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## *Chapter Two: The Emergence of International Relations as a Discipline*

THE phenomenal postwar proliferation of books, journals, courses, and research institutes devoted to international relations in the United States prompted Alfred Grosser in 1956 to wonder whether the study of international relations was an American specialty.<sup>1</sup> Had he been writing in 1956 about the other superpower, the Soviet Union, he might well have observed that the conspicuous avoidance of the study of international relations was one of the characteristic features of academic inquiry in that country.

During the intervening years, one of the major dimensions of the changed Soviet appraisal of international relations consisted in the greatly enhanced interest in the study of international relations by specialists in the institutes of the Academy of Sciences. For them, international relations has become a legitimate area of inquiry. In the Soviet Union the study of international relations has come to be viewed as a relatively autonomous discipline. There emerged, during the years of Khrushchev's tenure in power, moreover, a new, younger generation of social scientists interested in questions pertaining to international relations, who showed a striking propensity, by previous Soviet standards for methodological and conceptual innovation. These dramatic trends in the study of international relations are traced and analyzed in this chapter.

<sup>1</sup> Grosser, "L'étude des relations internationales, spécialité américaine?" pp. 634-51. Since the publication of Professor Grosser's article, the spate of scholarship has continued unabated and, if anything, has quickened. For a more recent discussion see William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox, "The Teaching of International Relations in the United States," pp. 339-59.

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### TO THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS

It is NOT precise to say that prior to 1956 there was no international relations literature in the Soviet Union. In the broadest sense, there was. After all, there were the pronouncements of that "coryphaeus" of human wisdom, Joseph V. Stalin, who in his uniquely didactic style had struggled with several major questions of contemporary international politics—war and peace,<sup>2</sup> bipolarity, patterns of cohesion and disintegration among states. In the postwar period Stalin's most relevant contribution was *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*,<sup>3</sup> written in 1952 just prior to his death, in which he took issue with some (unidentified) comrades who argued that the Leninist theory of the inevitability of wars had become obsolete.

Moreover, while Stalin lived, there were a few studies written by diplomatic historians and international lawyers which had at least a tangential bearing on international relations. Even in the days when the strictures of *partiinost'* were most manifest, publications of diplomatic historians like Eugene Tarle and of international lawyers like Eugene Korovin and Feodor Kozhevnikov occasionally warranted examination.

In the years between Stalin's death in 1953 and the Twentieth C.P.S.U. Congress in 1956, military and strategic thought, pallid as it was by Western standards, stood out against a background of other Soviet disciplines that might conceivably contribute insights into the international political

<sup>2</sup> Frederic S. Burin, "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVII, No. 2 (June 1963), pp. 334-55, examines Stalin's views on the causes of war.

<sup>3</sup> For a provocative interpretation of *Economic Problems of Socialism* see Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 20-34.

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process. The perceived need to rethink the nature of war in light of the development of atomic weapons gave impetus to a recrudescence in military thought. It was, in fact, largely in military matters—but more in strictly military matters than in those dealing with international relations—that the consequences of the cult of the personality were aired prior to the Twentieth Congress.

Only in one other area of inquiry, what in Soviet parlance is called Eastern studies (which in the 1950s embraced Asia, Africa, and Latin America), were there minimal signs of vigor before the Twentieth C.P.S.U. Congress.<sup>4</sup>

There were no contributions from the two disciplines, political science and sociology, which in the West have been most concerned with international relations. There were, strictly speaking, no political scientists or sociologists (of course, international economists existed as a group, but they had generally been in bad graces since the Varga controversy in 1947). The study of politics in the Soviet Union,<sup>5</sup> unlike

<sup>4</sup> In 1962 I. I. Potekhin, until his recent death an influential Soviet Africanist, argued that Africa should not be subsumed under the rubric “the East” now that colonialism was virtually at an end. “Africa is Africa,” he observed tautologically; “it is not a continuation of imperialist Europe and it is not the East.” A distinct anti-Chinese thrust may be discerned here: was Potekhin intimating that neither the “East wind” (China) nor the “West wind” would prevail in Africa? (“Narody Azii i Afrika—brat’ia” [The Peoples of Asia and Africa—Brothers], *Aziia i Afrika segodnia* [Asia and Africa Today], No. 3 (March 1962), p. 4.) Potekhin made no mention of Latin America. See Walter Z. Laqueur and George Lichtheim, *The Soviet Cultural Scene: 1956-1957* (New York: Atlantic Books Ltd., 1958), pp. 237-55.

<sup>5</sup> For two Western estimates of political science in the Soviet Union (unfortunately already dated), see Gordon Skilling, “In Search of Political Science in the U.S.S.R.,” *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. xxix, No. 4 (November 1963), pp. 519-29 and Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, “The Post-Stalin ‘Thaw’ and Soviet Po-

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that in the United States, had not extricated itself from legal studies,<sup>6</sup> a subordination which for other European countries, as W. A. Robson has pointed out, has resulted "invariably . . . in a narrow, inadequate and distorted conception of the subject."<sup>7</sup>

As for sociology, its status in the Soviet Union was nil. "There is no Soviet counterpart of Western sociology," Leopold Labedz could write in 1956. Despite the fact that in all Western accounts Marx is regarded as one of modern sociology's founders, the word "sociology" was always modified by the pejorative "bourgeois" in Soviet commentary. Academically its subject matter was largely subsumed under philosophy. There were no sociology departments nor institutes of sociology. (Moscow State University had a Chair of Sociology until 1924.) Practically, the purview of sociology was coopted by

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litical Science," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. xxx, No. 1 (February 1964), pp. 22-48.

<sup>6</sup> A modest, symbolic step toward Western notions of political science may have been taken in 1960 when the Institute of Law became the Institute of State and Law. See "O reorganizatsii Instituta Prava v Institute Gosudarstva i Prava" [Concerning the Reorganization of the Institute of Law into the Institute of State and Law], *Vestnik*, No. 8 (August 1960), p. 116.

In 1963 Leonid Il'ichev told a session of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences that "the question of studying specific spheres of politics deserves . . . attention": ". . . class relations at home and abroad, bourgeois parties, the communist and workers' movement, the democratic movement, public opinion, propaganda, the state (*not on the plane of constitutional and administrative norms, as it is studied by legal science, but on the plane of its real activities [zhivoi deatel'nosti*) and, last, international relations." "Metodologicheskie problemy estestvoznaniia i obshchestvennykh nauk" [Methodological Problems of the Natural and Social Sciences], *Vestnik*, No. 11 (November 1963), p. 43, italics added.

<sup>7</sup> Robson, *The University Teaching of Social Sciences: Political Science* (London: UNESCO, 1954), p. 16.

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the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.<sup>8</sup>

The situation in international relations scholarship per se was especially inadequate. One gains an impression of almost total quiescence from the speeches made at the Twentieth Party Congress. An examination of statements made by participants in the round of *kritika i samokritika* (critique and self-critique)<sup>9</sup> which appeared on the pages of *International Affairs* (in 1956 the only Soviet journal dealing specifically with international relations) in the aftermath of the Twentieth Party Congress, produces the same effect.

The minimal research being conducted was oriented primarily to the past. Scholars apparently retreated to the pre-Soviet period, an area in which their work was less likely to attract undue attention from the Party. To many, obscurantism must have seemed the better part of wisdom. Suggestive of the research preoccupations of Soviet scholarship were several of the titles of proposed topics, which according to S.

<sup>8</sup> Labedz's article, on which the above draws heavily, is reproduced in Laqueur and Lichtheim, *The Soviet Cultural Scene*, pp. 185-201, at p. 185. See also George Fischer, *Science and Politics: The New Sociology in the Soviet Union* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Center for International Studies, Cornell University Press, 1964).

<sup>9</sup> See especially E. Korovin et al., "A Letter to the Editors," *International Affairs*, No. 12 (December 1956), p. 98; I. Ivashin, "Comments on 'A Letter to the Editors,'" *International Affairs*, No. 1 (January 1957), p. 164; "Review of Letters," *International Affairs*, No. 1 (January 1957), pp. 160-61; and I. Galkin, "The Duty of Soviet Scholars," *International Affairs*, No. 2 (February 1956), p. 133.

For Western commentary see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Diplomacy in the Mirror of Soviet Scholarship," in *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror*, ed. John Keep and Liliana Brisby (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 243-85 and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy toward Developing Countries, 1953-1963* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 289-317, especially 298ff.

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Maiorov<sup>10</sup> (a Gospolitizdat official responsible for international affairs literature), were submitted at this juncture to Gospolitizdat: "Essays on the History of International Relations in the Years 1763-1870" and "The Foreign Policy of the Jacobin Republic of 1793-1794" (from the Department of Contemporary History at the Moscow Potemkin Pedagogical Institute); "International Relations in the 1870's" and "Russian Foreign Policy During the Unification of Germany (1866-1870)" (from the Byelorussian Lenin State University); "The Polish Question and the Diplomatic Struggle in Europe at the End of the 1850's and the Beginning of the 1860's" and "The Role of Austro-Hungary in Unleashing the First World War" (from the Modern History Department of Leningrad University).

Recruitment of new cadres in the social sciences generally—and specifically in areas dealing with international relations—had dwindled to nearly nothing. At the Twentieth Party Congress Anastas Mikoyan asked, "Who[m] do we have, after all, to engage in a serious study of [capitalism's contemporary state]?"<sup>11</sup> The answer was as obvious as the question was rhetorical: virtually no one. According to Maiorov, "not a single post-graduate submitted or even prepared a thesis in Soviet foreign policy" in 1956 for the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences.<sup>12</sup> "Training of post-graduates in the field of international relations has stopped . . ." asserted I. Galkin, dean of Moscow State University, "at a time when we are in dire need of research workers in the historiography of modern history, international relations, prob-

<sup>10</sup> "Review of Letters," p. 160.

<sup>11</sup> Leo Gruliov, ed., *Current Soviet Policies II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 87.

<sup>12</sup> "Review of Letters," p. 161.

lems of scientific socialism, and other vital branches of history."<sup>13</sup> "There are almost no educational establishments to train qualified propagandists in the field of international affairs,"<sup>14</sup> declared I. Ivashin of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee's Higher Party School.

The one journal dealing with international relations (*International Affairs*)<sup>15</sup> was an organ of the "popular All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, and not of the Academy of Sciences. What materials *were* being published on international questions in the Soviet press amounted to "dull and stereotyped" "popular booklets" or articles which were (as one participant in the pattern of *kritika i samokritika* said of an article written by Eugene Korovin,) "evidently composed in a hurry," and which were "nothing but a compilation of sentences and facts over a period of 40 years."<sup>16</sup> Four of the leading specialists in the study of international relations—including Korovin—were not exaggerating when they wrote, ". . . new and original scholarly works of research are not being published. . . . Actually no monographs on the basic problems of world affairs are available."<sup>17</sup>

And small wonder. Aside from any consideration of qualitative standards, there were not even the most rudimentary boundary markers indicating the existence of a legitimate area of inquiry. There were no required courses in interna-

<sup>13</sup> Galkin, "The Duty of Soviet Scholars," p. 133.

<sup>14</sup> Ivashin, "Comments," p. 164.

<sup>15</sup> Even *International Affairs* had only been published since 1954, although as Aspaturian (in Keep and Brisby, *Contemporary History*, p. 244) points out, a journal of the same title was published in the 1920s by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>16</sup> Ivashin, "Comments," p. 164.

<sup>17</sup> Korovin, "Letter to the Editors," p. 98.



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tional relations,<sup>18</sup> no textbooks, “no reference books dealing with political parties, and government bodies,”<sup>19</sup> “no yearbooks of world events,”<sup>20</sup> no institutes concerned specifically with the study of international relations.<sup>21</sup>

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Thus international relations studies were essentially starting from scratch in 1956. The major impetus to the legitimization of international relations as an area of inquiry came at the Twentieth Party Congress. Part of this impetus was indirect, in that the Twentieth Congress provided an atmosphere in the Soviet Union more conducive to intellectual honesty, although, it should be noted, international relations, unlike history, played no part in the post-Congress thaw. More directly, the impetus was supplied by the critique of Soviet social sciences, including international relations, undertaken by

<sup>18</sup> Ivashin, “Comments,” p. 164.

<sup>19</sup> Korovin, “Letter to the Editors,” p. 98.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> The Institute of World Economy and World Politics was disbanded after World War II as one of the results of the famous Varga controversy. N. A. Voznesensky had sharply criticized the institute’s leading light, Eugene Varga, for the views he expressed in *Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War*. (Varga’s “rightist” error was that he had foreseen the possibility of a postwar capitalist recovery.) Varga’s disgrace resulted in the absorption of the Institute into the Institute of Economics, then headed by Voznesensky, and the termination of the Institute’s journal, *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*. (A survey of these events may be found in Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.*, pp. 80-89.) Voznesensky was subsequently purged by Stalin. Ironically Varga survived and lived until 1964, when as an octogenarian he died of natural causes.

There did exist, however, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (closely associated with the Soviet Foreign Ministry), which served as a center for training foreign service cadres.

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members of the dominant Khrushchevian faction of the Presidium, who encouraged, and stressed the need for, greater work by specialists in areas related to international relations.

An especially prominent role in this was played by Anastas Mikoyan.<sup>22</sup> He had harsh words for the Soviet "study of capitalism's contemporary state"—the quality of which, he observed, was "sadly lacking." In particular, he expressed regret that "the Institute of World Economy and World Politics . . . [had been] done away with"—an observation which, in effect, rehabilitated the Institute and conveyed the implication that it or something like it should be created. On Soviet "Eastern Studies," his remarks were equally pointed. He ridiculed the work being done in the Academy of Sciences by noting that, whereas "the whole East has awakened," the Institute of Eastern Studies of the Academy of Sciences "was still dozing," and questioned the appropriateness of having undertaken "the liquidation of the 130-year-old Moscow Institute of Eastern Studies, particularly . . . at a time when our ties with the East were increasing and strengthening, a time when the expansion of our economic, political, and cultural ties with the countries of the East had brought about a tremendous rise in the Soviet people's interest in that area, and in the need for people who know the Eastern countries' languages, economics, and culture." Mikhail Suslov similarly urged specialists to "consider the supreme criterion of their work to be life, [not] statements by authority,"<sup>23</sup> and Dmitry Shepilov charged them—along with "literary artists, [and] all our workers in the sphere of socialist ideology"—to make it their "task . . . to imbue our people with proletarian internationalism, with friendship of peoples and intolerance of all forms

<sup>22</sup> Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies II*, p. 87.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

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of slavery, oppression, colonialism, national and racial discrimination.”<sup>24</sup>

Several concerns seem to have animated the dominant Presidium faction to encourage at this particular time an increased scholarly interest in international relations. The key members of the Soviet ruling group may have felt a need to legitimate the general rightward turn in Soviet foreign policy, which found its expression in both the intensification of Soviet foreign policy activities on several diplomatic fronts (the “spirit of Geneva,” the Bulganin-Khrushchev jaunt through Asia) and in doctrinal innovation, for example, the reconsideration of the inevitability-of-war doctrine. As a result, from the regime’s vantage point, it was no longer tolerable to omit from the research plans of institutes and universities such topics as

relations among Socialist countries, the present-day relations among capitalist states, the role and importance in international relations of countries that have overthrown the colonialist yoke and taken the road of independent development . . . the role of international organizations (UNO, democratic organizations of women, youth, or peace supporters), . . . the development of international communist and labour movements, the problems of proletarian internationalism. . . .<sup>25</sup>

Moreover, the ruling faction in the Presidium seems to have concluded that the credibility of the new policies could not be enhanced merely by requiring the ideologues to engage in the traditional Soviet practice of substituting new facts for old ones; rather, even for the narrow purposes of internal propaganda, a broader factual presentation was required.

In addition, Mikoyan emphasized the contribution of re-

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.

<sup>25</sup> Statement by S. Maïorov, “Review of Letters,” p. 160.

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search to policy-making. It was "not enough" in his view for the specialists merely to affirm that "the course of history indicates that in the present stage of imperialism . . . all Marxism-Leninism's basic tenets are invariably confirmed." Instead, they should concern themselves with "when, where, to what degree, and how this takes place."<sup>26</sup>

The members of the dominant faction may also have been motivated by a concern for high political stakes, particularly in the case of Asian studies. Throughout 1955 and into 1956 there was, in the words of Laqueur and Lichtheim, "a distinct hiatus between the Soviet Government's efforts to improve relations with Asian and African political leaders, and the tone of writing favoured by the more or less scholarly [Soviet] journals" which "continued to subject the Soviet Government's Asian and African interlocutors to criticism and abuse in the approved orthodox manner."<sup>27</sup> Many Orientalists, it would seem, were not favorably disposed to the direction being taken in Soviet foreign policy and, perhaps, may have been linked to Molotov or at least sympathetic ideologically with his views. (Others may simply have assumed that the foreign policy initiatives were strictly tactical and short-run, and wished not to be found in an awkward position when the "progressiveness" of the national bourgeoisie would once again be downgraded.) The most persuasive evidence that high politics was involved was provided by the January 1956 issue of *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie* [Soviet Eastern Studies], publication of which was delayed four months (sent to press on April 2, 1956). When it finally appeared, the old editorial board had been replaced and the lead editorial contained a strong hint that persons in Eastern Studies had been

<sup>26</sup> Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies II*, p. 72.

<sup>27</sup> Laqueur and Lichtheim, *The Soviet Cultural Scene*, p. 238.

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sympathetic to Molotov's views. Thus "sectarian mistakes" and "dogmatism" were discerned, and the editorial criticized the prevalent "misunderstanding of the character and depth of the contradiction between the forces of imperialism and domestic reactionaries and the forces of national progress in the non-socialist countries of the East."<sup>28</sup>

At the same time, other dominant themes of the Twentieth Congress—specifically (a) the stress on the need to reinvigorate the ideology as an instrumentality for mass mobilization by overcoming the ideology's "considerable detachment from life"<sup>29</sup> and (b) the concern evidenced about the general misallocation of resources through "the absence of coordination,"<sup>30</sup> "harmful parallelism,"<sup>31</sup> and the misdirection of research "to the past, into history, at the expense of present-day problems"<sup>32</sup>—suggest that the inclination to change was related to several traditional Soviet concerns. In particular, the impulse to increase the "coordination" of research and the desire to enhance the regime's ability to use ideology as an instrument of mass manipulation, undoubtedly played a major role in the initial encouragement of interest in 1956 in international relations-related matters.

Thus for some, the chief complaint about works dealing with international relations was that the "themes of monographs [were] not, as a rule, related and . . . not based on a uni-

<sup>28</sup> "XX s"ezd kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza i zadachi izucheniia sovremennogo Vostoka" [The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Tasks of Studying the Modern East], *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie*, No. 1 (January 1956), pp. 3-12, especially 7.

<sup>29</sup> "Party propaganda," Suslov declared, "has . . . begun to lose its militant Bolshevik spirit." Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies II*, p. 79.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

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fied plan of research";<sup>33</sup> that "the research [was] not directed and coordinated";<sup>34</sup> that the Ministry of Higher Education was not planning and directing "departmental research" but merely limiting "itself to the collection of annual plans drawn [up] by universities" which the Ministry "files . . . away."<sup>35</sup> Similarly, for old ideological *apparatchiki* like Ivashin it was cause for concern that *International Affairs* did not have a section "in aid of the lecturer and propagandist"<sup>36</sup> and that the journal "fairly frequently" published articles "without regard for whom they are written."<sup>37</sup>

### LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS: 1956-1962

THE FIRST big step taken after the Twentieth Congress that encouraged the study of international relations for those below the apex of the Party and the government apparatus was the announced reconstitution in April 1956 of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. A brief statement in *Pravda* noted that the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences had approved "the structure of the new institute"; declared that the Institute "will publish a monthly magazine entitled, *World Economy and International Relations*"; and summarized the Institute's assigned area of purview; to wit, "the study of the laws of

<sup>33</sup> "Review of Letters," p. 161.

<sup>34</sup> Galkin, "The Duty," p. 133.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> Evidently the specialists were initially able to withstand the pressure to harness *International Affairs* so directly to the propaganda purposes of the regime, for in March 1958 it was possible for the editors to assert that "some readers do not clearly understand the journal's purpose. They suggest a satirical section, *a section for lecturers, etc.*" "Readers Discuss Our Journal," *International Affairs*, No. 3 (March 1958), p. 124, italics added.

<sup>37</sup> Ivashin, "Comments," p. 164.

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development of present-day capitalism, of the economies and policies of individual countries, of mutual relations between the two world . . . systems—capitalist and socialist—of questions relating to the new role of Asian countries in world economy and policy, etc.”<sup>88</sup>

Apparently the activities of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations remained rather inconspicuous for more than a year. Not until July 1957 did it become a matter of public record that the institute had initiated operations in August 1956, and that in September 1956 Varga had presented a paper on the Suez situation.<sup>89</sup> Similarly, it was not until the publication of the March 1957 issue of *International Affairs* that mention was made of a series of meetings held in the fall and early winter of 1956, at which foreign lecturers were heard. Also, for some reason, the Institute did not begin publication of its monthly journal, *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, until July 1957.

Evidence of immediate responses in 1956 to the decisions of the Twentieth Congress was decidedly meager in areas touching on international affairs. In the December 1956 issue of *International Affairs* the letter (to which reference has already been made) signed by four leading figures in Soviet social science—Korovin, A. Guber, N. Liubimov, and A. Manfred—appeared, which initiated the public airing of the situation in international relations. In that letter the four specialists drew attention to the fact that those concerned with inter-

<sup>88</sup> *Pravda*, April 24, 1956, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter *Current Digest*), Vol. VIII, No. 17 (June 6, 1956), p. 21.

<sup>89</sup> I. Glagolev, “Nauchnaia zhizn’” [Scholarly Life], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 1 (July 1957), p. 156. Mention was made of the Institute in *Vestnik* in November 1956. See “O zadachakh i strukture Instituta Vostokovedeniia” [Concerning the Tasks and Structure of the Institute of Eastern Studies], *Vestnik*, No. 11 (November 1956), pp. 104-105.

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national relations were not among the "Soviet scholars . . . successfully overcoming the negative consequences of the personality cult"; "The social sciences dealing with world affairs appear to be reacting very slowly to the lead given by the Twentieth Congress. We are of the opinion that the necessary stimulation of research work on the study of current world affairs is proceeding too slowly."<sup>40</sup>

The torpor was not surprising. Whereas the historians, who had a journal and were already acknowledged as constituting a separate specialty, quickly responded to the more tolerant post-Congress atmosphere, obviously a certain lead time was involved in stimulating study in an area virtually lacking in cadres, lacking an academic journal, and not yet really recognized as a separate discipline. Moreover, there was some evidence that the proposal to create an Institute of World Economy and International Relations was not greeted with unmitigated enthusiasm by representatives of all "social sciences dealing with world affairs." Specifically, the remarks of V. Shurshalov and G. Zhukov, "members of the staff of the International Law Department of the Institute of Law," suggested a certain uneasiness on the part of some international lawyers about the role of the new Institute: "The establishment of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations," Shurshalov and Zhukov cautioned, "does not remove the necessity for an independent research centre to study the problems of international relations."<sup>41</sup>

Thus the length of time between the Twentieth Party Congress, at which Mikoyan had regretted that the old Institute of World Economy and World Politics had been "done away

<sup>40</sup> Korovin, "Letter to the Editors," p. 98.

<sup>41</sup> "Summary and Discussion," *International Affairs*, No. 5 (May 1957), p. 136.



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with," the announcement in April 1956 of the establishment of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and the appearance of the institute's journal in July 1957 can be explained without reference to that power struggle being waged within the highest echelons of the Communist Party, which culminated in the rout of the anti-Party group (a "minority" of seven) by the "majority" of four, at the June 22-29, 1957 Plenum of the Central Committee. One assumes, however, that the precise timing of the appearance of the institute's journal was related to these high-level events, since the first number of *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* went to press on July 5, that is, less than a week after the June Plenum.

In 1956 Mikoyan and other partisans of the Khrushchev faction in the Presidium apparently conceived the international relations dimension of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations' research to be within the context of "the study of capitalism's present state," about which Soviet scholars were "seriously lagging"; they expected that the institute would be primarily a research center for economists. The editorial charge in 1957 to the members of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations similarly called on *economists* to fulfill the tasks the Twentieth Party Congress had set for them by studying the capitalist economy.<sup>42</sup>

In view of the Marxist-Leninist commitment to the interrelation of economic and political factors, there was nothing exceptional in presuming international relations expertise of economists; accordingly, at the outset, economists appear to have predominated overwhelmingly in the cadres recruited

<sup>42</sup> "Nashi zadachi" [Our Tasks], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 1 (July 1957), pp. 3-6.

to staff the institute. However, the topic matter handled in the ensuing years was more indicative of a "scientific center bringing together specialists in world affairs in our country," the creation of which Korovin and others had declared a question "worthwhile discussing."<sup>43</sup> From the very first issues of the institute's journal the institute was as preoccupied with international relations as with economics—of individual countries or of the world economy generally.

The attitude was similarly, if contradictorily, prevalent that international relations was largely the domain of the historian.<sup>44</sup> The course offered in international relations at the major universities was taught in the history department. International relations, in the sense in which the historians were using it, meant *diplomatic history* and was basically synonymous with direct interstate relations, an attitude more appropriate to a nonrevolutionary period when "international politics was 'made' in [the foreign offices of] London, Paris, Washington, Berlin,"<sup>45</sup> or to the period of socialism in one country.

It was also much more appropriate to the period prior to the Twentieth Congress, when "topicality" [*akhtual'nost'*] was

<sup>43</sup> Korovin, "Letter to the Editors," p. 98. See also the summary and discussion in No. 5 (May 1957), *International Affairs*, pp. 135-37, in which a number of participants in the round of self-debasement and mutual recrimination specifically related the Korovin proposal to the institute. The general tenor of the remarks was that the establishment of the institute was only a "*first . . . step*," italics in original.

<sup>44</sup> For example, the specific remark to that effect, written in 1962 in AN IMEMO, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia . . .*, Vol. 1, p. xxvi: "Formerly, international relations was studied mainly by historians . . . ." See, too, Il'ichev's complaint in 1963, directed against the approach of "our historians" to the study of international relations. Il'ichev, "Metodologicheskie problemy . . .," p. 43.

<sup>45</sup> AN IMEMO, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia . . .*, Vol. 1, p. viii.

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avoided, than to the period after 1956 when topicality<sup>46</sup> became the order (literally) of the day.

Under these circumstances, it was natural that international relations should increasingly have come to be regarded as a distinct field of inquiry. The mere reestablishment of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations placed it in 1957-58 further along the gradations of official sanction than two other "new" social sciences, to which only in the last years of the Khrushchev regime was belated atten-

<sup>46</sup> See the blunt remarks of Boris N. Ponomarev (a Party Secretary largely concerned with international communist affairs):

"Comrades! The great variety of tasks standing before Soviet scholars . . . makes it imperative to raise the questions of the *topicality* of the subjects of historical research.

"The complete groundlessness of the concepts—still not completely eliminated—that for the study of modern history there are supposedly not sufficient quantity of sources accumulated in the archives, is apparent. Such assertions do not, will not, withstand criticism. . . . The problem of topicality . . . is determined first of all by those tasks which stand before our Party and the world revolutionary movement."

"Zadachi istoricheskoi nauki i podgotovka nauchno-pedagogicheskikh kadrov v oblasti istorii" [The Tasks of Historical Science and the Preparation of Scientific-pedagogical Cadres in History], *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1 (January 1963) pp. 3-35, at pp. 21-22, italics added.

See also, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie o merakh uluchsheniia podgotovki nauchno-pedagogicheskikh kadrov po istoricheskim naukam* [All-Union Conference on Measures of Improving the Preparation of Scientific-pedagogical Cadres in the Historical Sciences] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1964), pp. 11-54, and the discussion which follows, passim; and the remarks by Maiorov, a Gospolitizdat official ("Review of Letters," p. 160), who strongly suggested a link between possible publication and "topicality."

At the same time, it should be stressed that while the regime strongly encouraged "topicality," genuine diplomatic history also became more possible, since greater access was granted to archival materials, etc., and the regime seemed less intent on imposing politics on the past in all spheres.

tion devoted in the Soviet Union—sociology and social psychology.<sup>47</sup>

One indication of this emergence of international relations from a peripheral matter for economists or historians to a separate field was the upgrading accorded to the term *mezhdunarodnik* (literally, if awkwardly, *internationalist*) in the last years of the Khrushchev era. (The term actually is an old one which, often preceded by *iurist* [jurist], initially denoted international lawyers.) In the first few years after the Twentieth Party Congress, the appropriate scholars in the Academy of Sciences were referred to as economists or historians. *Mezhdunarodnik*, at this time, referred to activists as disseminators of the Party line on international matters to the masses in the Kolkhozes, etc. Thus, in a discussion of the contributions being made by *Mirovaia ekonomika*, I. M. Liadov, a lecturer of the Moscow Party *oblast'* committee, observed that the journal "had fully justified itself." It was, he said, "an academic publication . . . , but nevertheless found its readers not only among scientific workers but also among propagandists, speaker-*mezhdunarodnikov*, lecturers." Similarly A. A. Mishin of Moscow State University declared at the same meeting: "We use this journal not only as lecturer-*mezhdunarodniki* but as people engaged in scholarly work. The journal is valuable not only for economists but for representatives of the juridical and other social sciences as well."<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup> For Western comments on recent developments in Soviet sociology, see George Fischer, *Science and Politics: The New Sociology in the Soviet Union*; Paul Hollander, "The Dilemmas of Soviet Sociology," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. xiv, No. 6 (November-December 1965), pp. 34-46; and Leopold Labedz, "Sociology as a Vocation," *Survey*, No. 48 (July 1963), pp. 57-65.

<sup>48</sup> "Khronika" [Chronicle], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 9 (September 1958), pp. 151-52. Note the strikingly divergent perspectives with

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By 1962, however, the *Mirovaia ekonomika* editorial calling for the fulfillment of the tasks outlined in the Twenty-second Party Congress was directed to “economists and *mezhdunarodniki*.”<sup>49</sup> Similarly, in 1963, *Mirovaia ekonomika* introduced a forum in which specialists were given greater leeway to express their own views. It was a forum for economists and *mezhdunarodniki*. Here the term had come to be applied as a term of reference to specialists in a distinct area of inquiry (apart from, in this case, economics) who were researchers in an institute of the Academy of Sciences—that is, to a much more exalted kind of Soviet ideologue. Moreover, international relations was no longer the domain of “mainly historians” as it was “formerly”: “Now the joint efforts of historians, economists, [international] lawyers, and specialists in military affairs are required.”<sup>50</sup>

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respect to the function of the journal. For other examples of the use of *mezhdunarodnik* to connote propagandist, see the report of a one-day conference on the German problem, organized by the Institute and the Moscow city branch of the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge (under Agitprop): “Nauchnaia zhizn” [Scientific Life], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 2 (February 1959), p. 147; R. Grigor’iants, “Nauchnaia zhizn,” *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 2 (February 1960), p. 155; and “Khronika,” *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 2 (February 1959), p. 151.

<sup>49</sup> “XXII s’ezd KPSS i zadachi dal’neishego izucheniia problem mirovogo razvitiia” [The Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU and the Tasks of Further Studying the Problems of World Development], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 3 (March 1962), p. 6.

For other examples of the use of *mezhdunarodnik* to signify a specialist, see V. Granov, “Mezhdunarodnaia tema v populiarnoi literature” [The International Theme in Popular Literature], *Kommunist*, No. 2 (January 1961), p. 122 and N. Palgunov, “Bibliotekha vneshnei politiki SSSR” [The Little Library of the Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 5 (May 1963), p. 151.

*Mezhdunarodnik* continues, however, to refer to propagandists as well.

<sup>50</sup> AN IMEMO, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*. . . , Vol. 1, p. xxvi.

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Even more important, international relations in 1961-62 began to be described publicly as a "young science arising 'at the intersection' of a number of social sciences,"<sup>51</sup> with its boundaries demarcated. In a manner highly reminiscent of Quincy Wright, who describes international relations as a synthetic discipline drawing on the insights of eight already recognized disciplines,<sup>52</sup> the introduction to *International Relations Since World War II* (published in 1962) defined international relations in the following manner: "*the aggregate of economic, political, ideological, legal, diplomatic, military ties and inter-relations between peoples, between states and systems of states, between the basic social, economic and political forces and organizations acting in the world arena.*"<sup>53</sup>

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> This point, as Soviet observers would say, is not merely of theoretical interest. There is evidence which seems persuasive that members of the international law fraternity fought against giving recognition to international relations as a discipline presumably because it would downgrade the place of international law—and international lawyers. One major piece of evidence pertains to an extended attack by G. I. Morozov, *Organizatsiia ob"edinennykh natsii* [The United Nations Organization] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1962), on those Western specialists like Wright who speak of international relations as a synthetic discipline. The term international relations, Morozov declared, is "by no means adequate . . . [for adoption] in the Soviet Union" (p. 56). Morozov, moreover, was particularly exercised by the fact that in Wright's enumeration the study of international organization and international law are way down on the list (*ibid.*, p. 57), and argued that international law properly understood can deal with all the range of issues incorporated in Western conceptions of international relations (*ibid.*, p. 58). In the light of the definitions advanced by Inozemtsev and subsequently by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, one may assume that the developments being described in the present chapter were the brunt of Morozov's complaint. See, too, a similar attack addressed largely to Hans Morgenthau, by D. B. Levin, *Diplomatiia* [Diplomacy] (Moscow: Sotsekiz, 1962), pp. 45-46.

<sup>53</sup> AN IMEMO. *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* . . . , Vol. 1, p. xxvi.

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Other indications of a developing discipline could be seen in the improved technical competence evinced by the writings of Soviet international relations specialists. The minimal prerequisites of informational sources not available in 1956 were created. There was extensive diversification of subject matter. Many of the most glaring "memory holes" were filled in. Knowledge of Western materials and techniques advanced. The vilification of Western scholars, an atavistic residue of the heavy irony of Bolshevik polemics, tapered off somewhat, and the resort to vicious *ad hominem* arguments were less frequent.

Before 1956 a Soviet citizen, unless he was among those privileged to have access to Western sources, interested in engaging in international relations research, would have been confronted by insuperable obstacles (even allowing for the limitations of a totalitarian environment) by virtue of the absence of the most rudimentary source books. By the early sixties the absence of "the material bases" for research had been largely overcome. Factual information—to be sure, often still mendaciously selected and distorted—covering the gamut

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A year earlier, at the time of the Twenty-second Congress, N. N. Inozemtsev, deputy director of the Institute and editor-in-chief of the textbook, utilized a somewhat different formulation: "International relations represent the aggregate of the economic, legal, ideological and military contacts and ties between classes and nations in the world arena, between states and systems of states, between the main economic formations and their alliances, between the most influential political forces and organizations." ("Results and Prospects of the Development of International Relations," *International Affairs*, No. 11 [November 1961], p. 15.) Although in each instance the passage was followed by an assertion that "*class relations* play the cardinal, determining role . . ." (italics in original), the 1962 wording appears to have the effect of playing down the emphasis on class relationships.

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of international relations was now available from a number of sources. Yearbooks<sup>54</sup> covering world events became routine. The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (as of 1964 on a quarterly basis) published reviews of the international scene and statistical reports on the economies of nonsocialist countries. Documentary collections (especially two promising series, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i v nachale XX veka* [The Foreign Policy of Russia in the 19th and Beginning of the 20th Century] and *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR* [Documents of the Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.]) multiplied, and major treaties and United Nations resolutions were reproduced in Soviet journals and press with fair regularity. International front organizations, international economic organizations, the Organization of American States, and the United States Congress were just a few of the institutions for which there were available book-length accounts which provided descriptions of the historical background and the formal framework of the institution.<sup>55</sup> In 1961 a bibliog-

<sup>54</sup> Yearbooks include the *Ezhegodnik bol'shoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii* [Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR); AN IMEMO, *Mezhdunarodnyi politiko-ekonomicheskoi ezhegodnik* [International Politico-Economic Yearbook] (Moscow: Gospolitizdat) (the 1962 and subsequent versions have a minor title change, *Mezhdunarodnyi ezhegodnik: politika i ekonomika*); and *Sovetskii ezhegodnik mezhdunarodnogo prava* [The Soviet Yearbook of International Law] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR).

<sup>55</sup> For the institutions cited in the text see N. N. Ul'ianova, *Mezhdunarodnye demokraticheskie organizatsii* [International Democratic Organizations] (Kiev: Izdatel'stvo AN UkrSSR, 1956); *Mezhdunarodnye ekonomicheskije organizatsii* [International Economic Organizations] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1960); B. I. Gvozdev, *Organizatsiia amerikanskikh gosudarstv* [The Organization of American States] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1960); and Anatoly Gromyko, *Kongress SShA: Vybory, organizatsiia, polnomochiia* [The Congress of the U.S.A.: Elections, Organization, Powers] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1957).



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raphy of Soviet international relations writings<sup>56</sup> listed at least one book dealing with all the countries of Europe (except Yugoslavia!) and North America, most of the then existing nations of Africa and Asia, and half those of Latin America. Two fairly comprehensive bibliographies were published<sup>57</sup> and newly revised and updated editions of the *Politicheskii slovar'* and *Diplomaticeskii slovar'* were issued. Moreover, the bibliographies appended to a number of books, especially the multi-tomed "generalizing" works, were, by previous Soviet standards, quite impressive.<sup>58</sup>

In addition to the readier accessibility of raw, unadorned, pedestrian facts, extensive diversification of subject matter—suggested by several items in the preceding paragraph—occurred. Matters that before had been either left entirely to the leadership or perhaps touched on in pamphleteering, became in the early 1960s subject to considerable scrutiny by scholars. The increasingly public demonstration of technical sophistication and specificity with regard to the consequences of a third world war was a striking example. The amount of published materials dealing with relations among socialist countries, especially economic relations among Eastern European countries participating in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, was much larger. The United Nations was another area.<sup>59</sup> There were book-length studies (often surprisingly

<sup>56</sup> V. N. Egorov, comp., *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* [International Relations] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1961).

<sup>57</sup> V. N. Durdenevskii, *Sovetskaia literatura po mezhdunarodnomu pravu* [Soviet Literature on International Law] (Moscow: Gosizrizdat, 1959); and Egorov, comp.

<sup>58</sup> For example, AN IMEMO, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, Vol. 1, pp. 711-33 and Vol. 11, pp. 694-712; and V. A. Zorin et al., *Istoriia diplomatii* [History of Diplomacy], Vol. 1 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1959), pp. 824-65.

<sup>59</sup> See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Selected Bibliography of Soviet Works

knowledgeable, others rather dismal) of the International Labor Organization, the International Court of Justice, the International Atomic Energy Association, UNESCO, and the Food and Agricultural Organization—as well as the veto and collective security.<sup>60</sup>

The filling in of the most glaring Orwellian memory holes is amply illustrated by the striking contrast provided by two volumes dealing with international relations in the 1945-59 period, the first published in 1958 and edited by a notorious Stalinist, G. A. Deborin,<sup>61</sup> the second the aforementioned 1962 textbook. Alexander Dallin has described the first book as

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on the United Nations, 1946-1959," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LIV, No. 4 (December 1960), pp. 985-91.

<sup>60</sup> S. A. Ivanov, *Mezhdunarodnaia organizatsiia truda i profsoiuznoe pravo v kapitalicheskikh stranakh* [The International Labor Organization and Trade Union Rights in Capitalist Countries] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1959); S. B. Krylov, *Mezhdunarodnyi sud organizatsii ob"edinennykh natsii* [The International Court of the United Nations] (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1958); V. Lorin, *Mezhdunarodnoe agentstvo po atomnoi energii* [International Atomic Energy Agency] (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1957); M. Negin, *Organizatsiia ob"edinennykh natsii po voprosam prosveshcheniia, nauki i kultury* [The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1959); I. Ornatskii and M. Pan'nikov, *FAO—organizatsiia ob"edinennykh natsii po voprosam prodovol'stviia i sel'skogo khoziaistva* [FAO—The United Nations Organization for Food and Agriculture] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1959); N. A. Ushakov, *Printsip edinoglasiiia velikikh derzhav v organizatsii ob"edinennykh natsii* [The Principle of Unanimity of Great Powers in the United Nations] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1956); and V. K. Sobakin, *Kollektivnaia bezopasnost'—garantiia mirnogo sosushchestvovaniia* [Collective Security—a Guarantee of Peaceful Coexistence] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1962).

<sup>61</sup> G. A. Deborin, ed., *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia i vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1945-1949gg.* [International Relations and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1945-1949] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1958).

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"blatantly mendacious. . . . It contains nothing on the Stalin-Tito split, on Soviet demands on Turkey, or on the Soviet-Iranian crisis. It describes the Nazis in their attack on the U.S.S.R. as a tool of American imperialists and landlords, and Point Four as a form of American aggression."<sup>62</sup>

On the other hand, the later volume (published after the attacks on Stalin at the Twenty-second Party Congress) took a different tack. In the Stalin-Tito dispute the 1962 textbook apportioned blame about equally to Stalin and Yugoslavia (Tito was not once mentioned by name in the book) for the split and for relations between 1949 and 1953.<sup>63</sup> Apropos of Turkey, it acknowledged that, while there were "well-founded considerations and motives" (including the Soviet Union's "legitimate anxiety" for its security in the Black Sea) underlying Soviet relations with Turkey, there had also been "mistaken diplomatic actions, a result of the cult of Stalin," of which "a large share of the responsibility rests with Molotov." "The worsening of Soviet-Turkish relations," the authors observed, "was provoked by the proposal to re-examine the regime of the Black Sea straits concluded at Montreux in 1936." The advancement by Georgia and Armenia of territorial pretensions "inflamed the atmosphere," they added; "this was used by Turkish reactionary circles and foreign imperialism to intensify anti-Soviet and anti-Communist hysteria, for inducing Turkey into the military bloc headed by the U.S.A. under

<sup>62</sup> Alexander Dallin, "Recent Soviet Historiography," in Abraham Brumberg, ed., *Russia Under Khrushchev* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 487n.

<sup>63</sup> AN IMEMO, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* . . . , Vol. 1, pp. 103-104, 139-40. The Soviet Union's "consistent and persistent struggle" for the "just demands of Yugoslavia" in the Trieste issue was asserted on p. 514.

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the pretext [sic] of obtaining [Turkey's] security."<sup>64</sup> Again, the Soviet-Iranian crisis was by no means completely passed over. Instead, the volume contained a moderately detailed account which mentioned: the raising "in the UN of the question of 'Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iran'"; the withdrawal of Soviet troops; "the rout of the democratic forces"; the rupture in trade relations, "from 24% of the Iranian trade turnover in 1945-46 to 0.8% in 1948-49."<sup>65</sup> Remarks made by then Sen. Harry S Truman and by Sumner Welles before the United States entered the war were cited to show that "the genuine goals of the bourgeoisie" were to have "the Soviet Union and Germany bleed each other white in order to create suitable conditions for the domination by American and English imperialists."<sup>66</sup> But the contention was no longer made that Hitler was acting as a lackey of the United States in starting the war. Finally, on Point Four the tone was somewhat modified. It was denied that the United States initiated the program for disinterested and humane reasons and asserted that the "facts show that American 'aid' to underdeveloped countries was accompanied by interference in their domestic and foreign policy, a violation of their sovereignty. Such 'aid' serves as a means of pressure based on the calculation that these countries would remain in the future economically dependent on imperialism and first of all on American monopolies."<sup>67</sup> However, Point Four was not specifically branded an act of American aggression.

Knowledge of Western sources and techniques also showed improvement. Major steps to provide translations of Western

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 255.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 257-59.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 372.

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scholarly writings were undertaken. This tendency was manifest primarily in the area of military and strategic policy.<sup>68</sup> William W. Kaufmann, ed., *National Security and Military Policy*; Klaus Knorr, *The War Potential of Nations*; Pierre Gallois, *Stratégie de l'âge nucléaire*; Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*; Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*; Maxwell Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*; and Robert Osgood, *Limited War*—were all translated into Russian.<sup>69</sup> A handful of books of first magnitude in areas

<sup>68</sup> The translation of Western strategic literature has not been without incident. It is a measure of the task involved in rearranging expectations among Soviet elites concerning Western attitudes that the translation of W. W. Kaufmann, *Military Policy and National Security*, was condemned in a Central Committee resolution of June 4, 1959 because it "might cause harm to the politico-ideological education of the workers." *Voprosy ideologicheskoi raboty* [Questions of Ideological Work], (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1961), p. 275. A partial translation of the resolution is contained in "Policy Documents," *Survey*, No. 41 (April 1962), p. 172.

The continuing nature of the struggle may be illustrated by the translation in toto of Bernard Brodie's *Strategy in the Missile Age*. While the introduction, as well as many other overt Soviet sources, mendaciously intimated that Brodie's study defended preventive war, anyone wishing to find out Brodie's views need only skip the introduction and simply read the accurate Russian translation.

That such artifices have been employed has been admirably demonstrated by the statement of an anonymous Czech literary figure in "The Art of Survival," *Survey*, No. 51 (April 1964) p. 82:

"In the case of 'questionable' Western literary works to be translated into Czech, the method of submitting them for approval with an introduction criticizing . . . the author's lack of ideological insight, has worked wonders. Especially when written and signed by notorious dogmatists, the forewords (nobody reads them anyway) have made it possible for works by Beckett or a William Blake or a Valéry to be translated and published. . . ."

<sup>69</sup> [W. W. Kaufmann, ed.], *Voennaia politika i natsional'naiia bezopasnost'* [Military Policy and National Security] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo

other than strategy were also translated, for example, A.J.P. Taylor's *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, as were a number of memoirs by participant observers. Reviews in *International Affairs*, *World Marxist Review*, and *Mirovaia ekonomika* contributed to publicizing the positions of Western specialists. Herman Kahn, John Herz, Amitai Etzioni, Ernst Haas, Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, and George Kennan<sup>70</sup> were among those reviewed. A few Soviet

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Inostranlit, 1958); Klaus Knorr, *Voennyi potentsial gosudarstv* [The War Potential of Nations] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960), introduction by A. N. Lagovskii; P. Gallois, *Strategiia v iadernyi vek* [Strategy in the Nuclear Age] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960), condensed translation with an introduction by N. A. Lomov; G. H. Kissinger, *Iadernoe oruzhie i vneshniaia politika* [Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Inostranlit 1959), condensed translation with an introduction by S. N. Krasil'nikov; B. Brodie [Brodie], *Strategiia v vek raketnogo oruzhiia* [Strategy in the Missile Age] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961), introduction by V. M. Mochalov; M. Teilor [Taylor], *Nenadexhnaia strategiia* [An Unreliable Strategy] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961), introduction by M. A. Mil'shtein; Robert E. Osgood, *Ogranichennaia voina* [Limited War] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960), intro. by V. V. Mochalov.

For further titles see the (unfortunately incomplete) appendix to the RAND translation of V. D. Sokolovskii, ed., *Voennaia strategiia* ("Appendix II: Western Military Works Available in the Soviet Union") in RAND, *Soviet Military Strategy*, pp. 530-33.

<sup>70</sup> See Iu. Sheinin's review of Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War*, in *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 5 (May 1962), pp. 147-52 and of *Thinking About the Unthinkable*, in *ibid.*, No. 1 (January 1963), pp. 141-44. Also: V. Pechorkin, "About Acceptable War," *International Affairs*, No. 3 (March 1963), pp. 20-25; Iu. Krasin and I. Kurbatkin, review of Herz's *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, in *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 5 (May 1960), pp. 143-46; I. Glagolev, review of Etzioni's *The Hard Way to Peace*, in *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 10 (October 1962), pp. 142-44; K. Vladin, review of Haas's *The Uniting of Europe*, in *International Affairs*, No. 1 (January 1959), pp. 133-35; Y. [Iu.] Fadin, "Philosophy of a Moribund World," *International Affairs*, No. 4 (April 1962), pp. 95-98, which reviews Schelling and Halperin's *Strategy and Arms Control*; G. Anatolyev [Anatol'ev] and B. Ma-

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specialists achieved a greater awareness of American materials while working at the United Nations, in Washington, or, as in the case of N. N. Iakovlev, studying in the United States.

All things considered, therefore, the improvement in the status of international relations studies in the Soviet Union was appreciable during the years 1956-62. But like rate-of-growth statistics expressed in percentages of a negligible base point, the impression becomes tarnished when other comparative criteria are interjected.

When contrasted with criteria other than the state of international relations studies before the Twentieth Party Congress, the technical competence of many Soviet specialists and their knowledge of Western sources left much to be desired. The grossest kinds of factual errors still appeared. It is problematic whether in the 1960s many Soviet specialists would have written, as the old ideological warhorse Professor P. N. Fedoseev did in 1957, that "after [Nicholas] Spykman other American sociologists came forward with arguments in favour of the ideology of force. Their number included John Dewey, James Burnham, Grayson Kirk, Harold Lasswell, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Hans [sic] Morgenthau, and many others"<sup>71</sup>—although as recently as 1965, according to one Soviet scholar, other Soviet specialists were still confusing Henry and Hans Morgenthau. On the other hand, to encounter a reference to "former Chief of Staff of the American army, General Z. [Zachary?] Taylor"<sup>72</sup> in a book whose au-

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rushkin, "Through the Distorting Glass: Review of Kennan's *The Decision to Intervene*," *International Affairs*, No. 1 (January 1959), pp. 104-105.

<sup>71</sup> P. Fedoseyev [Fedoseev], "Sociological Theories and the Foreign Policy of Imperialism," *International Affairs*, No. 3 (March 1957), p. 12.

<sup>72</sup> Boris Dmitriev [B. Piadyshev], *Pentagon i vneshniaia politika SShA* [The Pentagon and U.S. Foreign Policy] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1961), p. 155.

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thor otherwise demonstrated an acquaintance with American sources, is equally disconcerting. It would unfortunately be an all too simple matter to multiply these examples.<sup>73</sup>

At the level of methodological techniques, Soviet international relations lagged far behind other *Soviet* social sciences. One searches in vain, prior to 1962, for a public manifestation of efforts on the part of international relations specialists to bring to bear any device from among the panoply of mathematical approaches which have been applied by other social scientists. Soviet international relations studies at this juncture paled in contrast not only with Western interest in, for instance, game theory and communications theory, but even with that of other branches of Soviet social science. There was no indication that international relations specialists regarded electronic computers as a valid research aid, as did at least three Soviet scholars (Iu. G. Kosarev, E. V. Evreinov, and V. A. Ustinov) whose fields were ancient history. If there were counterparts in international relations to the mathematical marginalists, L. V. Kantorovich and V. V. Novozhilov, in Soviet economics, they did not reveal themselves publicly.

Moreover, the emergence of international relations as an area "at the intersections" of other social sciences involved certain costs. Along with the emergence of international re-

<sup>73</sup> Cf. the timid recognition by V. G. Trukhanovskii, editor-in-chief of *Voprosy istorii*, of the unpreparedness of Soviet historians:

"In American and English journals, articles appear in which the blunders of our historians are rather often noted. The cause of these blunders is first of all the insufficiently deep knowledge of the material by several authors. When inaccuracy is allowed, then our argument is turned against ourselves. We do not need 'strong words' in the struggle with our opponents. Strong argument is needed and we can have it since historical truth is on our side."

"Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie istorikov" [All-Union Meeting of Historians], *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2 (February 1963), p. 17.



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lations into a status of its own, it was, at the same time, increasingly "collectivized" and politicized. Collectivization was expressed in three ways. The specialists were brought together in Moscow, the "production center."<sup>74</sup> They were obliged to deal increasingly with present-day issues, with "topicality," and therefore publication, was determined by "state interests." Finally, strenuous efforts were made to increase the number of collectively authored works.

Almost by definition, these collectivizing tendencies were steps that permitted greater control. (In light of V. D. Sokolovskii's *Military Strategy* a caveat should be entered. Collective works will obviously stifle individual initiative; they may, however, be expressions of *institutional* initiative, i.e., pressure, directed to particular members of an elite. But they do not necessarily signify inferior quality.) Directing the scholar's purview away from obscure events and to present-day matters tended partly to deprive the specialists of one of the few weapons at their disposal for coping with the Party functionary—their expertise. (Their counterparts in the physical sciences had less difficulty; it is rather implausible, in our day and age, to envisage a generalist in the Party hierarchy challenging a physicist on the compatibility of his research with the theoretical foundations of Marxism-Leninism.) In practice, prior to 1963, there were only a few indications of any proclivity to self-assertiveness on the part of international relations specialists other than the not insignificant accomplishment of having secured recognition that interna-

<sup>74</sup> In 1961 *Kommunist* asserted that more than ninety per cent of the social science professors and doctors in the R.F.S.F.R. lived in Moscow or Leningrad. (N. Kaz'min, "Tesnee sviazat' s zhizn'iu prepodavanie obshchestvennykh nauk v vuzakh" [Link the Training of the Social Sciences in Higher Schools More Closely with Life], *Kommunist*, No. 6 [April 1961], p. 27.)

tional relations was a legitimate area of inquiry. Suggestive in this regard is the fact that *Mirovaia ekonomika* had only one editor-in-chief, Ia. S. Khavinson, during these years of publication. (At this writing, autumn 1967, Khavinson remains the editor of *Mirovaia ekonomika*.) Its editorial policy was rarely criticized, and never in the strident tones which oblige an editorial board to acknowledge "the principled criticism" of its critics. There were no articles published for which the editors were subsequently chastened publicly for their unwisdom. Only one article, by Eugene Varga, was published in which the editors felt constrained to enter the admonishment that "several assertions of the present article are the personal opinion of Academician E. S. Varga."<sup>75</sup>

There was one area, however, in which the editors of the international relations journals and the social science specialists do appear to have waged a holding action for a measure of uniqueness. The specialists apparently tried unsuccessfully<sup>76</sup> to maintain the patina of scholarship by avoid-

<sup>75</sup> "Teoreticheskie problemy . . .," p. 49. The fact that Varga was a politically rehabilitated octogenarian undoubtedly made it easier for him to express a minority view. For a brief discussion of his differences of opinion with his Soviet confrères (which involved the proper appraisal of the European Common Market) and the proximity of his views to those of the French Communist Party, see François Fejtö, *The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 140.

<sup>76</sup> *International Affairs*, an organ of the Society for the Dissemination of Political-Scientific Knowledge, suffered no worse than *Mirovaia ekonomika*, an Academy of Sciences journal. Beginning with the March 1960 issue, the editors of *International Affairs* began publishing a section "in aid" to the lecturer and propagandist (a section euphemistically described in the English language edition as "Facts & Figures"). As early as 1957 Ivashin and others complained that *International Affairs* did not publish "the best lectures." At that time, it was possible for the editors to rebuff these efforts.

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ing features characteristic of the consciously propagandistic journals (such as *Agitator*, *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie* [Political Self-education], etc.). The editors of *Mirovaia ekonomika* encountered efforts to redefine the purpose of the journal in a way which would bring it more in line with the mass journals. M. Liadov of the Moscow *oblast'* committee, gave clearest expression to this pressure to popularize when he "declared that the issuance of the journal *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* had fully justified itself. The journal was an academic publication, an organ of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, but nevertheless found its readers not only among scientific workers, but among propagandists, international affairs speakers, [and] lecturers. It is rather helpful in their lecture and propaganda work."<sup>77</sup>

Those, like Liadov, who saw *Mirovaia ekonomika* mainly as rendering a service to propagandists, emphasized the importance of having reviews of international developments and then, once the reviews were begun, of publishing them frequently.<sup>78</sup> A. A. Mishin of Moscow State University, on the

<sup>77</sup> "Khronika," *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 9 (September 1958), p. 151. The issue went to press August 19. At approximately the same time, interestingly, as the editors were holding a meeting with Moscow "readers" (July 4), the editors of *International Affairs* were meeting with their Leningrad "readers." ("Conference of Leningrad Readers," *ibid.*, No. 7 [July 1958], to press June 20. No exact date was given for the meeting "to discuss the issues of 1957 and the first part of 1958" [p. 127].) The meetings were held primarily to make known the Party's wish that more attention be paid to the underdeveloped countries, especially in Southeast Asia, and to the socialist countries.

<sup>78</sup> For documentation of the persistence of the propagandists (and professors in the peripheral cities) on the question of international reviews, see the statements by Liadov and P. P. Kolesnikov, in "Khronika," *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 9 (September 1959), pp. 151-52; the statements of V. A. Doguadze, S. I. Sadad, and K. N. Vaiser-

other hand, expressed a view undoubtedly more in harmony with that of the editors. The rapporteur noted that Mishin, "having pointed out that the journal had found its audiences," had reversed Liadov's description: "We use this journal not only as international affairs lecturers but also as people engaging in scholarly work. The journal is valuable not only for economists but for representatives of the juridical and other social sciences as well."<sup>79</sup> In view of these contrasting roles envisaged for the journal, the statement prefacing the publication of the first review of international events acquires an interesting connotation: "In connection with numerous requests by readers, the editors of the journal *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* contemplate carrying periodically international reviews. . . . The editors hope that such material can render assistance to lecturers, propagandists, and all who are interested in international relations."<sup>80</sup>

Similarly, to those with aspirations to maintain a minimal facade of scholarship, the Central Committee decree in May 1961, "on measures for improving the selection and preparation of propaganda cadres," must have come as a blow (if not a surprise). The central committee declared, *inter alia*, that "the editorial staffs of the scholarly journals, in the first place

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man in "Konferentsiia zhurnala 'Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia' v Tbilisi" [Conference of the Journal 'World Economy and International Relations' in Tbilisi], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 12 (December 1960), pp. 142-44; and those by A. I. Patalazhen, V. F. Brovkin, and D. K. Karmazin, "Obsuzhdeniia zhurnala 'Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia'" [Discussion of the Journal 'World Economy and International Relations'], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 8 (August 1962), p. 156.

<sup>79</sup> "Khronika," *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 9 (September 1958), p. 152.

<sup>80</sup> A. A. Galkin et al., "Tekushchie problemy mirovoi politiki (obzor)" [Current Problems of World Politics (A Review)], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 7 (July 1959), p. 3.

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*Questions of the History of the CPSU, Questions of History, Questions of Philosophy, Questions of Economics, and World Economy and International Relations*, must regularly publish a section in assistance to propagandists.”<sup>81</sup> For the editors of *Mirovaia ekonomika* the Central Committee ukaz only re-affirmed the Party hierarchy’s position asserted by local Party functionaries, that an academic journal’s *raison d’être* was largely to provide materials for propagandist *aktiv*. In fact, *Mirovaia ekonomika* had already begun providing such features. A section for answers to readers’ questions became a regular feature with the No. 10 (October) issue of 1958 (a month after the meeting with Moscow “readers” had been reported). By 1962 what would be called in the United States a “man in the news” section (“People and Politics”) had been introduced and the international reviews were being published on a quarterly basis. (The latter, moreover, were generally written by *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* commentators rather than Institute researchers.) One probable (and important) reason the institute members were reluctant to produce reviews on a quarterly basis is suggested by the first words of the first quarterly review: “Three months is a very short time.”<sup>82</sup>

Under these circumstances it was not surprising that even from the regime’s standpoint, cadre recruitment, as in 1956, continued to be unsatisfactory. Indeed, judging by Boris Ponomarev’s December 1962 speech to Soviet historians, the

<sup>81</sup> “O merakh po uluchsheniiu podbora i podgotovki propagandistskikh kadrov” [Concerning Measures for the Improvement of Selection and Preparation of Propaganda Cadres], *Partinaiia zhizn’* [Party Life], No. 10 (May 1961), p. 33.

<sup>82</sup> V. A. Matveev, V. N. Nekrasov, and E. M. Primakov, “Tekushchie problemy mirovoi politiki” [Current Problems of World Politics], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 4 (April 1962), pp. 57-74.

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situation had reached crisis proportions.<sup>83</sup> Evidently few intelligent Soviet youths were choosing careers in the social sciences, and particularly international relations—whether as scholar, diplomat, or correspondent—in preference to the safer, freer, more apolitical climes of the physical sciences. Ironically this pattern, moreover, is one which the Party actually encouraged, since the physical sciences promise more immediate payoff to the regime. According to Ponomarev's figures, no candidates' dissertations<sup>84</sup> were submitted in 1956, 1957, 1959, or 1960 that dealt with Latin American history; three were submitted in 1958 and one in 1961. "For almost seven years," he observed, "not one specialist on the history of Cuba has graduated from aspirant status."

"Soviet Africanists are making only the first steps," he continued. "We have definitely not prepared enough specialists on the history . . . of the countries of northern Europe." In Ponomarev's view, the situation was especially troublesome with respect to "the history of socialist countries, especially in the peoples' democratic phase," for here, "we cannot even observe a tendency toward growth. On the contrary, the quantity of dissertations has contracted. In 1957 three were defended; in 1958, three; in 1959, two; in 1961, two; in 1962, one." Small wonder, therefore, that Ponomarev was concerned whether "the training of specialists is sufficient even to provide regular replacement of old personnel."

Thus, up to 1962, the need in the nuclear age for more sophisticated published analysis of international affairs seems to have taken a back seat to domestic propaganda considerations. Although Khrushchev was much more willing to listen to

<sup>83</sup> Ponomarev, "Zadachi istoricheskoi nauki . . .," pp. 21-22.

<sup>84</sup> Very roughly speaking, the Russian candidate's degree requires less work than the American doctorate, the Russian doctorate more.

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advice than Stalin was, and although he seemed to have some notion that several persons might possess insight, he was probably less disposed to recognize others' claims to expertise in international relations than perhaps in any other field except agriculture. In many facets of international relations, the role—or at least the public posture—of the specialist in the Institute as policy adviser and scholar continued to be secondary to his role as mobilizer, propagandist, and apologist.

### THE NEW RESPECTABILITY: 1963-1967

IN THE last year or two of the Khrushchev tenure in power however, developments at two levels, within the political leadership and among the specialists, suggested that the prospects for technically sophisticated research in areas of high political priority to the regime might be greater than indicated by experience prior to 1963.

From within the ruling group came calls for greater attention to methodology and theory by international relations specialists. The most direct evidence was contained in Leonid Il'ichev's speech in October 1963 to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences.<sup>85</sup> In that speech, Il'ichev characterized "attention to methodological questions as a symbol of progress in Soviet science" and adverted specifically to the recent development in the Soviet Union, *inter alia*, "of international relations theory." More detailed analysis, he contended, was called for in such "specific spheres of politics" as "class relations among us and abroad, bourgeois parties, the communist and worker's movements, and also democratic movements, public opinion, propaganda. . . ." Finally, in language reminiscent of a controversy settled in American political science

<sup>85</sup> "Metodologicheskie problemy estestvoznaniia i obshchestvennykh nauk," pp. 3-46.

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a generation ago, he expressed his dissatisfaction with traditional modes of analysis of the state and international relations. The state, he asserted, needed further study, "not on the plane of constitutional and administrative norms, as it is studied by legal science but on the plane of its real activities." International relations, he continued, needed to be examined "not as the historians do, but on the plane of the burning vital questions of the day."

There are possibly two reasons for the interest shown within the ruling group in greater sophistication on the part of Soviet international relations specialists. One relates to the growing tendency by Khrushchev and some other members of the ruling group to regard Leninism as irrelevant to international politics in the atomic age. That development is treated elsewhere in this book.<sup>86</sup> What warrants emphasis here is that, having concluded that the Leninist unity of theory and practice had been severed, presumably forever, these alleged defenders of the faith appear to have been increasingly attracted to the potential political payoffs to be achieved by encouraging the specialists below the top echelons of the Party to engage in rigorous analysis—without great concern for doctrinal considerations—of such "burning, vital questions of the day" as the foreign policy consequences of the internal political process in nonsocialist states, Western integration, and war and peace.

They may have been encouraged in this inclination by a sense that the work of American specialists (especially with respect to strategic doctrine and perhaps operations research) had been a factor in enhancing the effectiveness of American foreign policy, the success of which was in marked contrast

<sup>86</sup> See below, pp. 133-35.



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to the succession of foreign policy setbacks suffered by the Soviet regime.<sup>87</sup>

Moreover, especially in strategic matters, domestic political considerations probably figured in the calculation. One distinctive feature of the strategy dialogue in the Soviet Union in the last years of Khrushchev's tenure was that it was carried on within the military and between the military specialists and the political generalists.<sup>88</sup> This being a situation no leader concerned with his power position would find satisfactory for long, Khrushchev (despite his reluctance to acknowledge expertise to others in the area of international relations) may have encouraged the development of strategic expertise to prevent himself from becoming captive to the expertise of military strategists whose preoccupation was with waging war rather than with deterrence.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>87</sup> For the modest evidence in this regard see in particular G. Gerasimov, "War Savants Play Games," *International Affairs*, No. 7 (July 1964), pp. 77-82; AN IMEMO, *Dvizhushchie sily vneshnei politiki SShA* [Moving Forces of U.S. Foreign Policy] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1965), p. 3; and I. Lemin, "Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i mirovaia politika" [The Great October Revolution and World Politics], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 6 (June 1967), p. 10.

<sup>88</sup> Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads*, passim.

<sup>89</sup> In the last years of the Khrushchev term in power there was growing evidence of strategically relevant commentary by a few non-military figures. See for instance N. M. Nikol'skii, *Osnovnoi vopros sovremennosti* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1964); Iu. Sheinin's *Nauka i militarizm v SShA*, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1963), as well as Gerasimov, "War Savants . . .," pp. 77-83.

At the same time, inasmuch as the 1962 international relations textbook explicitly recognized that strategists had a contribution to make in the study of international relations, it is possible that ultimately an interplay between nonmilitary and military strategists within the Soviet Union may set off a dialogue in which keener insights into questions of war and peace may emerge. By October 1964, however, there were almost no signs of even a mechanism for such a dialogue.

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There were also important developments among the specialists. In early 1963 a "forum for economists and international relations specialists" was introduced as a regular feature of *Mirovaia ekonomika*. Its establishment had the effect of symbolizing a parity between economics and international relations and of reasserting a degree of differentiation between the explicitly propagandistic journals and a journal of an institute of the Academy of Sciences. More importantly, with its creation, specialists for the first time had a vehicle in which the expression of innovative views was encouraged and in which the risk of boldness to authors raising controversial issues was considerably reduced. Because the forum articles were published on the author's responsibility, the editorial board of *Mirovaia ekonomika* felt less constrained to rebuke an author or pressure him to engage in self-criticism—even when, as at the very outset, an author published a clearly revisionist statement that produced an intense reaction from old, Stalinist political economists and Arab emigré communists.<sup>90</sup>

In 1963 there were transparent efforts to indicate the emergence of a younger generation of Soviet scholars, all considerably less cowed by dogma than the Arzumanians and the Vargass, and all in 1963 under 40. The device was a simple

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For a rare example of collaboration between a military and a non-military specialist see I. Glagolev and V. Larionov "Soviet Defence Might and Peaceful Coexistence," *International Affairs*, No. 11 (November 1963), pp. 27-33.

<sup>90</sup> G. Mirskii, "Tvorcheskii Marksizm i problemy natsional'no-osvoboditel'nykh revoliutsii" [Creative Marxism and the Problems of the National-Liberation Revolutions], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 2 (February 1963), pp. 63-68. For a Western account see Uri Ra'anani, "Moscow and the Third World," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. xiv, No. 1 (January-February 1965), pp. 1-10.

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one: the editors merely indicated the birthdates of the younger contributors to the forum—G. Mirskii had been born in 1926; V. Kiselev, 1924; V. Terekhov, 1928; and V. Shastitko, 1924.

The last two years of Khrushchev's regime witnessed the appearance, actually for the first time, of a few works by specialists which were distinguished by markedly greater sophistication than that revealed in statements of political generalists. Substantive innovations, including statements directly and explicitly contravening *doctrinal* positions, appeared in the specialized international relations literature. Thus Mirskii,<sup>91</sup> in an article published in early 1963, significantly entitled "Creative Marxism [*not* creative Marxism-Leninism] and the Problems of National Liberation Revolutions," attempted to circumvent the impediments of class analysis *and* the dichotomic world-view<sup>92</sup> to the analysis of elite recruitment by calling for study of "the social elements of societies which do not go into the concept 'bourgeoisie' but in many cases play an enormous or even leading role, namely the intelligentsia and the army." Similarly indicative of efforts to reformulate a major problem in the study of international relations was a book by M. N. Nikol'skii, which, drawing on the American scholar Klaus Knorr's concept of the disposable surplus for war as a measure of a state's power in international relations, advanced the sensible suggestion that in the nuclear age Soviet power potential be calculated in terms of "*peace potential*";<sup>93</sup>

<sup>91</sup> Mirskii, "Tvorcheskii Marksizm. . . ."

<sup>92</sup> The Khrushchevian division of American ruling circles into "men of reason" and "madmen" suggests an effort to circumvent a class analysis of American politics; significantly, however, the *division* is still dichotomic in character.

<sup>93</sup> N. M. Nikol'skii, *Osnovnoi vopros sovremennosti*, p. 269, italics in original.

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i.e., be evaluated in terms of deterrent, rather than war-waging, capability. Another radical—and controversial—departure from conventional Soviet thinking first articulated in the specialized international relations literature<sup>94</sup> involved the explicit repudiation of the famous Clausewitzian dictum and core element in Leninism, that war is the continuation of politics via other means.

Perhaps equally significantly, lengthy studies related to politically sensitive topics could be published in which, for purposes of legitimation, only token deference was tendered the writings of the founders of Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, as V. I. Kaplan's *The U. S. in the War and Post-War Years* vividly illustrates,<sup>95</sup> a lengthy study could be published (and favorably reviewed) which virtually ignored Lenin, Marx, and Engels. Kaplan's book, for instance, contains 1,585 footnotes; of these, there was one reference to Lenin, one to Marx alone, and one to Marx and Engels. There were, to be sure, several references to the Twenty-second C.P.S.U. Congress and to Khrushchev, although the latter, appropriately, were largely related to his visit to the U.S.

It was also evident that in the last years of Khrushchev's tenure certain Western approaches hitherto conspicuously avoided by Soviet specialists had been legitimated. In the summer 1963, for instance, there were hints in the specialized journals that interest group analysis had become a tolerated analytical tool. One S. Epstein, writing in *Mirovaia ekonomika*, reviewed favorably a Polish political scientist's (Stan-

<sup>94</sup> V. Gantman et al., "Tekushchie problemy mirovoi politiki," *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 1 (January 1963), pp. 3-23.

<sup>95</sup> V. I. Lan [Kaplan], *SShA v voennye i poslevoennye gody* [The U.S. in the War and Postwar Years] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1964).

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lislaw Ehrlich's) study of pressure groups, *Grupy Nacisku*.<sup>96</sup> A brief note appeared in *International Affairs*, which acknowledged the existence of lobbies other than ones "operated by Big Business." "Trade unions, churches, and other organizations, including the AFL-CIO, the National Farmers' Union, the American Medical Association," the author of the note informed his readers, "have their own lobbies."<sup>97</sup> Confirmation of the hypothesis that interest group analysis had become permissible came in the winter of 1963-64 with the publication of *Parties in the System of the Dictatorship of the Monopolies*. In the words of the authors, the study treats "the role of foreign parties, employers' unions and societies, and also other pressure groups as instruments of the subordination of the state mechanism to control by the monopolies."<sup>98</sup> Similarly, in July 1964 an article appeared in *International Affairs*, which demonstrated an awareness that game theory might be used by "peace-loving forces" as well as "militarists." The purpose of the article, its author, G. Gerasimov, asserted, was "not to put . . . game theory in the dock." "If anything," he stated, "I think, it [should] . . . be defended against mutilation by the militarists."<sup>99</sup>

Thus Khrushchev's waning months seemed to hold forth the possibility of an era in Soviet social science in which there would be a genuine possibility of technically sophisticated

<sup>96</sup> "Gruppy davleniia," *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 8 (August 1963), pp. 150-51. Ehrlich, it might be noted, argued that pressure-group analysis can be applied to socialist countries, a fact omitted by Epstein.

<sup>97</sup> G. Yevgenyev [Evgenyev], "Lobbying in the U.S.A.," *International Affairs*, No. 6 (June 1963), pp. 93-94.

<sup>98</sup> AN SSSR, Institut Gosudarstva i Prava, *Partii v sisteme diktatury monopolii* [Parties in the System of Monopoly Dictatorship] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1964), p. 3.

<sup>99</sup> Gerasimov, "War Savants . . .," pp. 77-82, at p. 81.

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international relations research involving short- and middle-range theorizing on topics of immediate policy relevance to the political leadership. This is not to suggest the likelihood of the kind of abstract theorizing undertaken by Morton Kaplan in *System and Process in International Politics*; abstract theorizing would seem highly unlikely. Whether from the perspective of a few years hence these developments will be viewed as harbinging a new era or as merely an idiosyncratic phenomenon—a product perhaps of the post-Cuban missile crisis atmosphere in the Soviet Union and the dissensus within the Soviet ruling group—is unclear now.

In general, the present ruling group has shown itself to be less inclined than Khrushchev to permit ideology to encumber the specialists' analysis—perhaps best exemplified by the disgrace of Trofim Lysenko and the concomitant rehabilitation of classical genetics—and more prone to tolerate the depoliticization of scholarly inquiry. Such evidence as does exist suggests that for some influential personages, interest in taking politics out of science extends even to the science of politics. Indeed, a remarkable article by Feodor Burlatskii in *Pravda* in early 1965 encouraged specialists in politics, domestic and international, to engage in the kind of lively and sophisticated dialogue that has characterized Soviet economics in recent years.<sup>100</sup> On the other hand, in practice, the new ruling group, out of external and presumably internal considerations, severely circumscribed the specialists' opportunity during the first 18 months after Khrushchev's ouster to comment publicly on two important substantive topics—military strategy<sup>101</sup> and international communist developments. Can-

<sup>100</sup> *Pravda*, January 10, 1965.

<sup>101</sup> This appears only to have been a temporary phenomenon. See V. Larionov, "Razvitie sredstv vooruzheniia i strategicheskie kontseptsii

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dor about developments within the camp had been conspicuous by its absence throughout the Khrushchev years, as well, and was therefore largely a continuation of previous practice. In military matters, however, there had been evidence of the beginnings of a civilian literature on strategic matters.

In addition, many of the doctrinal innovations concerning international relations intimately associated with the Khrushchev regime have been quietly abandoned, effectively reformulated, or publicly attacked, particularly after September 1965, by members of the new ruling group or representatives of powerful Soviet sub-elites. There have been attacks by name on persons (specifically Nikol'skii and Nikolai Talenskii)<sup>102</sup> who gave vent to many of the novel insights of the last years of Khrushchev's tenure in office. All of this has presumably served to dampen specialists' interest in innovating.

Certainly it has been the case that the three years following Khrushchev's ouster have not seen the degree of promising creativity in evidence during 1963-64. Of the innovative materials that have appeared, a number were completed soon after Khrushchev's removal and must properly be construed as a direct outgrowth of projects undertaken during his years as premier. Such was the case, for instance, of several Soviet analyses of American foreign policy, all of which were noteworthy for their balanced and relatively nonideological treatment of American foreign policy behavior. One of these studies drew heavily (plagiarized might be the more candid

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SShA" [The Development of the Means of Armament and U.S. Strategic Concepts], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 6 (June 1966), pp. 74-81.

<sup>102</sup> See the articles by Col. I. Grudinin in *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 21, 1966, and Col. E. Rybkin in *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, cited in English translation in Roman Kolkowicz, "The Red 'Hawks' on the Rationality of Nuclear War," Memorandum RM 4899 PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, March 1966), p. 46.

term) from the writings of Stanley Hoffmann, and another was significant for the attention (previously unnoted in Soviet commentary) it showed to public opinion as a variable shaping American foreign policy.<sup>103</sup>

At the same time, it has not been the case that, even discounting those works properly assigned to Khrushchev's time, the years since Khrushchev have been ones of inactivity among those in the Soviet Union concerned with international relations. In mid-1966, for instance, Gerasimov published the clearest exposition of game theory and its potential relevance to the study of international relations yet to appear in the Soviet literature.<sup>104</sup> Of equal significance was the fact that certain topics and doctrines which previously had been denied the specialists' purview began to be analyzed. The Stalinist definition of nationalism, which throughout the whole de-Stalinization process in the Khrushchev years went almost unchallenged, underwent a major reappraisal by Soviet historians during 1966,<sup>105</sup> the strenuous efforts of other Soviet his-

<sup>103</sup> For the former see AN IMEMO, *Dvizhushchie sily*. . . . Public opinion is stressed in E. I. Popova's dissertation published in 1966, *SShA: bor'ba po voprosam vneshnei politiki* [The USA: The Struggle Over Questions of Foreign Policy] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1966).

<sup>104</sup> "Teoriia igr i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia" [The Theory of Games and International Relations], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 7 (July 1966), pp. 101-108.

<sup>105</sup> See, in particular, the articles by P. M. Rogachev and M. A. Sverdlin, "O poniatii 'natsiia'" [Concerning the Concept 'Nation'], *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1 (January 1966), pp. 33-48; R. F. Vinokurova, "Obsuzhdenie stat'i P. M. Rogacheva i M. A. Sverdlina 'o poniatii natsiia'" [A Discussion of the Article by P. M. Rogachev and M. A. Sverdlin, "Concerning the Concept 'Nation'"], *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2 (February 1966), pp. 169-71; and S. T. Kaltakhchian, "K voprosu o poniatii 'natsiia'" [On the Question of the Concept 'Nation'], *Voprosy istorii*, No. 6 (June 1966), pp. 211-43. Of particular interest is Kal-



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torians to avert such a reappraisal notwithstanding. Moreover, in the fall of 1966 there were indications of a new candor in Soviet commentary about relations among socialist states. For the first time, an article was published that disabused Soviet readers of the notion—long a part of the conventional belief—that the communist system of states was something more than an international system.<sup>106</sup> As a result, it may yet prove possible for Soviet specialists to treat relations among communist states as a legitimate area of scrutiny; ultimately it may even be possible for Soviet specialists to redress what a Czech historian has characterized as the “paradoxical situation” wherein “the socialist countries [have] fallen behind . . . the Western world in the study of . . . the socialist system.”<sup>107</sup>

From an institutional perspective, the most notable event was the appointment in 1966 (to succeed the deceased A. A.

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takhchian's resounding declaration (in response to the efforts of one S. D. Iakubuskaia to restrict the scope of the reexamination) in favor of “free discussion.” (Vinokovura, p. 170.) For a thorough Western account see Grey Hodnett, “What's in a Nation,” *Problems of Communism*, Vol. xvi, No. 5 (September-October 1967), pp. 2-16.

<sup>106</sup> A. Butenko, “O zakonomernostiakh razvitiia sotsializma kak obshchestvennogo stroia i kak mirovoi sistemy” [Concerning the Law-governed Development of Socialism as a Social System and as a World System], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 11 (November 1966), pp. 84-91. Also “Problemy razvitiia mirovoi sotsialisticheskoi sistemy” [Problems of the Development of a World Socialist System], *Vestnik*, No. 11 (November 1966), pp. 86-89. The appearance of such articles should be read in the context of Soviet-Rumanian relations. For a vigorous traditionalist rejoinder to Butenko's article see M. Savov and E. Bondarenko “Spornaia tochka zreniia” [Debatable Viewpoint], *Mirovaia ekonomika*, No. 6 (June 1967), pp. 117-120. Savov is identified as a Bulgarian.

<sup>107</sup> V. Kotyk, “The Problem of Historical Research on the World Socialist System,” *Ceskoslovensky Casopis Historicky*, No. 3, 1965, trans. in Radio Free Europe, Czechoslovak Press Survey No. 1,689 (244), p. 2.

Arzumian) of N. N. Inozemtsev as director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Perhaps more than any other Soviet specialist, Inozemtsev has advocated the recognition of international relations as a synthetic, but autonomous, discipline drawing on the insights of several narrower, specialized areas of inquiry. He has, in addition, specifically lamented the fact that international relations and related subjects were the "step-children" of the Soviet academic family.<sup>108</sup> Consequently, Inozemtsev's appointment acquired considerable symbolic significance. It served as a measure of the progressive evolution of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in the decade since 1956 away from an organization primarily composed of economists interested only tangentially in international relations, and toward an interdisciplinary center according equal weight to the study of noncommunist economics and the international market, on the one hand, and international relations, per se, on the other. It was moreover another indication of the legitimation of international relations as an area of specialist inquiry.

The appointment of Inozemtsev was followed by a lead editorial in *Mirovaia ekonomika* in mid-1967 which speaks of the tasks "before the social sciences, in particular the science of international relations," and asserts that "it goes without saying" that "the use of computers, the application of the 'theory of games,' the 'theory of probabilities' and other mathematical methods are fully expedient both in the sphere of foreign policy and in the science of international relations."<sup>109</sup>

For all the ambivalence of the record since October 1964 it

<sup>108</sup> *Pravda*, June 13, 1965. For a translation see *Current Digest*, Vol. xvii, No. 23 (June 23, 1965), pp. 14-15.

<sup>109</sup> Lemin, "Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia . . .," p. 10.

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would seem, therefore, that there continues to be interest in the Soviet Union within the ruling group, as well as among the specialists in the institutes in enhancing the study of international relations. Progress in such a politically sensitive area will naturally continue to be highly responsive to political flux, domestic and international; any projections thus must be tentative. Nevertheless, it is of considerable significance that the Soviet system has become sufficiently depoliticized that it is at least possible to speculate about a time when serious studies of international politics will issue forth from the Soviet Union with the blessing of the keepers of the faith. Were such a development to occur, the function of ideology in the Soviet system would have been radically transformed. Ideology would have ceased to be the language of analysis and become instead merely the rhetoric for legitimating a process whereby the ruling group would weigh divergent specialist appraisals—the latter being couched in terms particular to the specialists' narrow areas of inquiry. For the last years of Khrushchev's tenure in office and for the three years following his removal, however, such a prospect remained almost totally in the future. Thus, in the substantive analysis of Soviet international relations perspectives which follows, the focus has necessarily been directed to the overt declarations of both specialist and political generalist alike.