ways of growth, adaptation, and collapse as well as of maintaining homeostasis. These are its dynamic properties. It has structures and configurations in that it has degrees of homogeneity, polarities, distributions of resources, subsystems, rank orders and compositions, concentrations of power, status, prestige, and legitimacy, public goods, various types of actors, and degrees of order. It even has its paradoxes beyond mere unanticipated outcomes, for as the system functions it can demonstrate the power of the weak and the impotence of the strong. As states behave and statecraft is practiced, reciprocal relationships are created within the system and must be addressed, without necessarily accepting Schroeder's view that "it is less important to know why statesmen took certain actions than to know what reactions and results those actions produced in the international arena, and why under the prevailing system they led to these results and not others, and how these actions affected the system itself."[5] This call for systems analysis need not be confined to the realm of strategy and politics. Economic, cultural, and ideological systems require investigation, as do intersystemic relations.

The state is both society and government. It has structures, processes, and functions. In that space between the institutions, mechanisms, and practices of government and the boundaries of society, a private sector produces public opinion while a public sector spawns military and civilian agencies. Individuals, influential groups, and the media function, constitute an intellectual climate, and help define the nature and purposes of the state. From these one extracts the domestic sources of and constraints on foreign and defense policies, the resources available to government, and the view that state policy is an expression of social values and heritage, racial composition, political texture, and economic structure.[6] More specifically, one seeks to understand the influence of electorates, party political and legislative processes and rhetoric, the press, lobbies, pressure groups, corporatists and publicists, churches, business, and organized labor. These concerns relate to the sources of elite power and to the way elites emerge, adapt, develop structures of interests, beliefs, values, and doctrines, institutionalize ideologies, pursue goals, sustain themselves, and are coopted, disbanded, and brought down.

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Conversely, foreign policy behavior may be viewed as a mechanism to reconcile diverse interests and values within a state and to justify the extraction from and reallocation of resources to various segments of society, in effect as an independent variable and as a contributor to political consensus, social order, and national unity. In these ways one captures some of the important manifestations of linkage politics, of the reciprocal interplay between domestic and external policy needs, goals, and behavior. Understanding may be enriched as international historians read the "high politics"[7] approach, the work of Arno Mayer,[8] economic and social history, and, following James Joll's lead, intellectual history, [9] along with media and public opinion studies and the work of political scientists, psychologists, social theorists, and sociologists.

Governments formulate and attempt to implement policies that reflect the state's attributes, capabilities, interests, needs, and values. They make decisions in crisis and routine situations and practice statecraft in all its forms. They stand in a domestic and international setting and deal with the determinable and the uncertain, with the predictable and the unanticipated at home, in other states, and in the international system. The determinants of decisions, and the decision-making process, rather more than the practice of statecraft, have a firm place in both historical and social science literature. This literature views decisions as outputs of a government's operating procedures, of formal and informal processes at the executive level, of rational choice, and of bargaining among bureaucrats in the government's relevant agencies. The historical study of bureaucratic and cabinet politics has bloomed particularly as a result of the opening in the last twenty years of the Western and Asian public and private archives on the origins, conduct, and consequences of the two world wars. The richness of these sources gives a previously lacking authority to interpretative explanation; the piles of elaborate footnotes provide authenticity.

Nevertheless, historians of international relations can continue to benefit from using forms of institutional history, including approaches that focus on the composition and functions of foreign ministries, treasuries, the military establishments, and the diplomatic corps. Zara Steiner and others have pointed the way.[10] In addition, a sensitive and discriminating use of perspectives from the social science literature on organizational processes, political sociology, bureaucratic and executive behavior, cybernetics, game theory, and decision theory will prove rewarding. For the pursuit of statecraft and its practice there is a rich literature on bargaining and negotiation in bilateral, bloc, and multilateral frameworks. Here lies one of the potentially richest areas of collaboration between historians and social scientists, if the former are modest and the latter patient.

Groups and individuals, in office or dissenting, relatively free of structural constraints or enjoying only limited choice, acting rationally or less than

that, processing information within a collective set of assumptions or with individual belief systems, and driven by ideology and ambition, provide common ground for historians and social scientists. It could not be otherwise. Social psychologists, political scientists fascinated with cognitive processes, historians of high politics, biographers, and psychohistorians seek to reconstruct personality, to capture the official mind and its unified view of domestic society and the international system, to understand purpose, intent, and motive, and to assess the impact of stress. They share an interest in the relationship between beliefs and behavior, in the intensity with which beliefs are held, and in the distinction between central and peripheral beliefs. Both, but particularly social scientists concerned with the anatomy of decision and crisis, question the assumptions of classical rationalism, explore the constraints thereon all the way to the boundaries of pathological behavior, and probe those forms of logic related to rationalization.[11] Was an unwise and disfunctional decision inevitable because of compelling circumstances that, after all, left no choice? Will hindsight somehow demonstrate that a seemingly unsound decision was in fact a wise one? Are beliefs constructed after the fact of behavior in order to provide internal consistency and justification?

A review of the literature at these four levels of analysis demonstrates that the record of collaboration between historians and social scientists interested in international relations, and the ease of passage for those who would cross boundaries, has been at best uneven. Segregation has been more in evidence than integration; university structures have reinforced competitive solitudes. Schools of international relations are dominated by political scientists. Yet, experimentation between historians and social scientists is more advanced and the relations between international historians and international relations theorists more promising in the United States than elsewhere. For those historians who care to master the language of science, who are numerate as well as literate, who can consume social science research findings, and who are willing to clamber over disciplinary walls that are less forbidding than is often assumed, opportunities exist to enrich their work. Social science research lies in varying states of maturity and disarray, ready to be exploited in a selective and discriminating fashion.

In their turn, international relations theorists are probably more prepared than ever to think historically, to seek out historical processes, to use historical precedents, and to pursue interpretative explanation. Some of the most advanced methodologically (dealing, for example, in artificial intelligence) are the most historically sensitive. The concern with emulating the natural or exact sciences has, predictably and sensibly, abated. International relations theorists are more conscious of the distorting effects of some of their work and sense an uncomfortable degree of relative poverty. They insist rightly that historians must be more systematic and persistently comparative in their thinking, more formal in their causal reasoning, more theoretically informed

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and concerned to test hypotheses, more in search of replicable patterns, and more at ease with less familiar techniques such as formal modeling, sampling and survey, and content analysis. But these scientists are open and receptive, and at least recognize the positivist bent and concern for objective analysis of modern international historians.

This guardedly optimistic view is reinforced when one examines some of the central problems in the philosophies of history and science and certain epistemological issues.[12] They may be stated as open questions: What relationship can exist between unique events and deterministic laws, between the singular and the existence of generalized patterns in human behavior? Should one seek lawlike propositions or pursue complexity? Should one introduce change over time and space to seek explanation? What is the significance of the accidental, the indeterminate, and the contingent in human conduct? Is it reasonable always to see human behavior as caused? Hows does one know the past as opposed to the present? What constitutes historical and scientific understanding? How does one verify historical as opposed to contemporary facts, and what constitutes accepted internal standards of criticism in history and social science? What is regarded as explanation and cumulation over time? What is the status of interpretation and reinterpretation in history and social science? Which theories of causation flourish or languish? What discourse can take place on the subjective and the relative on the one hand, and the objective and the definitive on the other? How in history and social science can one handle the special data, such as individual relationships that exist because individuals observe and are observed and because of the presence of consciousness and perception in purposeful human behavior? What is the relationship between prevailing structures and the logic of situations, and individual conduct? What mix of deductive, inductive, and adductive reasoning should prove valuable in historical and social science inquiry, as one crosses the boundaries between the worlds of theory and empiricism, between the realms of interpretation and evidence?

The results of such an examination will be clear in their central tendencies. Although history may be distinctive within the social sciences, the continuities between historical and scientific approaches outweigh the discontinuities, and ". . . the development of a scientific explanation of international relations depends upon accepting some of the fundamental epistemological assumptions which underpin the historical approach."[13]

Scholars in both history and the social sciences can help make the study of international relations a coherent body of thought, rather than an additive quilt. Most of them now regard the contending approaches controversy as arcane; the debate over quantitative techniques is mercifully at rest; the issue of the relationship between theory and empirics shows that neither historians nor social scientists can be typed in simplified ways; and the divisions within their respective ranks are as significant epistemologically as between

them. Each can enrich the other. Whether their respective contributions are balanced, even roughly, is irrelevant.[14] They might even join forces, in discourse with governments and foundations, on the preservation of sources of evidence, for the partial, arbitrary record of past experience and behavior is all they have.

*History: Its Professional Relevance*

Schools of international relations, dominated as they are by social scientists, can be particularly rewarding places for historians who take up these challenges. Such schools, in their graduate work, are not concerned with training professional historians, with having a rounded history curriculum, with historiography, or with issues central to the philosophy of history. They are concerned with history's contribution to an international relations curriculum in terms of course content and method, with the substantial benefits students can derive from historical and historically informed training, and with certain applied questions and rewards of career-long relevance. Their students come from many parts of the world and consciously are preparatory scholar-practitioners. This in turn raises the question of what type of historian will flourish in such schools: it is a matter of experience and temperament, of prescience and preference, of appetite for interdisciplinary work and views of graduate training.

The advantages to being historically informed and sensitive to history are several.[15] Historical knowledge is a principal source of comparative judgment and reasoning about what is new and what is enduring, about what is different and what is unchanging, about what is unique and what may be replicable, about what are fundamental similarities and what are fundamental differences. It sets standards for what is required for real and valuable rather than superficial and trivial comparison, for the compelling models and the deviant cases. It provides the basis for particular forms of reasoning that take examples and elevate them to the level of precedents and use analogies as tools to find order in complexity and a degree of certainty in the uncertain. Historical knowledge develops a sense of the validity or invalidity of parallels and lessons, whether real or contrived, and of the value of and dangers in generalization.

Judgment, insight, and perspective follow from historical knowledge and comparative reasoning. Historically informed scholar-practitioners should, for example, understand the sequential nature of events, the evolvement, unfolding, and critical junctures of events, and the impact of events over time, as a preface to interpreting the meaning of events. They should be able to see the recurring nature, even permanence, of problems and thus the limitations of policy solutions. As Seth Tillman pointed out in the November 1985 colloquium, what is intellectually imaginable is not necessarily

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what is historically possible, let alone feasible in the short term. History is memory and record and, therefore, cumulation for individuals, classes, governments, and societies. How can we understand, for example, Japan's seeming intransigence over trade liberalization today without reference to its experiences in the 1930s? Thus, history provides a basis from which to ponder the tension in policy science between analytical and normative theory, for in the former, models must conform to the world, whereas in the latter, retroductively, the world must conform to the model.

Perspective applies to both policy formulation and the practice of statecraft. It provides standards by which the rationality of the decision process and the novelty, creativity, timeliness, appropriateness, and wisdom of decisions and policies can be evaluated. It provides yardsticks by which the techniques and style of statecraft, from private talks *à deux* to public conference diplomacy and covering the range of cooperative and coercive acts, can be measured. It is an antidote to the ascribed authority of current judgment.

A related, applied, and, it must be added, sobering question concerns the historical sensitivity of a decision-maker when training and practice eventually combine and when history becomes an intervening variable.[16] It is part of a broader issue of the role historical knowledge and experience play in the development of the beliefs and collective memories of groups, classes, and nations. What government leaders have learned, interpreted, and misinterpreted from and about history is a significant part of their consciousness. Clearly, a sense and reading of history, whether shallow or sophisticated, and the perspectives history gives affect the construction of beliefs, images, and perceptions. Information is processed in history's context, as people look back for compelling examples and precedents. They also seek to anticipate the unavoidable judgment of history, for politicians write memoirs and apologia, while historians weigh the record. History as a scholarly discipline, the current history of the press, historical awareness, and actual personal experience and memory all have their impact.

It is reasonable to ask whether a sense of history and what it portends promotes or hinders optimal decision making. It ought to promote, if history is a valuable teacher, but does it necessarily do so? Can convictions about a parallel or precedent eliminate inconvenient information? Does history stimulate diagnosis but hinder prescription? Do certain officials and colleagues tell leaders, solemnly and authoritatively, while enjoying the exercise, what has happened in the past and yet rarely offer clear-cut policy choices? Does a grasp of history breed elaborate memoranda and ponderous statements rather than decisive advice? In sum, apprentice scholars who would govern must remember that history lends itself just as easily to abuse as to profitable use, and that as history is in one sense what historians say it is, one deals with mere interpretation. Indeed, historians tend to be surprised that others take them so seriously when in pursuit of precedents, analogies, lessons, and abiding truths.

Historical knowledge is an awareness of change over time, of differentiated rates of change, of discontinuities in change, of differences in the short, medium, and long term. It provides caveats against excessively confident prediction. It provides a view of the relationship between the specifics of time, place, and issue and broad, seemingly timeless contexts, of the way patterns and regularities are subordinate to time, place, and circumstance and thus may have only limited explanatory value. Historical examples in all their richness should give insight into the relative freedom of choice and maneuver available to individuals, into the constrained relationships between individual behavior and enduring structures and situational logic.

To be historically informed is to understand the changing meaning of terms, concepts, and theories because of a sensitivity to their historical context. Moreover, history stresses the relativeness that must underpin judgment of human behavior because of cultural differences, changing attitudes over time, and differing contexts. War was not a moral evil in the state system of the nineteenth century; similarly, imperialism has been viewed as a progressive force at certain times and in certain cultures.

When historians think historiographically, they are concerned with the writing of history; with the question of who wrote what, when, and why; with what constitutes a tradition of thought, a school of writing, or a mere set of preferences; and with the organizing principles, perhaps called paradigms, that guide historical inquiry. These approaches and analytical techniques are relatively underdeveloped in the social sciences, though literature review is regarded as essential in research design.

Methodologically, it is the historian who demonstrates the value of adductive reasoning to produce explanation through identification of contingent relationships between factors, persons, events, and perceptions. Historians should set the standards for the development of the richest case studies. They should preach a certain skepticism about the nature of evidence and thus insure that it is not forced to bear an unacceptable weight of explanation, which the more exuberant are tempted to place on it as they pursue the twin myths of totally objective and definitive research. The historian will continue to debate interpretations and regard cumulation as the contest between competitive interpretations.

History courses, or historically based courses, should be included in the curriculum of a school of international relations, probably organized in terms of a core curriculum and fields of study (sometimes called concentrations). A basic question is whether history or classical and behavioral theory, or some combination of the two, should constitute the core curriculum, as the central foundation of the program. One could argue that there is a body of historical knowledge that forms the indispensable basis from which to probe major recurring problems, to help students move more freely between economics, politics, and ideational themes, to think interdisciplinarily, and to consume significant sections of the social science literature on

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international relations. Robert Jervis's work, for example, demands a sophisticated grasp of the history of the international relations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Whether a single course or even a short sequence of courses can provide that core of knowledge for the curriculum is a difficult question, especially for those who refuse to see history as an hors d'oeuvre before the main meal of contemporary questions. On balance, there is much to commend theory, set in its historical context, as the core of the curriculum.

History or historically based courses as essential parts of specific fields of study are, in most cases, easier to identify, largely because they are more specific. Students interested primarily in political and strategic matters should study modern international history and aspects of military history. One may also question the level of emphasis that should be given to the centrality of the United States–Soviet Union relationship in order to ground students in the history of the realities of the post-1945 world.

The study of modern international history should include the development of the international state system and the emergence of international organizations, the expansion of Europe and the decline of the Eurocentric system, the derivation of the foreign and defense policies of the major powers, the changing practice of statecraft, the role of individuals and small groups in those processes, and the outbreaks of war and peace. Military history, as Martin Van Creveld has recently shown, is growing in content and sophistication.[17] It now embraces the history of battles, theatres, campaigns, and wars on land and sea and in the air (sometimes comparatively); the study of tactics, strategy, operations, logistics, intelligence, and structures of command, control, and communication; the art and science of war of all types; the evolution of military technology, strategy, and defense policies and their relationship to foreign policy; military biography; war not in operational but in social, economic, and political terms; civil-military relations; armed forces as social institutions and their relationship to other institutions in society and to the state; social, economic, cultural, intellectual, and political influences on military affairs; defense budgeting, economic preparations for war, and economies at war; issues of morale, will, recruitment, training, and motivation of personnel; and veterans affairs. Methodologically, military historians are exploring quantitative techniques, modeling, gaming and simulation, and operations research techniques. In sum, much seems healthy, many seem buoyant, and more comparative work across states, time, and cultures will bring added intellectual prosperity.

Students of international political economy could reasonably be expected to achieve some competence in economic and business history, the history of comparative economic systems, and the unfolding of the international trade, services, financial, and migration systems to explain the wealth of nations. Put differently, history courses would analyze the origins of the European industrial revolution, the evolution of industrialization in other

regions, the emergence of large multinational firms, and the unfolding of the liberal global political economy in the nineteenth century, its tribulations after 1918, and the creation of fresh trade and monetary systems after 1945. David Wightman, in a witty and pointed chapter, attacked American academic parochialism on this subject. He began with Joseph Schumpeter and ended with H. Phelps Brown.

> The economist who is best equipped to understand the working of the economy around him and to advise on policy, needs in point of analysis the equipment that is needed by the economic historian, and no more. I take this to be the analysis of demand and supply, distribution, international trade and money, as these are developed in a text for undergraduates. . . . I doubt whether more concepts or relationships than are contained here will in practice be drawn upon, even by those who can handle them with facility, in work upon particular problems at the highest level of responsibility. The entrant would also receive thoroughgoing training in statistical methods. For the rest his course would include much economic, social and political history: this is essential. The course would also provide for the study in detail of some contemporary societies and their recent changes.[18]

The debate over area or functional studies as fields of study is a venerable and important one. Schools of international relations have either failed to resolve it or have consciously avoided choosing between very demanding alternatives. One compromise finding favor (but never fully resolving the doubts that extend to questions of library resources and language training) is the study of regions, in terms of their societies and governments, and intra- and/or interregional relations and functional problems in regions and/or across them comparatively. The former compromise is seen more frequently, as in the course offerings on the international relations of Latin America, the Middle East, and so on. The latter is seen in Third World and communist world studies, courses on development, modernization, and change, and on U.S.-Soviet global competition, which tend to be comparative. Because of the lack of homogeneity in this part of the curriculum, the scope of relevant history courses ranges from the conventional, for example, on developments in the Middle East or East Asia from some appropriate point in the nineteenth century, to courses on comparative regional history, the history of interregional relations, and the historical analysis of the unfolding of functional problems in various world regions. Here anthropological and sociological perspectives could flourish and provide a welcome change from more standard political or economic histories.

There is, in any event, as in the question of the role of history in the core curriculum, far less certainty, and thus far more of a challenge to those who would reform. The challenge must be met, for, after all, its solution would constitute only one step, however large, toward an international relations curriculum that is a genuine fusion of the disciplines in both content and methodology.

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## *Notes*

[1]Michael Kammen, ed., *The Past Before Us* (Ithaca, 1980). The relevant chapter is Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," 355–87. Its most important predecessors are: Thomas J. McCormick, "The State of American Diplomatic History," and Lawrence Evans, "The Dangers of Diplomatic History," in Herbert J. Bass, ed., *The State of American History* (Chicago, 1970), 119–41, 142–56; Ernest R. May, "The Decline of Diplomatic History," in George Athan Billias and Gerald N. Grob, eds., *American History: Retrospect and Prospect* (New York, 1971), 399–430; Gordon A. Craig, "The Historian and the Study of International Relations," *American Historical Review,* 88 (February 1983): 1–11; Ernest R. May, "Writing Contemporary International History," *Diplomatic History,* 8 (Spring 1984): 103–13; and C. P. Hill, "History and International Relations," in Steve Smith, ed., *International Relations: British and American Perspectives* (New York, 1985), 126–45. Specific responses to Maier's article are in articles grouped under the title "Symposium" in *Diplomatic History,* V (Fall 1981): 354–82. See also Morton A. Kaplan, *Toward Professionalism in International Theory* (New York, 1979), ch. 4, "Diplomatic History and International Systems," 165–77.

[2]W. N. Medlicott pointed the way over thirty years ago in "The Scope and Study of International History," *International Affairs,* XXXI (October 1955): 422. Donald Cameron Watt, in "What About the People? Abstraction and Reality in History and the Social Sciences" (Inaugural lecture, London School of Economics, 1983), took up the issue of methods and many other questions relevant to this essay.

[3]For recent examples of Schroeder's work, see "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System," *International History Review,* VI (February 1984): 1–27, and "The European International System, 1789–1848: Is There a Problem? An Answer?" (Paper delivered at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Princeton, N.J., March 1984).

[4]Maier, "Marking Time," 386.

[5]Ibid.

[6]This theme takes one back to the work of Fritz Fischer and more recently to Paul Kennedy's *The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914* (London, 1980). For a particularly interesting view, which sees a nation as a cultural system and international relations as interactions among cultural and power systems, see Akira Iriye, "Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations," *Diplomatic History,* III (1979): 115–28.

[7]Maurice Cowling, despairing of the biographical approach, pursues the thought worlds, temperament, use of rhetoric, and relationships between "situational necessity" and political intentions, and between oratory and reality, in ways that are not unrelated to this essay; see Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Labour 1920–1924* (Cambridge, U.K., 1971) and *The Impact of Hitler 1933–1940* (New York, 1975). See also Michael Bentley, *The Liberal Mind, 1914–1929* (New York, 1977).

[8]Michael G. Fry and Arthur N. Gilbert, "A Historian and Linkage Politics: Arno Mayer," *International Studies Quarterly,* XXVI (September 1982): 425–44.

[9]James Joll, *1914: The Unspoken Assumptions* (London, 1968).

[10]Zara S. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914* (London, 1969); and Robert Schulzinger, *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind* (Middletown, Ct., 1975) and *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York, 1984).

[11]I have used this level to give examples of a rich body of social science literature. See Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* VI (September 1962): 244–52, and "The Operational Code Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs," *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* III (1 March 1970): 124–57; K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly,* XIV (September 1970): 233–309; Stephen Walker, "The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* XXI (1 March 1977): 129–68, and "The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: An Analysis of the Operational Code Construct" (Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, March 1980); Richard Mandel, *Perception, Decision Making and Conflict* (Washington, D.C., 1979); Robert M. Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton, 1976); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976); Irving Lester Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston, 1972); Richard Ned Lebow, *Between War and Peace: The Nature of International Crises* (Baltimore, 1981),



chs. 5, 6; Janice G. Stein and Raymond Tanter, *Rational Decision Making* (Columbus, Oh., 1980), 3–87; Alexander L. George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly,* XIII (June 1969): 190–223, "The Causal Nexus Between Operational Code Beliefs and Decision Making Behavior: Problems of Theory and Methodology," in Lawrence Falkowski, ed., *Psychological Models of International Politics* (Boulder, Co., 1979), and *Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, Co., 1980); Dennis Kavanagh, "The Operational Code of Ramsay MacDonald" (Paper delivered at Stanford University, 1971); and Deborah W. Larson, *The Origins of Containment* (Princeton, 1985).

[12]The literature on these subjects is vast. The journal *History and Theory* is indispensable, and standard works include R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford, 1946); Patrick L. Gardiner, ed., *The Philosophy of History* (New York, 1974); Michael J. Oakeshott, *On History and Other Essays* (Totowa, N.J., 1983); Eugene J. Meehan, *Explanation in Social Science: A System Paradigm* (Homewood, Il., 1968); Karl R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (Boston, 1957); M. A. Kaplan, *On Historical and Political Knowing* (Chicago, 1975); Murray G. Murphey, *Our Knowledge of the Historical Past* (Indianapolis, 1973); T. A. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Chicago, 1970); Robert King Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York, 1968); May Brodbeck, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science* (New York, 1968); Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge, U.K., 1970); Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth, and History* (New York, 1981); Charles Reynolds, *Theory and Explanation in International Politics* (London, 1979); and Richard Little, "History and the Analysis of International Relations: Three Ways to Beat Time" (Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the British International Studies Association, December 1978).

[13]Little, "History and the Analysis of International Relations," 3.

[14]Christopher Thorne has pointed the way in *The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933* (New York, 1973), *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945* (New York, 1978), *The Issue of War: States, Societies and the Far Eastern Conflict of 1941–1945* (New York, 1985), and "International Relations and the Promptings of History," *Review of International Studies,* 9 (April 1983): 123–36.

[15]See Alan K. Henrikson, "Thinking Historically," *Fletcher Forum,* 2 (May 1978): 225–32. Historians should have a rich basis for counterfactual reasoning but rarely exploit that device thoroughly.

[16]One can still read to advantage Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past* (New York, 1973). See also Miles Kahler, "Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy," *Foreign Affairs,* 58 (Winter 1980): 374–96.

[17]Martin Van Creveld, "The State of Military History Studies," *Washington Quarterly,* 8 (Winter 1985): 183–94.

[18]David Wightman, "Why Economic History," in Susan Strange, ed., *Paths to International Political Economy* (London, 1984), 23–32. He quotes from H. Phelps Brown, "The Radical Reflections of an Applied Economist," *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review,* 132 (March 1980): 3–14.

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# Alternative Approaches and Commentary

*Jonathan Haslam, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University*

Those who enter schools of international studies come for an understanding of the present, not the past. They will have to be persuaded of the value of history if teaching is not to be entirely coercive.

The relevance of history to the future participant in international affairs can be argued from several angles. First, diplomats and politicians act on certain assumptions about the past, whether they are conscious of doing so or not. They resemble Monsieur Jourdain in *La Maladie Imaginaire,* who expressed surprise and gratification to learn that he had been speaking prose all his life without knowing that he had. It is, of course, better that diplomats and politicians attain Monsieur Jourdain's state of awareness before they reach power, rather than afterwards, and schools of international studies have a responsibility to insure that this is achieved. Presumably, their actions will be the better for being conscious of the assumptions underlying their behavior, so that they can guard against bias where it can be demonstrated. Only a study of history will enable vigilance of this sort. Secondly, what occurs on the international stage cannot be accounted for purely in terms of existing conditions; not everything that happens is new. To understand the extent of change we need knowledge of continuity; we require some understanding of the past. Lastly, the foreign policies of states have evolved over time. The element of time is thus integral to the explanation of existing forms. We need to know how a state became what it is today.

These are the arguments—by no means all—for the study of history. Clearly, not all history is equally useful to the practitioner of international relations. Although it is difficult to rule out anything as totally irrelevant, in practice a choice has to be made, and certain areas of history will be more readily acceptable as essential to the purpose than others.

Those in international studies need to know how states interrelate politically; how they trade and operate abroad financially; and how they function domestically. For the reasons already outlined, each of these three areas needs its historical dimension within the curriculum: the history of international political relations, at the very least in the twentieth century, at best from 1789; the development of the international economic and financial systems; and the domestic political, social, and economic development of selected states. The first two present no difficult choice in respect to subject

matter, though a considerable challenge to even the most accomplished teacher. The third area, domestic systems and their evolution, presents a dilemma: how much breadth against how much depth? How many states can one reasonably study in the time available? If students are obliged to have an area studies focus at some stage of the degree, to add some depth to breadth, the issue is more readily soluble.

This is the ideal model. But what happens in reality? Is it safe to assume that historians are generally willing and able to offer the type of history needed and present it in a form that persuades students of its relevance? It is here that I would take issue with some of my colleagues. Why is it that there are so few who wish to buy what the historians have to sell to students of international relations? Why are political scientists, for instance, so reluctant to hire historians or to recommend their work?

One explanation is that political scientists have fought to mark out their field using historians as a negative reference point in order to establish departmental autonomy. Political scientists are not about to acknowledge their parents, let alone allow historians into the home they have built for themselves in order to escape insufferable conditions in the parental domain. This sectarianism, which is by any rational standard intellectually unjustifiable, is likely to change with time as political scientists cease to feel the need to stress differences over common interest and develop sufficient self-confidence to be tolerant of the historical approach to the study of politics. Moreover, are historians entirely innocent in all this? Most of what history offers to those fascinated by the contemporary world is valueless as an aid to understanding the present. Historians of the present generation have a division of labor in the field that results in highly detailed studies of highly specialized areas. Few attempt to deal with the macrocosm, few are truly holistic in their approach. What historians offer is often so arcane that even the most curious and most diligent of political scientists and students of international affairs neither have the time nor expend the effort in what may prove a frustrating and futile search. The historian as antiquarian is therefore of little use to the outside; the more utilitarian the approach to the subject, the more marketable is the final product, particularly in the field of international affairs. Surely historians want their work to contribute to the betterment of humanity.

Within the field of international history, one should also be wary of product labels: Is the product "international," or is it essentially the world view of the American or British instructor? Is the course in fact, though not in name, a history of American or British foreign policy dressed up as a history of international relations? However utilitarian the historian, if one's approach to the history of international relations is in fact ethnocentric, the value of the work is much diminished. The only way to avoid the ethnocentric trap is to master a foreign language and immerse oneself in foreign language sources. Only this way can historians hope to see themselves as others see them and guard against an easy but dangerous bias. The study and use of

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foreign languages by historians of international relations is thus fundamental to the health and ultimate utility of the area. Too few enter the field with foreign languages under their belts. Works that are well researched are nonetheless very often fatally flawed by reliance upon an archival base that is exclusively American or British. It is obviously easier to do this, but the price paid is enormous, and if history is to be sold on the international studies market, the supply must be adjusted to meet the demand. This can be done only by taking all these factors into consideration.

*Alan K. Henrikson, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University*

There are two interrelated questions. First, is there (and should there be) anything distinctive about the way international history is taught in the schools of international affairs? Second, does this distinctive characteristic lead to better scholarship and to better leadership? The approach to the teaching of the history of international relations at the Fletcher School has three distinguishing features. First, it recognizes the essential "foreignness" of foreign affairs. About 30 percent of its students are foreigners, who provide a wide foreign language base for research within the graduate program. The students, taken as a whole, have visited a large portion of the world, and this offers the possibility of creating within the classroom a sense of "being there" in dealing with international affairs.

Second, there is an appreciation of the professional and technical orientation of the students' approach to problems. Students have an interdisciplinary and pragmatic perspective because many of them, who have already worked in government, have been present when authorities have discussed and decided issues. They have an awareness of detail, that is, of data of a concrete kind that make up any international agreement. Since very few teachers of diplomatic history know a great deal about the actual practice of diplomacy, there is an opportunity for diplomatic historians at APSIA institutions to learn as well as teach the craft of diplomacy and the content of the subject. This involves, among other things, giving students a sense of how to sequence issues in negotiation, for example, whether to begin with the most difficult or the easiest; how to formulate communiqués, treaties, and other international agreements; and how to interpret properly the meaning of the informal terms used in the somewhat coded language of diplomacy.

Third, students and graduates have an awareness of the sense for policy and a feeling of responsibility, of a personal as well as institutional sort, in approaching international problems. Many of them already have much at stake. They feel an intellectual as well as a political need for consistency. Here an interest in alternative directions and choices that might have been pursued in the course of history comes into play. Students from abroad, given their various situations, can easily express alternative points of view. This variety of outlook can help a class understand why a particular approach was

not tried or, if it was tried, why it did not work. Students in international affairs are very apt to think in terms of analogies, which can be used both as argument and as proof. These students are adept at rhetorical analysis and at the more formal analysis of declaratory policy. They know that the words they and their governments use can be binding, politically as well as legally. They realize that statements they make in the official positions they have held (or will hold) have consequences that will constrain them.

What are the weaknesses and strengths of this distinctive schools-of-international-affairs approach to the teaching of history? First, the pragmatic orientation leads to a certain narrowness of outlook. Many scholar-practitioners of diplomatic history are not very comfortable with attempts to determine the underlying economic and social forces or the influence of the climate of opinion as factors in international relations. Such factors seem amorphous. Second, many students, though linguistically and otherwise accomplished, are far too deferential and unassuming. They expect to be analysts and implementers; very few see themselves as potential leaders or as entrepreneurs. It would be advisable to pay more attention, in instruction, to leadership and to innovation in international relations. More than offsetting this is a very impressive trait of students who have been trained at the Fletcher School, and presumably those who have studied at other APSIA institutions: their close insight into the gap between thought and action, as well as between word and reality, in world affairs. They understand the processes of achievement. They know how things happen historically and, by extension, how things can be made to happen.

*Theodore Geiger, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University*

The educational goals and the nature of the student body are determining principles for a school of international affairs. The master's degree is a professional degree, and most graduates do not go on to higher degrees but instead obtain employment in the private sector (multinational corporations, banks, policy-oriented research organizations, etc.) or in the U.S. Foreign Service, other governmental agencies, and international institutions. About a third of the students are foreign, some at midcareer levels in their countries' foreign services or ministries of foreign affairs. Most students have had at least a year of full-time work experience at home or abroad before joining the program at Georgetown University. The aim of the two-year MA program is to train policy analysts and policy implementers, many of whom will eventually become policymakers in the private, governmental, or international-organization sectors.

In brief, the essence of policymaking is to cause something desired to happen or to prevent something undesired from happening in the short or long term. Hence, policymaking involves identifying the factors that are

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likely to be determinative of the desired outcome and ascertaining the extent to which and the way in which the operation of these factors could be influenced by deliberate human decisions and actions. The real-life problems with which policymakers must cope commonly involve a greater or lesser diversity of interacting factors—political, economic, social-institutional, and psychocultural. This means that the training of students for policy-oriented work in the international field needs to employ an interdisciplinary approach with both functional breadth and historical depth. Accordingly, the program's curriculum encompasses and endeavors to integrate the political, economic, socio-institutional, and psychocultural factors involved in developments at national and international levels. It also seeks to foster understanding of the dynamics of how these factors change over time—past, present, and future—for if policies are to be effective, they must be based on as full an understanding as possible of the ways in which the present is both a continuation of and different from the past and of the more and less likely changes that could occur over the foreseeable future. As Lord Acton wrote: "History must be our deliverer not only from the undue influence of other times but from the undue influence of our own, from the tyranny of the environment and from the pressure of the air we breathe."[1] Similarly, one corollary of Santayana's famous maxim that those who know no history are condemned to repeat it would be that those who *know* history will be better able to make it.

These are ambitious requirements for a school's curriculum. One approach is a combination of required generalist (that is, interdisciplinary) courses that constitute the core curriculum and more specialized elective courses in students' fields of concentration. The core curriculum includes three year-long courses dealing with the history of intersocietal relations, international economics, and the making and implementation of foreign policies.

The objectives of the intersocietal relations history core courses, which use the term society in a sociological sense, are designed to help students develop a sense of the main sociocultural differences between societies that have developed within the Western civilizational tradition and those that have developed within the other major civilizational traditions, as these differences have affected their respective past and present motivations and capabilities for carrying on external relationships; a sense of the main modes—demographic, political, economic, social-institutional, and psychocultural—in which societies with similar and different historical backgrounds and sociocultural characteristics have interacted in past and present systems of intersocietal relations; and a sense of how past and present systems of intersocietal relations have changed over time, that is, how the structural characteristics and modes of operation of the system have helped to shape the development of its constituent societies and, conversely, how the changing motivations and capabilities of the constituent societies have affected the development of the intersocietal system.

This history component of the core curriculum is *not* a course in diplomatic history or even in international relations as conventionally understood. It includes these disciplines, where relevant, but it also involves the other significant ways in which societies interact. Because it deals in part with the interactions of historical societies that were not nation-states, the inclusive term "intersocietal relations" is used rather than the more restricted concept of "international relations."

*Notes*

[1]Lord Acton, *Lectures on Modern History* (London, 1906), 33.

*Albert D. Mott, School of International Service, The American University*

We have entered a phase when sociology, the theoretical approach, and history, the empirical source of "facts," have to be fused if we are to understand the contemporary world situation. Gordon Craig outlined a key aspect of this change of perspective when he stressed the passing of the traditional "paradigm" of the nation-state as the prime index to politics. He added that the "great movements of modern politics must be regarded as functions of the process of modern industrialism."[1] Thus, international history, if it is to achieve disciplinary respectability separate from the usual study of international relations, should adopt the approach of historical sociology. As Philip Abrams suggested, this approach provides a method of getting more theory into history and more facts into sociology.[2] Theda Skocpol's comparative study of revolution in the agrarian societies of France, Russia, and China[3] provides a celebrated and controversial example and is decidedly relevant to the study of international relations. In this era of ideological schism, historical sociology, as an already advanced part of the analysis of international relations, should be recognized in courses that emphasize the themes of Skocpol's work and introduce Marx's theoretical systems and Max Weber's sociological method.

The first requirement is the identification of general theories of world transition, using the works of Marx and Weber. Marx's classical revolutionary theory, a linear theory with millenarian overtones, based on class and class conflict, stressing the interacting relationships between infrastructure (the mode of production) and superstructure (values), is markedly deficient, however, in explaining what is currently taking place, that is, a transition from "traditional" to "modern" values. Without discounting economic and class differences, Weber's method of ideal-types, together with his two master concepts, rationalization and bureaucratization, when linked with his concepts of ideal and practical modes of rationality, that is, utopian-millenarian values and their clash with practical ends, provides a more advanced and in some ways more "objective" mode of analysis. Marx has

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achieved primacy in terms of ideological influence (witness the regimes founded on his doctrines), but Weber's nonlinear conceptions of traditional domination, legal-rational domination, and charismatic domination have more relevance to the realities of the contemporary world. From Lenin to Mao, "charismatic" leaders have been the dominant figures, with Hitler the most disastrous example. A course introducing these themes would necessarily differentiate between advanced industrial societies and traditional societies and seek to illuminate modernization and resistance to change in terms of conflicting values and appraisals of "reality."[4]

A course or sequence of courses should then turn to empirical questions, using the work of Skocpol and others. In his classic study *The Anatomy of Revolution,* Crane Brinton, for example, developed a pattern common to the English, French, and Russian revolutions. His was a fundamentally comparative analysis, which retains its value both in terms of methodology and content. Others have built on his work and provided a body of literature of great richness.[5] The internationalizing of the appraisal of revolution could lead to a clarification of contemporary Russian behavior toward the traditional societies bordering on the Soviet Union, along with the internal traditionalism in these areas. Afghanistan is a case in point. Gregory Massell has applied the theorem of the eradication of "traditionalism" as an explanation of Soviet policy in the attempted modernization of Central Asia. He has emphasized "tribal-patriarchal residues" and even views Moslem women as a "surrogate proletariat"![6] The use of political sociology can also assist understanding of recent trends in Western Europe. Indeed, Europe itself can be viewed in terms of a developmental analysis by contrasting the southern tier with the northern tier and both with a group of states in an intermediate state of development.

The idea of the state from classical to modern times must be examined, for it would enrich the study of general theory and introduce the students to germane political theory. Karl Dietrich Bracher's *The German Dilemma: The Relationship Between the State and Democracy* (New York, 1975) is an exemplary book on this theme. Evaluation of the relation of the state to revolutionary movements,[7] the problem of ostensibly secular revolutionary regimes, and the significance of modern technocratic theory, linked with positivist scientific thought and often in conflict with liberal and democratic values, would follow. This would allow some of the aspects of critical theory advanced by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno as well as Herbert Marcuse to be used. France is a leading example of the impact of technocratic state theory.[8]

The role of intellectuals in politics is a theme closely linked with both general theory and the idea of the state. The extraordinary prominence of intellectuals in modern politics would provide a means of critical evaluation of motives and effects.[9] The rise of terrorism in the 1970s and its spread to the level of a global phenomenon has a direct relation to the role of intellectuals in politics and thus would be examined.[10] What Albert Camus called

logical crime–killing in the name of an idea–is now chronic in the world arena. It would be worthwhile to study this phenomenon, for not only does terrorism open up the areas of grievance, it also involves what Weber called *Wertrationalität,* action in the name of perceived injustice or the realization of some utopian goal. A sober analysis of its causes and effects would be a vital introduction to the realities of contemporary politics. Indeed, integrating the study of terrorism into the complex of international history would be more valuable than a course on terrorism alone.

This theme could lead to a comparative study of the middle classes and their ideological preferences. The Euro-American Protestant middle class, the subject of Max Weber's celebrated Protestant ethic, would be one focus of analysis. The Catholic middle class of the southern tier of Europe and Latin America would be another. A comparison of this behavior might demonstrate differing views of social responsibility. This approach would also extend to the middle class in Islamic countries, in India, and in other parts of the world.

Finally, there are issues such as nationalism and imperialism, as well as geopolitical theory, that should be included in any course or sequence of courses. The debate on the relationship between nationalism and socialism, the psychological bases of nationalism, the political and economic effects of nationalist movements such as state creation and the development of common markets, the links between nationalism, racism, and fascism, Marx's underestimation of the force of nationalism, the emergence of national communism, the decline of nationalism in Europe after 1945 and the rise of local, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural loyalties, and the link between nationalism and terrorism must be explored.[11] The difference between oceanic imperialism and land-power imperialism, and between democratic and communist imperialism, the rich and varied theories of imperialism, United States and Soviet foreign policies seen as examples of comparative imperialism, imperialism as motive and consequence, the relationship of theories of imperialism to geopolitical theories, and a study of Islamic imperialism would provide insight into the functioning of the international system and the conduct of foreign policies by states of several ideological persuasions.

In sum, an attempt must be made to merge sociology (theory) and history (empirical reality) in courses that are part of the training of graduate students for careers in international affairs.

*Notes*

[1]Gordon Craig, "The Historian and the Study of International Relations," *American Historical Review,* 88 (February 1983): 1–11.

[2]Philip Abrams, *Historical Society* (Ithaca, 1982), 300. See also G. Stedman Jones, "From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History," *British Journal of Sociology,* XXVII (1976): 295–305.

[3]Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolution* (New York, 1979). See also David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism* (New York, 1961); and Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative and Historical Studies* (New York, 1986).

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[4]Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, 1966), and Daniel Bell, *Post-Industrial Society* (New York, 1973), would be a basis for the appraisal of advanced industrial societies. See also S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires: The Rise and Fall of the Historical Bureaucratic Societies* (New York, 1963).

[5]See Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1969); John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions* (Cambridge, U.K., 1972); Al S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution: An Introduction* (New York, 1975); Mark N. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution* (New York, 1974); Michael Freeman, "Review Article: Theories of Revolution," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2 (July 1972): 339-59; Barbara Salert, *Revolutions and Revolutionaries: Four Theories* (New York, 1976); and Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966).

[6]Gregory J. Massell, "Traditional Structures as Obstacles to Revolutionary Change: The Case of Soviet Central Asia," in Eric Nordlinger, ed., *Politics and Society: Studies in Comparative Political Sociology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), 266-87.

[7]See also Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (Fairlawn, N.J., 1957).

[8]See also Ezra Suleiman, *Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite* (Princeton, 1974); and G. William Domhoff and Hoyt B. Ballard, eds., *C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite* (Boston, 1968).

[9]See Thomas Molnar, *The Decline of the Intellectual* (Cleveland, 1961); James Joll, *Three Intellectuals in Politics: Blum, Rathenau, Marinetti* (New York, 1961); Lewis A. Coser, *Men of Ideas: A Sociologist's View* (New York, 1965); Lewis Feuer, *The Conflict of Generations: The Character and Significance of Student Movements* (New York, 1969); and George B. de Huszar, ed., *The Intellectuals* (New York, 1960).

[10]See Franco Venture, *Roots of Revolution* (New York, 1960); Leonard I. Krimerman and Lewis Perry, eds., *Patterns of Anarchy* (Garden City, N.Y., 1966); Alessandro Silj, *New Again Without a Rifle* (New York, 1979); and Jillian Becker, *Hitler's Children* (New York, 1979).

[11]See Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York, 1971) and *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge, U.K., 1981); Hans Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism* (New York, 1962); and Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism (Action Francaise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism)* (New York, 1965).

*Arthur Gilbert, The Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver*

Historical studies in schools of international affairs can serve two major purposes. The first is methodological. It is essential for graduate students to learn about various approaches to history, how history is written, and the ways in which history can be combined with other disciplines to produce new views of the past. The second goal is demonstrative. It must be shown how history can specifically illuminate particular problems that are pertinent to the study of international affairs. These two purposes can complement each other in courses combining both methods and the study of specific international problems.

Cumulation can be achieved in the following way. Students can be introduced to a variety of methodological problems and then to comparative history in sequential courses. A first course could deal with such standard philosophical problems as moral judgments in history, the use of conceptual apparatus and ideological frameworks in the writing of history, language and the writing of history, and the possibilities of scientific history. There could be an emphasis on the imaginative ways in which historians have utilized psychology, anthropology, and sociology in historical research so that students develop a sense of the interdisciplinary flavor of some modern

historical scholarship. A second course could focus on what is comparable in history and the ways in which comparative studies can illuminate certain phenomena. For example, after reading a great deal of the theoretical literature on fascism and totalitarianism, students could read empirical works on the nature of regimes that are often labeled as fascist or totalitarian. This blend of the theoretical and the empirical would force students to evaluate the utility of the concept for comparative purposes. Other themes that lend themselves to comparative analysis are slavery and genocide.

History must also be prominent in two critical areas of interest to the study of international politics: war and revolution. Courses on the outbreak of war and on comparative revolutions can combine theoretical literature on conflict and historical case studies. An outbreak-of-war course can focus on the contribution of crisis management, linkage politics, perception and misperception, and systems theory, for example, as well as studies by historians of how and why certain wars began. The dominant theme of the course would be to observe how well theories about war fit with case studies. A course on comparative revolutions would enable students to read the major theoretical works on revolution from Crane Brinton to Charles Tilly and Theda Skocpol, followed by the history of and the historiographical debates on specific revolutions. Evaluating theoretical works on revolution after intensive study of the history of revolutions would permit students to undertake comparative analysis.

In these ways history can and does make a significant contribution to the international studies curriculum.

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# A Guide to History in the APSIA Institutions

The APSIA institutions do not share a common curriculum, and offer courses of study leading to a variety of advanced degrees. The role that the study of history plays in the schools is varied and is summarized in terms of the types of courses offered and their centrality to the curriculum. Courses are identified as 1) history courses per se, or 2) courses with a substantial historical content; and as a) part of a required core curriculum, b) part of a field of study, or c) an elective. Graduate students of the schools are able to take courses in the respective departments of history, depending on the degree regulations governing study outside a school's own curriculum. The frequently rich offerings in the respective departments of history are not included here unless they are identified also as part of the international affairs curriculum.

## THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Washington, D.C. 20016

### School of International Service

DEGREES OFFERED: MA, MA/JD, PhD

CORE CURRICULUM: None (MA); selected courses in international affairs (PhD)

FIELDS OF STUDY:
European Integration
International Affairs
International Communication
International Development
Regional and International Systems

HISTORY COURSES:
Culture and Society: Freud to Sartre (2, c)
Culture and Society: Marx to Weber (2, c)
The Development of the Study of International Relations (2, b)
Diplomacy of World War II (2, b, c)
International Relations, 1919–1939 (2, b, c)
International Relations of Africa I and II (2, b)
International Relations of East Asia I and II (2, b)

International Relations of Latin America I and II (2, b)
International Relations of the Middle East I and II (2, b)
International Relations of Western Europe (2, b)
Modern China (2, b)
Modern Japan (2, b)
Politics and Society in Western Europe Since 1945 (2, b)
The United States in World Affairs (2, b)

## COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
New York, New York 10027

### School of International and Public Affairs

DEGREES OFFERED: MIA, MPA

CORE CURRICULUM: Four one-semester courses, including one course in international politics and one course in foreign historical and political processes plus two courses from the following three fields (one course per field)—international law, conflict resolution, and human rights; U.S. foreign policy; international policy analysis and management (MIA)

FIELDS OF STUDY: Functional (students directed to history courses that complement or provide background for an understanding of the field selected)
Economic and Political Development
Human Rights and International Law
International Business
International Economics
International Finance and Banking
International Media and Communication
International Political Economy
International Security Policy
Policy Analysis and Public Management
Regional (students normally take courses in modern history of the geographical area selected)
Africa
East Africa
East Central Europe
Latin America and Iberia

is of Latin America I and II

is of the Middle East I and II

is of Western Europe (2, b)

i Western Europe Since 1945

World Affairs (2, b)

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Public Management
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Middle East
Southern Asia
Soviet Union/Russia
Western Europe

HISTORY COURSES:

Biology and Society Since the 18th Century (2, b, c)
Colloquium on Soviet History (1, b, c)
Colloquium on the History and Politics of Israel (1, b, c)
Colloquium on the History of Modern Malaysia (1, b, c)
The Development of Russian and Soviet Marxism (1, b, c)
European International Relations, 1914 to the Present (2, b, c)
European International Relations Since 1939 (2, b, c)
European Politics and Society Since 1919 (2, b, c)
Europe Since 1919 (1, b, c)
France Since 1848 (1, b, c)
History of East Africa (1, b, c)
History of Latin American Civilization (1, b, c)
History of Modern China (1, b, c)
History of Modern India and Pakistan (1, b, c)
History of Modern Korea (1, b, c)
History of Modern Poland (1, b, c)
History of Modern South Africa (1, b, c)
History of Modern West Africa (1, b, c)
History of Soviet Russia (1, b, c)
History of Spain (1, b, c)
History of the Hapsburg Monarchy (1, b, c)
Islamic Renewal and Revolutionary Movements in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa (2, b, c)
Japan in the 20th Century (1, b, c)
Main Directions in the Foreign Relations of the United States (2, a)
The Political Culture of Modern Britain, 1760 to the Present (2, b, c)
The United States in the 20th Century (2, b, c)

Upper level history colloquia and seminars may be taken by those students with adequate background; students may select some of these courses to fulfill the core requirements

# UNIVERSITY OF DENVER
Denver, Colorado 80208

## The Graduate School of International Studies

DEGREES OFFERED: MA, MA/JD, MIM, PhD

CORE CURRICULUM: One course in research methods

FIELDS OF STUDY:
Comparative Politics
Global Conflict Analysis
Global Political Economy
Human Rights
International Development
International Economics
International Politics
Technology, Modernization, and International Relations

HISTORY COURSES:
The Arab-Israeli Conflict (1, b, c)
The Chinese Revolution (2, b, c)
The Cold War: History and Historiography (1, b, c)
Comparative Revolutions (2, b, c)
Comparative Socialist Development (2, b, c)
Diplomatic History (1, b, c)
European Imperialism in the 20th Century (1, b, c)
Fascism-Resistance in 20th-Century Europe (2, b, c)
History and Historiography (1, a)
The Holocaust and Human Experience (1, b, c)
Introduction to Comparative History (1, b, c)
The Outbreak of Peace (1, b, c)
The Outbreak of War (1, b, c)
Soviet Foreign and Defense Policy Under Brezhnev and His Successors (2, b, c)
Soviet Political and Economic Development (2, b, c)
U.S. Foreign Policy: 1917–1953 (1, b, c)
The West Views China: From Marco Polo to Kissinger (1, b, c)

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1, b, c)
n in the 20th Century

20th-Century Europe

graphy (1, a)
Human Experience (1, b, c)
parative History (1, b, c)
ce (1, b, c)
r (1, b, c)
Defense Policy Under Brezhnev
(2, b, c)
Economic Development

1917–1953 (1, b, c)
na: From Marco Polo to



## GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Washington, D.C. 20057

**Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service**

DEGREES OFFERED: MSFS, MSFS/MA (history), MSFS/MA (economics), JD/MSFS

CORE CURRICULUM: Three courses–International Economic Relations and Analysis; History of Intersocietal Relations; Foreign Policy Decision Making and Implementation

MSFS/MA in history, a joint degree, 18-course program, requires Introduction to History Methods and Historiography, History of Intersocietal Relations I and II, History Research Seminar, four history electives, and two free electives

FIELDS OF STUDY: Comparative and Regional Studies
International Trade, Finance, Development, and Business Diplomacy
U.S. Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (including Security Studies)

HISTORY COURSES: History of American Diplomacy (1, b, c)
Intersocietal Relations as Historical Process: Past, Present, and Future I, II, and III (1, a)

Electives include departmental offerings, intercultural seminars, and international business diplomacy courses

## THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Washington, D.C. 20036

**School of Advanced International Studies**

DEGREES OFFERED: MA, PhD

CORE CURRICULUM: Four courses–American Foreign Policy Since World War II; Comparative National Systems; Evolution

of the International System 1815–1945; Theories of the International System

FIELDS OF STUDY:

Geographic Areas
- Africa
- American Foreign Policy
- Asia, especially China and Japan
- Canada
- Europe
- Latin America
- Middle East
- Soviet Union

International Economics (required)
International Relations
Social Change and Development

HISTORY COURSES:

American Foreign Policy Since World War II (1, a, b)
America's Rise to Global Power (2, b, c)
Comparative National Systems (2, a)
Egypt: Political History, Culture, and the Political Process (2, b, c)
Europe and the World, 1945 to the 1960s (1, b, c)
Europe Between the Wars (1, b, c)
Europe in the World Since the 1960s (1, b, c)
The Evolution of Soviet Foreign Policy (1, b, c)
Evolution of the Canadian Polity (1, b, c)
Evolution of the International System 1815–1945 (1, a, b)
Foundation of African Societies (2, b, c)
Foundations of American Diplomacy (1, b, c)
Israel: Political History, Culture, and the Political Process (2, b, c)
Japanese Modern History (1, b, c)
Latin American History (1, b, c)
The Middle Eastern Order and the West (1, b, c)
Modern Chinese History (1, b, c)
Modern European History (1, b, c)
Nationalism and Nationalities in Russia and the USSR (2, b, c)
Pax Britannica: The Colonizer and the Colonized (2, b, c)
Political Culture and International Relations of Eastern Europe (2, b, c)

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Systems (2, a)
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The Politics of Development in Russia and the USSR (2, b, c)
Southeast Asia and the Modern World (2, b, c)
State and Empire Systems in History (1, b, c)
The State and the International System: Center-Periphery Issues in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (2, b, c)
Theories of the International System (2, a)

## UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

### Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

Information unavailable from the school at this time about the historical content of its curriculum

## PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Princeton, New Jersey 08544

### Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

DEGREES OFFERED: MPA, PhD

CORE CURRICULUM: Four courses including two courses in economics and quantitative analysis and two courses in political analysis and public management

FIELDS OF STUDY:
Development Studies
Economics and Public Policy
International Relations
Urban Affairs and Domestic Policy
Urban and Regional Planning

HISTORY COURSES:
Chinese Development (2, c)
Economic Development Policy (2, b)
The German Question (2, c)
Land Tenure and Economic Development in the Near East (2, c)
Political Economy of the Middle East (2, c)
Presidential Leadership and Public Policy (2, c)
Relations Among the Advanced Industrial Societies (2, c)
Relations Between Industrial and Developing Countries (2, c)

## UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles, California 90089-0034

### School of International Relations

DEGREES OFFERED: MA, MA/JD, MSIPA, PhD

CORE CURRICULUM: Three courses—International Relations Theory; International Relations Theory (advanced); Philosophy of Science and Introduction to Research Design

FIELDS OF STUDY:
Defense and Strategic Studies
Development Economics
Foreign Policy Analysis
International Economics
International Political Economy
International Politics and Diplomacy
Marine and Coastal Studies
Regional International Relations
- East Asia
- Latin America
- Middle East
- Soviet Union and the Communist World

HISTORY COURSES:
Chinese Foreign Policy (2, b)
Cold War Belief Systems and American Foreign Policy (2, b)
Geo-politics in Theory and Practice (2, b)
International Communism (2, b)
International Relations of the Great Powers in the 19th and 20th Centuries (1, b)
International Relations of the Middle East in the 20th Century (2, b)
Japanese Foreign Policy (2, b)
Politics of the World Economy (2, b)
Power and the State System (2, b)
Soviet Foreign Policy (2, b)

## TUFTS UNIVERSITY
Medford, Massachusetts 02115

### The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

DEGREES OFFERED: MA, MALD, PhD

CALIFORNIA

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ational Relations Theory;
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Studies
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CORE CURRICULUM: None

FIELDS OF STUDY: Curriculum separated into four divisions, each with specific fields of study

Business
- International Business Relations
- International Energy and Business
- International Nutrition, Food, and Agriculture

Economics
- Development Economics
- International Monetary Theory and Policy
- International Trade and Commercial Policies

Law
- International Organizations
- Law and Social Change
- Private International Law
- Public International Law

Politics
- Civilization and Foreign Affairs
- Comparative and Developmental Political Analysis
- International Information and Communications
- International Security Studies
- Political Systems and Theories

HISTORY COURSES:
- Cultural Diplomacy: Philanthropy and Foreign Affairs (1, c)
- The Dynamics of Socialist Internationalism (1, c)
- European Civilization and Diplomacy up to 1850 (1, b*, c)
- European Diplomacy in the 20th Century (1, b*, c)
- European Nationalism and Imperialism (1, b)
- The Evolution of Military Doctrines, With Special Reference to the United States (2, c)
- The Foreign Relations of the United States Since 1917 (1, b*, c)
- The Foreign Relations of the United States to 1917 (1, b*, c)
- The Formation and Conduct of American World Policy (1, b*, c)

* Alternative required course—students may choose to fulfill a requirement with either a required course or an alternative required course

History of the Turks and the International Politics of Eurasia (1, c)
International Law in American Diplomatic History (2, c)
The International Monetary System (2, b*, c)
The International Oil Business (2, c)
International Organization (2, b*, c)
Islamic History and Civilization (1, c)
Japanese Civilization and Foreign Affairs (1, c)
Korean Civilization and Foreign Affairs (1, c)
The Modernization of Saudi Arabia (2, c)
Modern Radical and Revolutionary Ideologies (1, c)
Origins and Development of International Law (2, c)
The Role of Force in International Politics (2, b)
Seminar in American Diplomatic History (1, b*, c)
Seminar on Cultural History: Modernism and the German Mind–The Road to Hitler (2, c)
Seminar on Diplomatic Negotiation (2, c)
Seminar on the United States and Western Hemisphere Relations (2, b)
Seminar on United States–Central American Relations (2, c)
Seminar on Values: J. Robert Oppenheimer and the Foundations of U.S. Nuclear Policy (2, c)
Social Stratification, Social Class, and Class Conflict (2, c)
Southwest Asia: History, Culture, and Politics (2, b)
Soviet Diplomacy and International Strategy (1, b)
Soviet Relations with Communist States and Parties (1, c)
The Third World and International Relations (2, b*, c)
The United States and Northeast Asia (1, c)
United States Diplomacy and Africa (2, c)

* Alternative required course–students may choose to fulfill a requirement with either a required course or an alternative required course

and the International Politics

American Diplomatic History

ɔnetary System (2, b*, c)
Business (2, c)
ation (2, b*, c)
ivilization (1, c)
ınd Foreign Affairs (1, c)
ıd Foreign Affairs (1, c)
f Saudi Arabia (2, c)
Revolutionary Ideologies

ıent of International Law

International Politics (2, b)
Diplomatic History (1, b*, c)
History: Modernism and the
Road to Hitler (2, c)
ic Negotiation (2, c)
d States and Western
ıs (2, b)
ates–Central American

Robert Oppenheimer and
U.S. Nuclear Policy (2, c)
ɔcial Class, and Class Conflict

ry, Culture, and Politics

International Strategy (1, b)
Communist States and Parties

International Relations

Northeast Asia (1, c)
cy and Africa (2, c)

fulfill a requirement with either a



# THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
Seattle, Washington 98195

## The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies

DEGREES OFFERED: MA, MA/JD, MA/MPA, MA/MBA

CORE CURRICULUM: Three courses–Change and Stability in International Affairs; International Political Economy; Origins of the Modern Global System

FIELDS OF STUDY:
- Functional Studies
  - Internal and Comparative Dimensions of Business, Forestry, Law, Marine Studies, and Public Affairs
- Regional Studies
  - China
  - Japan
  - Middle East
  - Russia and East Europe
  - South Asia
- Special Topics Field
  - Ethics in International Affairs
  - Food Production
  - Technology Transfer
  - Others
- Topical Series
  - World Issues and Comparative Processes and Institutions

HISTORY COURSES:
Change and Stability in International Affairs (2, a)
Emergence of Postwar Japan (2, b)
Field Course in Russian History (1, b)
History of Eastern Europe: 1931–Present (1, b)
History of Mid-East Since 1789 (1, b)
History of Modern China (1, b)
History of Modern Japan (1, b)
History of Tokugawa Japan (1, b)
Modern Indian History (1, b)
Modern Russian History (1, b)
Origins of the Modern Global System (2, a)